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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the 100 year old land dispute between the two ethnic communities of 
Nkonya and Alavanyo in the Volta region of Ghana, who have lived together for over 300 
years, and have engaged in intermarriages and other interactive social activities until the land 
dispute emerged and weakened the social relations between them. The disputed land, an area 
of 6,459.82 acres or 2,616.23 hectares is fertile for agrarian activities, rich in timber and 
alleged to have deposits of gold, clay and mercury. While on the surface the conflict is known 
to be a boundary dispute, in the real world, it is the ‘raiding’ of timber, court verdicts, ethnic 
politics, the reinventions of history, and the activities of ‘elite’ groups among other factors 
that constitute the major drivers of the dispute. 
In 1913, when the area was still under German control, a map was drawn by Hans 
Gruner, a German colonial carthographer, in the effort to settle the dispute but it did not. By 
1920, the British took over the area and also tried to solve the dispute but again, they failed. 
So the Nkonya, who have always claimed to be owners of the land on the basis of their first 
comer status, took the matter to court in 1953. From 1953 till 1980, all court rulings (five) 
based on the Gruner map have gone in favour of the Nkonya, giving them a legal victory, but 
not a social victory, i.e. their ability to own and use the land. Today, the major issues that 
continue to drive the conflict are issues of court verdicts, ethnicity, land security, local and 
state politics, economic interest in commercial trees, autochthony and first comer narratives 
among other factors. It is however, the power and agency of traditional authorities, elite 
groups, and youth groups to instrumentalise and politicise these drivers that is largely 
responsible for the insolubility of the land dispute.  
This study critically examines why interventions by colonial officials, traditional 
authorities and Mediation Committees since the 1970s to date have failed. Also, the study 
seeks to find out why over the years, the alignment and realignment of the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya to different state actors, political parties and their ethnic neighbours in the effort to 
have matters settled between them have remained unsuccessful. The study concludes that, 
given the failure of colonial officials, traditional efforts, legal verdicts and mediation 
committees to resolve the dispute, a broad-based process comprising of conflict resolution 
experts, the state and social scientists who should factor in the beliefs of the people about 
land, the role of chiefs, the elite, the youth, elders, women and other significant actors, offers 
a more sustaining trajectory for resolving the land dispute. 
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 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
“Land is not just earth, soil or economic property. Land is the genesis and the 
sustenance of life. Land is the ground of the relationship between humans and 
celestial beings, history, meaning and memory. To live is to have land, and to 
have lived well is to have had good relations with the land, ancestors and 
neighbours. This is the essence of life.” - From Elders of Alavanyo and Nkonya   
 
When I arrived on the field to start my research among the people of Nkonya and Alavanyo, 
my initial thought was that I was going to be dealing with a land dispute which is confined to 
two local communities. Soon, however, I realised that the general perception in the Ghanaian 
public domain of the land conflict between these two communities as a local matter, and of 
the two communities being intransigent and not malleable to any peace process was 
erroneous. The Nkonya-Alavanyo land conflict is not confined to the local level, but is 
enwrapped in regional, national and even global geo-political discourses and dimensions, as 
exemplified in the interventions of the Volta Regional Security Council (REGSEC), the Volta 
Regional House of Chiefs, the diaspora from the two communities, successive governments, 
national security services, and the UNDP. As I will later demonstrate, it was obvious to me 
then, as it is today, that the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute is a local-national palaver and any 
concerted effort to resolve the land conflict must also be approached from this local-national 
perspective.  
In all societies across the globe, land is unquestionably indispensable to human 
survival, and the appropriation of the land’s resources can bring cultural, social and economic 
benefits not only to local communities, but also to the state/nation (cf. Alao, 2008). Land 
unites people across generations and forms the basis of and gives meaning to an enduring 
sociality, economy, identity, culture and history among groups and individuals (cf. Lund and 
Boone, 2013; Kuba and Lentz, 2006). However, it is also true that land use practices can 
engender violence, hatred and enduring contestation and conflict between individuals and 
among groups if its resources are misappropriated, for example, by traditional authorities and 
youth groups. Land use practices are thus ambivalent in nature and engender a great deal of 
unpredictability, which in my view explains why in many parts of Africa land disputes often 
remain inconclusive and never seem to end (cf. Lund, 2008).  
In Ghana, chieftaincy and land disputes such as the one involving the Dagomba and 
the Konkomba, (Tsikata and Seini, 2004) or religious conflicts involving two Muslim groups, 
such as the Tijaniya and Al Sunna Muslims at Wenchi in the Brong Ahafo Region in 1990s 
 2 
 
(Ghanaian Times, 6/10/97 and 29/1/98) abound. But it seems that land disputes are by far the 
most violent and persistent especially when they are linked to chieftaincy and ethnic issues 
(cf. Berry, 2001; Crook, 2005; and Tonah, 2012). This fact is explainable on the grounds that 
in most Ghanaian societies land is not just an economic resource, but, importantly, it is also 
perceived as the basis of cosmology, power, history, identity, territorial control and the 
foundation of life itself. These are powerful collective and individual identity and symbolic 
representations which, when they are disputed by communities, families or individuals, tend 
to create or occasion a lot of hostility and violence.  
In many parts of Africa, not least Ghana, the connection between the construction of 
colonial boundaries and land conflicts has also been well articulated by many scholars (cf. 
Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Lentz, 2003). In the Volta Region of Ghana, the Nkonya-
Alavanyo land dispute is a conflict that was triggered by a colonial boundary map drawn in 
1913 by a German colonial carthographer, Hans Gruner. While the Gruner map was meant to 
settle the boundary issues between the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, it actually led to a major 
land dispute that is still ongoing today (Lilley, 1925; Dzathor, 1998; and Ampene, 2011).  
For Yakohene (in Darkwa et al, 2012) the colonial boundary argument that arose from 
the Gruner map indeed formed the genesis of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute. According 
to this author the persistence of the dispute is threatening human and food security in the two 
communities and the Ghanaian state, and therefore every effort should be made by locals, the 
government and other stakeholders, to end the conflict. Bening (1983), Austin (1963), and 
Nugent & Asiwaju (1996), on the other hand, locate the remote cause of the Nkonya-
Alavanyo land dispute in the drawing up of the Ghana-Togo boundary in the early colonial 
period. This new border generated many internal (interethnic, community and family) land 
disputes that the colonial authorities subsequently tried to address, but unsuccessfully (see 
also Brown, 1980). Today, the persistence of the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute continues to 
defy any form of resolution, thereby indicating that neither the Gruner map nor the Ghana-
Togo boundary succeeded in solving the land conflict.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Presently, what is actually driving the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute are compelling 
issues of court verdicts, ethnic issues, land security problems, local and state politics, an 
important economic interest in commercial trees, autochthony ideologies and first comer 
narratives. Traditional authorities, elite groups, and youth groups instrumentalise and 
politicise each of these drivers, and continue to abuse the moral economy of social relations 
between the two communities, to misappropriate the resources of the land and other fiduciary 
benefits (cf. www.ghanaweb.com, 08/01/15; www.modernghana.com, 09/01/15). As the 
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activities of these actors continue to create and recreate the contestations and violence 
surrounding the land dispute, it is not clear for now when this land dispute will be resolved. It 
is the objective of this study to critically examine the dynamics and evolution of this 
particular land conflict with the view to bringing to the surface the real issues embedded in 
this land matter. In this study, the names of chiefs, politicians and significant individuals who 
are in the public domain have been retained. However, the names of individuals who have 
asked that their names be kept out of the public sphere and those who have offered vital 
information during the course of my research have been changed to ensure anonymity. 
Additionally, I use the term “traditional authorities” to refer to chiefs and elders. Unlike the 
West where youth is conceptualised in terms of age, the category “youth” (nyasubi in Nkonya 
and sohe in Ewe) is a social construct that transcends age and embodies social, political and 
religious roles and privileges. By ‘elite’ I mean the influential individual(s) who supply arms, 
timber contractors and those whose long distance advice keeps promoting entrenched 
positions and shifting the balance of power in the area. 
 
A Brief Outline 
In this study, the first chapter will put the land dispute in perspective so to give readers a brief 
but comprehensive dimension of the dynamics of the conflict. I then continue with a general 
overview of the literature on land reforms and tenure systems across Africa, and Ghana in 
particular. Additionally, I will present the conceptual framework which will be grounded in 
the anthropological concepts of power and agency.   
The second chapter will briefly outline the political and socio-economic background of 
the two communities, and unravel the history and intergenerational challenges in which the 
conflict is enwrapped through the lens of the colonial and postcolonial period, as well as the 
present. I will also talk about the cosmology of the communities with the view to showing 
how the Nkonya and the Alavanyo relate with the land, deal with celestial beings and 
neighbours, and cope with the everyday challenges that the land conflict imposes upon them.  
The main actors (traditional authorities, the elite, youth and the women) in the conflict 
will be the focus of the third chapter. In Ghana, traditional authorities are still highly 
respected, and they wield considerable authority in the maintenance of social control, law and 
order in their communities (cf. Odotei and Awedoba, 2006). But, today, in Alavanyo and 
Nkonya, traditional authorities have lost the political clout to take decisive action on the land 
dispute, basically because of the involvement of some in the illegal timber business, the 
daunting challenges of the conflict itself, as well as the continuous alignment and realignment 
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of others with the local elites, and especially the politicians. In this chapter, I will argue that 
the power and agency of different categories of youth in the conflict is an ambivalent one. 
Through local views on youth, and recent theoretical perspectives on youth by Honwana and 
De Boeck, (2005); Honwana, (2012); Stephens, (2005); Van Dijk et al (2011), Abbink & 
Kessel, (eds) (2005) among others, I will demonstrate how this ambivalence plays out. While 
a majority of the youth are perceived to want an end to the dispute, there are a few among 
them who because they are colluding with some chiefs and timber contractors in the illegal 
timber business do not want to see an end to the conflict. This phenomenon has divided up the 
youth and weakened their power and agentive capacities to help end the land dispute. The role 
of the Nkonya and the Alavanyo Youth Associations is important to consider here, as some of 
the leaders within this association are mobilising social and political capital through these 
associations for personal and group interests. Also, in this section, the agency of the elite and 
how they influence the everyday events of the land dispute will be treated. In the 
anthropology of conflict, women are said to be weak and bear the brunt of the conflict. While 
this assertion is generally true, in the context of Alavanyo and Nkonya, women have 
demonstrated that they have agency and power to occasion change and alter social and 
economic events in the communities. All of this would not have been possible but for the 
resilience and tenacity of the womenfolk.  
In the fourth chapter, the migration and identity narratives of the two communities and 
how they came to live side by side will be treated. In Nkonya and Alavanyo one’s 
belongingness to the lineage, clan and family are vital for access to land use and ownership. 
This custom is however, not a straight forward matter, as land rights and tenure systems are 
also undergirded by gender and power relations between men and women in a male-
dominated society. How the two communities surmount these challenges associated with land 
appropriation and issues of livelihood engendered by the protraction of the conflict will be 
closely examined.  
The fifth chapter will critically examine how autochthony claims, first comer 
narratives, and social borders are constructed, sustained and instrumentalised in the context of 
the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict. The chapter argues that the insolubility of the land 
disputes also rests on challenges of social and cultural interchange and belonging between the 
two groups which are fundamentally the result of the politicisation of autochthony and 
differences exemplified in the use of markers. How these markers are employed to advance 
claims to autochthony in order to own the disputed land and how the two disputing groups can 
 5 
de-emphasise their differences and develop new grounds of mutual social and cultural 
exchange which can then promote peaceful coexistence between them will also be treated. 
In the sixth chapter I will carefully analyse the various unsuccessful attempts - court 
verdicts, colonial efforts, local conflict resolution mechanisms, and state sponsored mediation 
committees - that have been used from the colonial period till today to resolve the dispute. 
This study argues that the resolution of the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute rests not in the 
mediatory work of a single institution or individuals, but in a process that should involve 
trained mediators, conflict resolution experts, the state and other significant actors.  
By way of general conclusion, I argue that among the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, land 
is not only the ground for economic and biological fecundity, but most importantly, it forms 
the basis of the genesis and sustenance of life itself, and this explains why in the two 
communities they say ‘they relate with the land, but do not just live on the land.’  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
CURRENT EVENTS, DEBATES AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
“If you have no land you are dead, you have no life because land makes you who and what you are. If you have 
no land, you are a slave”   A Nkonya Elder 
INTRODUCTION 
 
My objective in this chapter of the study is to acquaint my readers with the significant 
dimensions of the ongoing land dispute between the Alavanyo and Nkonya. In many parts of 
Africa, not least Ghana, land constitutes “a valuable and immovable resource of limited 
quantity, land is not only fundamental to the livelihoods of most Africans, but also represents 
a precious reservoir of natural resources" (Anseeuw & Alden, 2010:2). Land, thus, invokes 
different registers of meaning in which multiple interests for different people in different 
settings are configured. In Alavanyo, one chief told me “for us land is the wealth of our 
people, our village and generations to come, so it is everything to us.”1  
But while a natural resource such as land has been a source of blessing for many 
communities/nations, in other contexts, such as that of the Alavanyo and Nkonya where 
traditional authorities, youth and ‘elite’ groups collude for various reasons, including timber 
‘raiding’, it has been a burden/curse for the society. This duplex character of land and what it 
can engender has occupied the attention of many social scientists, land policy analysts, 
agriculturalists, economists and so on for years. Yet, no satisfactory response has been 
developed by way of land reforms or tenure practices that can limit the many occurrences of 
land conflicts/disputes.   
In this chapter, I will put the Nkonya-Alavanyo land conflict in perspective and show how 
its escalation is impacting on social, economic and political life in Nkonya and Alavanyo 
today. Furthermore, I will investigate the implications of this for issues pertaining to local, 
regional and national security. Also, I will relate my preparations before getting into the two 
communities to begin my research, the methodology I employed, and my ‘anthropological’ 
relationship with the people. A brief but comprehensive review of the relevant literature on 
the land question/debate will equally be treated in this chapter. Following this, I will present 
                                                          
1
 Interview with Togbe Kofi Gator, at Alavanyo-Abehenease, July, 2012 
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the concepts I intend to embody in the analysis of this work and outline the objectives and 
motivations for this study. 
 
 
Figure 1. A map of Ghana showing its neighbours: Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin. The Kpandu 
and Hohoe districts where Nkonya and Alavanyo belong are also shown. Today, Nkonya belongs to the new 
district of Biakoye which is carved out of the Kpandu district. 
 8 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the Volta region showing the location of Nkonya and Alavanyo and the boundary between 
Ghana and Togo on the East (adapted from Darkwa et. al. 2012). 
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1.1. THE LAND DISPUTE IN PERSPECTIVE    
 
Early 2013 saw the eruption of the land dispute between the Alavanyo and Nkonya resulting 
in a lot of violence and the loss of lives. One person was reported dead and others wounded, 
prompting a deployment of military and police to the area.
2
 Later, the Interior Minister 
announced a curfew and warned that any person caught with arms, ammunition or offensive 
weapons would be prosecuted (Ghana News Agency, 23/03/13).   
The official records have it that the dispute started about 10 decades ago over a land 
boundary drawn in 1913 by a German colonial carthographer, Hans Gruner. In the ‘real 
world’ however, the major issues driving the dispute are land security and the economic 
interest of a few in the commercial trees on the land.
3
 As the dispute is ongoing, people from 
both sides continue to be periodically shot and killed in the bush when rival parties engage 
each other in the illegal lumbering of timber. (Ghana News Agency, 30/12/2012, Ghana News 
Agency, 23/03/13, Daily Guide, 06/04/13).
4
 These events have created food shortages, 
transportation problems and a decline in economic activities, and in some instances even have 
forced families and individuals from the two communities to temporally migrate to join 
relations in nearby towns and villages waiting for the situation to improve before they return. 
This dislocation is posing a psychological and social challenge for the receiving and received 
families or individuals as they have to share meagre economic accumulations, food, and 
shelter together.  
The immediate reason for the 2013 eruption of the conflict should be sought in the 
performance of a reunification ceremony that was held in 2005, and was meant to unify the 
two communities. The process was initiated by a clergy-led mediation committee (MC) which 
has been trying to broker a peace deal ever since. This ceremony brought together traditional 
authorities and peoples of Nkonya and Alavanyo, Government officials including the regional 
minister, two catholic bishops from the area and a retired Presbyterian minister who is 
chairman of the MC. During the ceremonies, the traditional ritual of drinking fetish
5
 was 
                                                          
2
 22/03/13, www.radioxyz.com. 
3
 Nana Ampem Darko III, a sub chief of Nkonya, told the Regional Minister who visited the area in the wake of 
killings that the real issue in Nkonya and Alavanyo is not land but timber and he blamed the Alavanyo for 
entering Nkonya territory and logging the timber illegally (Regional News, 9/7/2013, www.ghanaweb.com)  
4
 The use of newspapers in the historical narrative of the land dispute is the result of a lack of more scholarly 
accounts on the conflict.  
5
 This is a ritual of sealing pacts between two communities, or a marriage pact. In this particular ceremony, the 
paramount chiefs from Alavanyo and Nkonya drunk from the same calabash that was used for the ritual to 
signify their resolve to put behind the past and to seek peace. Additionally, the paramount linguists of both chiefs 
equally drank from the same calabash as a sign that the gods and ancestors of both communities are witnesses to 
the ritual and to punish those who breach the covenant (also see Kouassi in Zartman, 2000).  
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enacted and (Christian) prayers were recited to invoke the presence of the ancestors and 
deities of the land, and to remind the chiefs and peoples to live in peace and to cooperate with 
the MC. This event brought relative peace and led to the resumption of economic activities, 
the reopening of schools, the movement of people across the two communities and social 
relations between the two.
6
 After four years of negotiations, both the negotiating team of 
Alavanyo and Nkonya and the MC agreed that a re-demarcation of the Gruner boundary be 
done in an attempt to determine the extent of the land. Hitherto, leaders of the two groups 
were arguing and debating over the actual size of a land which they have very little 
knowledge about. Two licensed surveyors were employed to carry out the exercise.
7
 At the 
end they came up with a composite map constituting what the Alavanyo thought was their 
boundary and what the Nkonya also thought was their boundary.  The MC then said: “now we 
have two truths, one from Nkonya and the other from Alavanyo. It will take your cooperation 
to have one truth.”  
In furtherance of the ‘one truth’ theory, the MC asked the leadership of both 
communities what they thought was the best way to move forward in resolving the dispute. 
After conferring with traditional authorities and the people, the Alavanyo suggested that the 
land be divided between the two and that will bring peace to the two communities. The 
Nkonya objected to the position of Alavanyo insisting that the resolution of the dispute lies 
not in simply dividing the land between the two communities, but in discovering who the 
rightful ‘owner’ is. They also saw in the ‘one truth’ theory an attempt by the MC to divide the 
land between the two, something that the Nkonya have always refused.
8
 Nkonya then 
demanded that the court verdicts and the Gruner map be respected; the historical narratives 
(written and oral) that tell their story as ‘owners’ of the disputed land be acknowledged and 
also a submission of the video clips that were produced by the surveyors during the re-
demarcation exercise for their perusal. As one informant told me they realized that the 
Alavanyo had tresspassed the 1913 Gruner boundary map which formed the basis of all the 
court rulings. Today, while the ‘one truth’ theory and other conditionalities of the Nkonya 
have died (may be to come back in the future), the issue of the video clips continuous to be a 
                                                          
6
 The Nkonya and Alavanyo have been intermarrying for over three hundred years and their relations are 
characterized by common interactive social activities, but these have gone down because of the intensification of 
the conflict over the years.  
7
 This is about the fourth time the boundary has been re-demarcated following the one drawn by Hans Gruner. 
8
 Since the beginning of the mediation process, the Mediation Committee have navigated away from the thorny 
issue of the court rulings by arguing that the work of previous committees based on the court verdicts did not 
bring peace to the area and so they want to seek a new pathway of resolving the conflict by pleading with the 
Alavanyo and Nkonya to put aside the court verdicts and start fresh negotiations, but the Nkonya were unwilling 
to put aside the court verdicts because it gives them a competitive leverage over their opponents.  
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burden to the MC, which has not been able to release the video clips to either party. This has 
further complicated efforts by the MC to bring peace to the area. On the grounds of this 
drawback, the Nkonya summarily withdrew from the negotiations asking for more time to 
rethink the issue. This went on for four years, until finally, on the 3
rd
 of January 2013, the 
paramount chief of Nkonya traditional area wrote to the chairman of the MC and copied the 
President and other officers including the heads of all the security agencies in the country.
9
 It 
seems the response of Nkonya angered some people and so barely two months after the letter, 
violent escalations erupted leading to the events that were well captured by the media since 
the beginning of March, 2013.  
These escalations prompted the Regional House of Chiefs to threaten the two 
paramount chiefs from the area with sanctions if they did not “expose those involve in the 
violence and hostilities.”10 This will be a difficult exercise for the chiefs, because in Alavanyo 
and Nkonya, the people tend to support and cover up the wrongs of their kith and kin. One 
informant told me: “How can you turn your back on your own blood?” This is a major reason 
why it is difficult to apprehend offenders in the illegal timber business and other offences.  
The events of 2011-2013 compelled the Alavanyo Youth Association to call on the 
president to “do something about the situation”11 Later a parliamentary delegation made up of 
Parliamentarians from the Volta region went to the area to appeal to the people to stop the 
killings and return to the negotiation table. During the visit, the then majority leader of 
parliament, who does not come from the area, remarked that; 
“…some people are using “ethnic enterprise” factor to fuel the conflict because 
they benefit from it. It would not be surprising that these ethnic benefactors are 
supplying arms to those groups to kill themselves. He called for the identification 
and inclusion of these personalities in the peace process” (Daily Guide, 29/3/13, 
www.modernghana.com).  
 
This was the first time since the events of the beginning of the year that a leading politician 
raised the issue of ethnicity in the conflict. This is perhaps not so surprising since the 
involvement of local politicians in the conflict is a complex and significant factor in the 
fomentation of hostilities in the area. While some are seen to be pushing for a resolution of 
the dispute, those who benefit economically and politically from it do not want to see an end 
to the conflict. Also, I see the mention of the majority leader that those personalities 
                                                          
9
 The letter recounted the events that led to the dispute from the early 1900s, the verdicts, and the insistence of 
the Nkonya to have a copy of the video clips of the re-demarcation exercise and non-acceptance of any new 
boundary among other factors. An electronic version of this letter is in private possession of the author. 
10
President of Volta Region House of chiefs, Ho, 2012.  
11
(www.modernghana.com, 24/4/13). 
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fomenting trouble in the area be identified and included in the peace process as a laudable 
point which is in fact, a familiar discourse often appealed to by politicians and conflict 
mediation and peace analysts such as John Paul Lederach (1995); Peter Wallensteen (2011); 
Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (1999) among others. It is believed 
that the reasons for their actions and reactions could come to the fore and help resolve the 
dispute if their voices were factored into major discussions about the conflict. My 
observations in the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute, however, show that while the logic behind 
their inclusion is tenable, their tendency to play the ‘double’, and the ethnic politics and 
economic benefits some are deriving from the dispute is making it difficult to get these people 
completely on board. To borrow a term from Jean-Francois Bayart (2010), this is all about a 
‘politics of the belly’ i.e. the tendency of the politicians to corrupt the process through 
networks of chiefs, elders and local youth in order to maximize group or individual economic 
and political benefits from the uncertainties or social disjunctures engendered by the conflict.  
In the Volta region, the Ewe to which the Alavanyo belong constitute about 60.8% of 
the population, while the Guan to which the Nkonya belong, represent 9.2%.
12
 Over the years, 
the Nkonya have accused the Alavanyo of using their ethnic majority and the support from 
their compatriots to reject the court rulings and engage in vandalism. By the same argument, 
when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) came to power in 2008 with some Guan 
personalities in high places in government, the Alavanyo also accused the Nkonya of 
highhandedness in the peace process because their men were up there. The dynamic nexus of 
state and ethnic politics in the dispute is complex and complicated by the fact that both ethnic 
groups are amenable to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and are said to be the 
“world bank” of votes for the party since the 4th Republic. This complexity has given vent to 
covert interests and political coalitions in which politicians, individuals and other stake 
holders from the two communities keep aligning and realigning their positions, shifting the 
balance of power and the contours of the dispute and encouraging entrenched positions. Given 
that politics is about numbers and the Volta region does give the NDC massive votes, it will 
be difficult for the government to decisively tackle the issue. All efforts to confront the issue 
from the national, regional and the district levels of the government machinery have so far 
remained cosmetic. Little wonder, some observers have opined that it will take more than 
political power from central government to solve the land conflict. 
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 (www.modernghana.com/ghanaHome/regions/volta.asp). 
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In the meanwhile, the land conflict had also attracted the attention of the international 
community. A UN team and the UNDP from Ghana visited Nkonya and Alavanyo on a fact 
finding tour on the grounds after the situation in Nkonya and Alavanyo had caught the 
attention of the UN. During this visit the team assured the people of a comprehensive support 
to help end the conflict (Ghana News Agency, 11/10/2007), but to date not much has 
happened because of struggles over power and control between youth groups and traditional 
authorities, and undue interference in local matters by national and transnational actors.  
Between 2003 and 2007, several incidents of violence and killings attributed to the 
combined activities of youth groups, timber contractors and unknown actors were recorded. 
These clashes often start in the bush, where rival illegal loggers engage each other. For 
example, a letter from a Nkonya citizen to one newspaper alleged that some people engage in 
“unprovoked skirmishes so that in the midst of the ensuing confusion they have a field day to 
harvest timber, bamboo, cola nuts and cocoa, fell palm trees for palm wine and also engage in 
the wild and ruthless looting of food crops, poultry, sheep and goats…” (Chronicle, 
4/11/2003, in Dzodzi & Seini, 2004). This account was supported by the MP of Biakoye, a 
citizen of Nkonya, who also argued that the area’s soils are rich in food crops and trees and 
that disputes are usually generated around the harvesting of Odum, a very valuable timber 
species (GT, 1/3/03 in Dzodzi & Seini, 2004). Little surprise that in 2003, a police and 
military patrol arrested some Alavanyo with a cache of arms which included “a locally 
manufactured pistol, 87 pieces of shot gun cartridges, a notebook containing 102 names of 
Alavanyos who voluntarily contributed various sums of money to purchase firearms and 
ammunition for their men deployed in the bush to attack the Nkonya” (Winston Tamakloe, 
Ghanaian Times, 12/6/2003). The supply of arms and ammunition by national and 
transnational actors is very much part of the way in which both communities operate and this 
has been a major driver of the dispute which must be confronted if the conflict must end. 
Rumour also plays a great part in the resilience of the conflict. It constitutes a strong 
device employed by actors of both communities to generate panic and deliberately create 
disorder in order to carry out acts of looting and violence (cf. Ellis & Ter Haar, 2004). In 
April, 2003 it was rumoured that the Nkonya had camped at a place near Akrofu closer to Ho, 
the Volta regional capital to attack the people in retaliation for their support to the Alavanyo 
(Tsikata & Seini, 2004). This rumour was later found to be false but not until it had 
occasioned some unnecessary panic in Alavanyo and Nkonya. During my research there were 
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other rumours, two of which I helped to dispel in April and June, 2012.
13
 The youth and 
traditional authorities have often been blamed for these rumours, but this is a scapegoat for 
actors who are much more difficult to identify. Besides in conflict situations, rumour 
constitutes a strong weapon for actors to inform and misinform the public and so to gain 
competitive advantage over their opponents for multiple reasons.   
But the events of the 2000s have not come in a vacuum; they are premised on the 
happenings in the 1990s in which loss of life and looting of farm produce was commonplace. 
In 1995, the District Chief Executives of Hohoe and Jasikan
14
 set up the Mireku Committee to 
mediate the dispute and make proposals for the implementation of an agreement, but its 
findings were never implemented, though the committee said “the implementation of the 
court’s decision will not help to promote peace between the two traditional areas” (Mireku, as 
said in letter of Togbega Tsedze Atakora, Fiaga of Alavanyo, GT, 15/2/97). By the same 
token the Committee also said it did not have the power to put aside court verdicts. Prior to 
this committee, in 1992, the then military government, the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC), set up the Acquah Committee to mediate the conflict and make proposals to 
the government, but subsequently no hearings took place. The inability of the government to 
implement the findings of the two committees led to a chaotic situation which gave illegal 
loggers in Alavanyo and Nkonya a field day. It also brought an influx of youth to the area to 
engage in the business. This further complicated social life in the area and made it difficult for 
the state and local authorities to maintain law and order. The illegal timber business even 
assumed national proportions and compelled the then Minister for Lands and Forestry Dr. 
Kwabena Adjei to complain that:  
 
“Lately there has been a disturbing development in chainsaw operations. This has 
been the swarming up of the trade by thugs. The criminals are violent, vicious and 
daring illegal operators who armed themselves with cudgels, cutlasses and 
shotguns when carrying out the felling, sawing of trees and attack forestry 
officials who try to ward them off” (Daily Graphic, 05/07/1995, quoted in 
Amanor, 1999:71).  
 
                                                          
13
 In April, 2012 during a visit to the palace of the Nkonya Paramount chief, the latter informed me that a young 
man from Nkonya told him the Alavanyo were preparing to attack Nkonya. In a discussion with him I 
admonished him to call his counterpart in Alavanyo and discuss the issue. It later appeared that there was no 
merit in the rumour. A similar rumour reached me in June, 2012 through one of the youth leaders of Alavanyo. 
Again I encouraged him to discuss the issue with the Nkonya youth leader. This also turned out to be the work of 
what he termed “bad people” or ame vondi in Ewe. 
14
 Alavanyo is part of Hohoe district, but Nkonya now belongs to the new district of Biakoye which has been 
carved out of the Jasikan district. 
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The Minister also mentioned that District chief executives, forestry officials, chiefs, elders, 
transport owners, the customs and other groups of people were collaborators in the chainsaw 
business. In fact, in the 1990s the schemes of ‘elite’ groups in the ‘raiding’ of timber became 
so lucrative that this prompted scholars such as Amanor to observe that “the informal timber 
sector operating on farmlands has become big business and many “wayside operators” are 
now the “frontmen” for highly organized urban-based ventures run by powerful individuals 
(1999:71-72).” In Nkonya and Alavanyo, as some traditional authorities got involved in the 
illegal timber business with the collusion of the youth, they lost their political leverage to 
maintain law and order. This situation led to heightened tension and rampant attacks from 
both sides.  
To appreciate the events of the 1990s I will go back in time to make an analysis of the 
1980s which I find the most compelling period in understanding the current events in 
Alavanyo and Nkonya.  
The year 1983 is very significant to the dynamics of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land 
conflict, not only because of the land dispute but also because it marked a watershed in 
Ghanaian political and economic history. It was just two years after the coup d’état by Flt. 
Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings that toppled the democratically elected government of Dr. 
Hilla Limann, an event that coincided with the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs across most parts of Africa (Amanor, 1999). The mass return of Ghanaian youth 
who had gone to Nigeria in the wake of the oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s also took place 
around this time (Berry 2008). Furthermore, this year marked the beginning of famine and 
drought across most parts of the country (Daily Graphic, 19/04/1983). Additionally, 
unemployment was high, and crime rates were up. These social and economic challenges 
affected many parts of Ghana, not least Alavanyo and Nkonya, where the collapse of the 
cocoa production and other activities left many youths jobless. These are some of the 
underlying causes that fueled the 1983 confrontation which was started by two youths of both 
communities who quarreled at a stream that serves both during dry parts of the year. Although 
the quarrel was not related to the land dispute itself, it led to fresh attacks resulting in the 
closure of schools, the loss of lives, the looting of farm produce and other “indiscriminate acts 
of lawlessness” by the youth (Daily Graphic, 15/04/1983, 19/04/1983 and Ghanaian Times, 
9/05/83, 10/05/83). A Catholic Bishop helping to broker peace in the area lamented then that 
“Ghana could no longer continue to lose its youth in such fights since their energies were 
needed for the reconstruction of the country” (Daily Graphic, 19/04/83). 
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In Alavanyo itself, this upheaval led to the destoolment of the former Alavanyo 
paramount chief Togbe Anku Atakora V. He was accused of harbouring some Nkonya and of 
selling ammunitions to them because he had blood relations there. He was physically 
assaulted, admitted in hospital and later died (Daily Graphic, 15/04/1983). Before he died, he 
addressed a letter to the Acquah committee set up by the Provisional National Defense 
Council (PNDC) in 1992 (Tsikata & Seini, 2004) to mediate the land dispute between the two. 
In this letter he wrote among other things:  
“The crisis is a long-standing land dispute between Alavanyo and Nkonya. Before 
the Alavanyos arrived at their present settlement about two centuries ago, the 
people of Nkonya had already settled. Being the earlier settlers, the people of 
Nkonya naturally owned the greater portion of the land. Thanks to the German 
colonial administrators, who administered the then Togoland, boundaries were set 
up to clearly demarcate tribal lands including those of Nkonyas and Alavanyos. 
Despite these definite boundaries, my people, the Alavanyo have repeatedly 
trespassed into Nkonya land, made farms on them without atoning tenancy, 
vandalized Nkonya farms on Nkonya land and perpetrated all forms of aggression 
against the Nkonyas”.15  
 
Togbe’s letter received no serious attention from local and state officials and did nothing to 
assuage the increasing violence or change the politics of power in the area. 
Eventually, the security agencies, realizing that the chiefs and elders were a big part of 
the problem, rounded them up to Ho in order to ensure some relative peace and tranquility 
(Daily Graphic, 09/05/1983, Ghanaian Times, 10/05/1983). This period marked the beginning 
of co-ordinated hostilities and an aggravation of the dispute. Traditional authorities lost their 
control over the events when youth and war leaders started to wield guns and other 
implements and turned the area into a hostile environment. Many of the youth were 
disappointed with their leaders for their lack of consistent effort to end the dispute and so in 
anger and resistance to their marginal influence in community affairs, they disregarded 
traditional authority and took matters into their own hands. In Alavanyo and Nkonya this 
signaled an inversion of roles and power in traditional power structures and a breakdown of 
social and political control.  
These coordinated confrontations received the endorsement of some powerful 
individuals as well as traditional authorities and notable groups such as the Alavanyo and 
Nkonya Youth Associations because it was considered by all involved to be a community 
affair. Indeed, it was the community dimension to the dispute that got the youth deeply 
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 This letter was dated but not signed; however since the Daily Graphic 15/04/1983 pp 4-5 captured some of its 
contents, its authenticity cannot be doubted. 
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involved in the conflict and this is what explains their actions and reactions, even though the 
risk became too high for some of them, as this story told to me attests:  
“I am Atsu Anane and I am 40 years old. I come from Alavanyo. I returned from 
Accra because during the violent escalations in 1983 and the 2000s youth from 
Alavanyo were asked to come home and defend ‘their land.’ I was however 
unlucky, as I was shot with multiple wounds. I asked the elders of the town for 
financial help but too little help came. A foreign philanthropist offered to help me 
but some traditional authorities sat on the money. Today, I am in a wheelchair 
with only one functional arm and I am cared for by my poor parents and siblings. 
Clearly, I have no future. I am very angry with the youth leader, chiefs and elders 
of the Alavanyo state for abandoning me at a time I needed them most.”  
 
The story of Atsu unfolds how the youth were drafted into the conflict and also demonstrates 
how collective feeling expressed through community participation and importance can be 
instrumentalised in conflict situations to involve different actors, not the least of which are the 
youth (cf. Honwana & De Boeck, 2005; Honwana, 2012).  
Also, the area is a hub for large marijuana plantations which provide jobs and income 
for the youth (Ghanaian Times, 12/01/1998 in Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Alavanyo is also 
famous for its talented blacksmiths who produce some of the finest guns of the area. Some 
blacksmiths producing guns in secret for lack of a license confided in me how men of both 
communities bought (and continue to buy) guns from them. That every conflict is a double-
edge sword is here clearly perceived. While overall the dispute has weakened family life by 
depriving many of farmable land, and by bringing pain, disorder and joblessness to the area, 
to some it has also brought economic benefits. There are however, some youth who object to 
the escalation of violence by arguing that: 
 “Fighting and violence will not solve the dispute. Anytime there is an attack we 
can’t go to our farms and we can’t visit our relations on the other side. Only a few 
who are benefiting economically from ‘raiding’ the timber in the forest are 
promoting acts of violence and intimidating others”.16  
 
A significant earlier dimension of the land dispute is formed by the court cases which started 
in 1953 and ended in 1980 in a relitigation in which Alavanyo lost. The rejection of the court 
verdicts by Alavanyo from 1957 to the relitigation in 1980 was based on a number of 
arguments. First, they argued that the 1913 Gruner map contained inaccuracies, was small in 
scale and was not meant to demarcate boundaries. Second, that the traditional boundary trees 
(Anya) that were planted to demarcate the boundaries between their forefathers and the 
Nkonya before the drawing of the Gruner boundary were not taken into account by the courts. 
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 A random group of youth I interviewed during fieldwork. 
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The loss of the relitigation case laid the foundation for the events of 1983, which can 
only be understood and explained in reference to earlier happenings. It is however the 1957 
ruling that will offer a path for understanding the issues of the 1950s. The conclusion of the 
verdict in 1957 was based on the first court case in 1953 in which Nkonya took seven 
Alavanyo farmers to the Akpini native court ‘B’ (Kpandu), where the case was later 
transferred to the Lands Division of the High Court at Accra.
17
 According to written sources 
and oral tradition in Nkonya, they went to court because the Alavanyo had started farming 
beyond the Gruner boundary without the usual customary procedures of land acquisition, i.e. 
providing a keg of palm wine, a bottle of schnapps and some amount of money to the land 
owners. They also took the issue to court because of the culture of tardiness and indifference 
on the part of the British colonial government to deal with the problem after both 
communities had complained of trespasses into lands they claimed belonged to them.   
On the basis of the Gruner map, verdict was given on 24
th
 May 1957 in favour of the 
Nkonya, but Alavanyo refused the verdict, citing among other factors unfair procedures by 
lawyers who were insiders of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) at the time, a party to 
which the Nkonya were alleged to be amenable.
18
 Additionally, a 1905 map which was drawn 
by German colonial officials at the time was rejected by the courts because the map was 
meant to show the general geography of the area and not to demarcate ethnic boundaries. Bent 
on getting issues resolved, Nkonya took the matter to the colonial secretary M.J.E. Patteson of 
the Gold Coast colony in Accra.
19
 However, the latter did not intervene directly in the matter 
but referred it to his subordinate, the Senior District commissioner in Ho, but action was not 
taken. It is evident from this that British colonial diplomacy and the policy of indirect rule did 
not allow senior officers to handle matters clearly within the powers of lower officers. They 
also thought traditional authorities could and should resolve these matters among themselves. 
This effort also fell through because of indifference and lack of decisive action from the 
commissioner.  
It is on record that already in the 1940s, Nkonya appealed to the British colonial 
commissioner at Kpandu, the seat of the Eastern Province, to intervene in the matter but again 
not much was done.
20
 This was so because Nkonya observing that the Gruner boundary had 
been trespassed by Alavanyo decided to send emissaries to Alavanyo on Empire Day 1923 so 
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 Suit No. Tr. L. 19/1953, High Court of Justice, Lands Division, Accra. 
18
 Interview with Mr. Paul Dzathor, 14/02/2012 at Alavanyo-Deme 
19
 Letter dated 27/02/1950 in Ghana National Archives, ADM 39/1/119, File No. 025. Subject: Alavanyo and 
Nkonya land dispute. 
20
 Letter dated 02/4/1945 from Acting Nkonyahene, Kwasi Kokortey X at Ghana National Archives, ADM 
39/1/119, File No. 025. Subject: Alavanyo and Nkonya land dispute. 
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elders and youth of both communities could retrace their boundary and avoid further 
misunderstandings. However, this turned into a quarrel in which men from both sides were 
physically assaulted.
21
 During my research, informants told me that the 1923 events were 
engendered by attacks and killings which took place already around 1904.  
Today, the mediation process has once more come to a standstill and there is still 
police and military presence in the area because of the events that took place since the 
beginning of March, 2013. In June 2013, the then Interior Minister, Hon. Kwesi Ahwoi, 
invited leaders of the two communities to Accra, the Ghanaian capital, to deliberate with them 
on how to deescalate the tension in the area following the disturbances and the violence since 
the beginning of 2013. The meeting resulted in the signing of a declaration in which the 
traditional authorities and elders present promised to restrain their people from resorting to the 
gun and to seek dialogue. Additionally, it was agreed that no one should be allowed to enter 
the disputed land to farm, log timber, collect foodstuffs or cola nuts. To give point and 
meaning to the government’s commitment to resolve the issue this time around, the interior 
minister promised to build a police station in Alavanyo.
22
 Later in September, 2013 the 
President himself visited the communities of Alavanyo and Nkonya and pleaded with the 
people to try and live in peace while he tried to put in place a new mediation committee to 
decisively chart a new path that may lead to the end of the land conflict.
23
  
While these measures have brought relative calm to the area for now, the promise to 
strengthen security in the area and the personal intervention of the president are not new: past 
presidents have done that before, but all their efforts fell through. The setting up of a new 
committee is also not a new strategy, as the Acquah, Mireku and the current mediation 
committees attest. There seem to be a certain degree of ‘stubbornness’ and resilience 
associated with this conflict as it seems to defy all attempts at resolution, and my observations 
during fieldwork posit that this is due to two factors. First, the economic benefits a few are 
making in the illegal logging, and second, the insistence of the Nkonya that the court verdicts 
be respected by Alavanyo before any new path can be negotiated. This explains why previous 
measures to resolve the land dispute have been flouted by peoples of both communities. It 
                                                          
21
 Interview with elders of Nkonya and Alavanyo during fieldwork January 2011-October 2012 
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 Since the events of 1983, the police station at Alavanyo was closed down www.modernghana.com, June 30, 
2013. 
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 In January 2015, the president followed through with his words and set up a committee led by the Vice 
President Kwesi Amissah Arthur and supported by the Paramount chief of Kpandu traditional area. It remains to 
be seen if this committee can end the land dispute and bring peace to the area (cf. www.ghanaweb.com, 
12/05/15). 
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therefore remains to be seen how much the current declaration and the ardent commitment of 
central government can lead to a resolution of the dispute. 
The above narrative briefly explains the complexities of the land conflict and situates 
clearly why Alavanyo and Nkonya are in a ‘bad’ state today. No one knows for sure how long 
the ‘cemetery’ style peace the two communities are enjoying will last or how to redefine the 
drivers and triggers of the conflict and seek innovative trajectories of solving a conflict which 
is almost becoming insoluble. Different but related issues have come to the fore that merit 
serious attention, but in this study, I will concentrate on examining closely the causes and 
dynamics of the dispute, the specific agency of the actors involved (traditional authorities, 
youth and youth leaders, war leaders etc), as well as the cosmology, the settlement history and 
livelihood conditions of both communities, and the related issues of autochthony, borders and 
belonging at play within and between them. I will also treat the traditional processes that have 
been unsuccessful in solving the dispute, the court verdicts, the mediation processes, state 
versus local politics and intergenerational challenges.  
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Figure 3. The Gruner map of 1913 with the red lines indicating the contiguous boundaries of the six states of 
Alavanyo, Nkonya, Bowiri, Akpafu, Gbi and Santrokofi 
 22 
 
  
Figure 4. The disputed land (6459.82 acres/2616.23 hectares) in the shaded portion. The line on the 
right of the shaded portion is the Gruner boundary and on the left is the demarcation claimed by the Alavanyo.    
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1.2. GETTING STARTED: CHALLENGES AND ATTITUDES 
In January 2012, I left Belgium for Ghana to begin a 10 month fieldwork on the Alavanyo-
Nkonya land dispute. Having made periodic visits to the area from 2006-2008 before this 
period, I was somehow familiar with the terrain, but the fact that I was now going to stay for a 
longer period of time made me a bit apprehensive and anxious about what could happen. 
Since the land dispute began there have been different mediation committees/groups made up 
of traditional authorities and state authorities who have tried to mediate and solve the dispute 
but have not been successful.  
In June, 2004 yet another Mediation Committee (MC) already mentioned above was 
formed to mediate the dispute. To carry out its work effectively and in order to achieve the 
desired end, the MC which has been working till today developed what it termed a “peace 
architecture” which is a sub-structure comprising of community peace setters24 and a 
consultative committee.
25
 In recent times the MCs work has come under serious strain 
pointing to a seemingly loss of leverage in brokering peace in the area as the leadership of 
both Alavanyo and Nkonya are constantly breaching agreements reached at different stages of 
the mediation and negotiation talks.  
Given the volatility and the sensitivity of the land dispute, the MC has over the years 
and on the basis of the powers granted it by central government decided through the 
Consultative Committee to ‘monitor’ the movement of people in the area especially 
researchers who want to investigate the land dispute. They feared that the relative peace in the 
area could be disturbed if suspecting figures and researchers were allowed to investigate the 
land dispute, for they might open a can of worms which will reignite passions and lead to 
further tensions and violence. I was therefore compelled to consult with members of the MC 
who have literally become the ‘gatekeepers’ in the two communities. Deliberating and 
negotiating with the MC in order to carry out my research was the most demanding 
diplomatic exercise I have ever been involved in. While some members of the committee felt 
my research could help to resolve the dispute, as a collective body, the committee did not 
want to be seen to be complicit in my research, so their final word to me was, “we are not 
saying you should not go there, and we are not saying you should go.” The non-committed 
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 This group is made up of clergymen working in the area who serve as ‘foot soldiers’ for the MC and who use 
the pulpit and other means to preach peace. 
25
 This is made up of 5 selected delegates from Alavanyo and Nkonya communities who are responsible for 
monitoring the day to day activities in the communities and to give periodic updates to the Mediation 
Committee. Lack of funds and divided opinions about the substantial issues of the conflict has rendered the 
group weak. During field work, two members told me they had gone for a whole year without a meeting. 
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attitude of the MC seems to be a fundamental experience of many researchers with 
“gatekeepers” as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:51) attest:  
“Whether or not they grant entry to the setting, gatekeepers will generally, and 
understandably, be concerned as to the picture of the organization or community 
that the ethnographer will paint, and they will usually have practical interests in 
seeing themselves and their colleagues presented in a favourable light. At least, 
they will wish to safeguard what they perceive as their legitimate interest. 
Gatekeepers may therefore attempt to exercise some degree of surveillance and 
control, either by blocking off certain lines of inquiry, or by shepherding the 
fieldworker in one direction or another”  
 
This was a big challenge to me as I was torn between going ahead with the research and 
bracing myself for any consequences or abandoning the project all together. I chose the 
former with all the risks involved. I was consoled by the fact that the discipline of 
anthropology is not without risk, as is attested by the research experience of many 
anthropologists. The risk I was about to take is therefore not an exception but part of what can 
be termed ‘normal.’  
It is important to underscore an important observation here. The land dispute in 
Nkonya and Alavanyo has made the reception of visitors a strong political issue. Any new 
‘face’ in the area is quickly noticed and ‘tracked’, and the purpose of the person’s mission 
may become the subject of ‘gossip’: frantic investigations are often carried out behind the 
person’s back until s/he leaves the area. This behaviour pattern has become part of everyday 
life in the two communities. Later, some informants shared with me that the major reason for 
this state of affairs is the fear that ‘strange’ people like researchers are likely to ‘see, hear and 
feel’ things and bring them up in a manner that might lead to one party losing the land to the 
other. To outsiders this suspicion or mindset may seem banal, but in a situation where two 
groups are struggling over a resource, this cannot be edited out as ‘noise’ or as ‘frivolous’, 
because it does make a lot of political sense for the disputants who are constantly seeking for 
ways to eliminate any barrier that will weaken their case to claim the land.  
As I entered first in Nkonya and later Alavanyo, my research was greatly facilitated by 
traditional authorities (chiefs, elders, queen mothers etc) and church leaders of the Catholic 
Church. I divided up the 10 months research period between the two communities. In the 
early stages and in both communities the chiefs and elders would often make a careful 
analysis of the substance and import of my interviews and what their response may entail. In 
one instance, a leading traditional authority in one community cautioned his people to be 
“careful” about how they responded to my questions. There is no doubt in my mind that the 
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different actors in the dispute have some interest to guide, hence the apprehension about what 
to say to me. A discourse of this kind has been very fundamental to the inner logic of the 
dispute which is always framed as a competition in which a winner ‘must take all’ is 
envisaged as the ultimate solution. It is observable that deep-seated concerns of this sort have 
and continue to inform the entrenched positions taken by both groups since the genesis of the 
land dispute.  
 
 
Figure 5. An aerial view of Alavanyo-Kpeme, one of the frontline villages in the dispute. 
 
This constituted a big challenge for me and I think also for the people themselves, as both of 
us had to learn to accommodate the expected and unexpected realities of our ‘anthropological’ 
relationship. This kind of relational tension is not new in the field of research, as Bernard 
Russell, (1988:112) affirms:  
“Anthropologists and the people they study don’t have to like one another, but 
both are well served if they find each other interesting. The anthropologist needs 
to sustain his or her interest in order to go out every day and collect data. The 
studied group needs to be able to gossip about the anthropologist’s antics with 
interest in order to tolerate the intrusion.” 
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As our mutual relationship became well-defined and understandable, most of the suspicions 
died down. Nevertheless, questions of what my research would finally entail and why I did 
not go elsewhere but chose to do this research among them continue till this day. This 
“nuisance” is as important to them as it is to me, for it challenges the motivation and goal of 
my research and the need to be circumspect and diplomatic, whatever that means, in the 
analysis of what I discover.  
As I lived among the Alavanyo and Nkonya, I observed that from dawn to dusk the 
rhythms and movements of life revolve around activities on land and with the land. The land 
(‘anyigba’ in Ewe or ‘usulu’ in Nkonya) is perceived as a ‘living being’, i.e. akyankpator in 
Nkonya or nugbagbe in Ewe, capable of influencing the movements and directions of 
people’s life-world beyond time and space. The land is said to be eternal and is gendered as a 
‘mother’ who cares for the daily and future needs of the people, protecting them against 
enemies near and far. The land defines the borders of what is culturally permissible and what 
is not. It punctuates the events of everyday life and inspires how men and women appropriate 
the land to meet their needs and define their relationships with neighbours and nature.  
Additionally, the land serves as a social template on which the meaning and the 
purpose of life among individuals and groups within the communities are articulated and 
acted out. At the material level, the land is daily converted into a social field for shaping and 
ordering the relationship among persons and between persons and things In this sense, 
relationships are about persons and their activities with the land as they are also about how the 
land impacts on human relationships. Everything that is called a meaningful life becomes 
achievable only in the dynamic relationship between the land and humans (cf. Lund & Boone 
2013).  
Today, the land dispute has challenged these long-held traditions, which will be 
analysed in the second chapter. 
1.3. DOING RESEARCH: METHODOLOGY AND FIELD EXPERIENCES  
 
The idea of method is very central to the discipline of anthropology and it is often the basis 
for distinguishing anthropology from other disciplines. Yet, even in anthropology there are 
different approaches and a lack of unanimity on which method is ideal for which research. 
The kind of methodology employed therefore depends on the type of research, the interest of 
the researcher and the society in question. Looking at the nature of the Nkonya and Alavanyo 
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societies and the dynamics of the land dispute, I adopted the method of participant 
observation, in combination with structured and semi-structured interviews. This implied that 
I observed a lot of what was taking place in the two communities on a daily basis.  
I relied on two major types of informants, namely primary and secondary informants. I 
visited the primary ones almost every day and the secondary ones periodically.  
However, in a later stage of my research, I became more eclectic, allowing the 
practical exigencies on the ground to inspire the choice of method appropriate to the different 
circumstances of my encounter with the people. This was because I was dealing with two 
different ethnic groups with different interests and understandings of the dispute and also 
because the conflict was still running at the time of fieldwork and continues to do so today. 
Initially, my coming from a different part of Ghana did pose some challenges to me, 
because some of the people felt I was an intruder, which made them suspicious of my 
presence. Furthermore, since I was the first to do research among the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya using a participatory approach, I had the onerous responsibility to carefully explain 
the goal of my work because again some of them saw me as ‘stranger’ who, oblivious of the 
overt and covert matters of the land dispute, might open a can of worms that might lead to 
either of them winning/losing the land to their opponents, or compel them to confront issues 
they did not want to confront out in the open. The anxiety over what I might discover does 
mean a lot to the two communities because as already mentioned, they have always looked on 
the conflict as a competition in which a winner-takes-all is perceived as the ultimate goal. As 
the two communities are very homogenous and closely-knit, there were times I had great 
difficulty getting information because my informants would not speak. Even till today, the 
older generation in the two communities continues to be secretive, very measured and tight-
lipped especially when it comes to issues/information concerning the land dispute.  
In the course of time, I realised that though this attitudinal disposition gained currency 
in the cause of the dispute, it does not seem to be a recent invention but rather a long standing 
disposition embedded in the collective unconscious of peoples of the two communities. They 
have a deep systemic fear and suspicion about each other because of the longevity of the 
conflict and the ugly impact it is having on the minds and hearts of the people. In some 
circumstances, I had to do a lot of social engineering to get information I considered 
important to my research. Two elderly informants told me: “We are afraid of each other 
because, deep down in the minds of our people, they think the conflict can erupt at any time, 
given the many failed efforts that have been made in the past and today to resolve the 
conflict.”  
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Figure 6. A visit to the Paramount chief of Nkonya traditional Nana Okoto Kofi III (fourth from right)     
and his elders when the promotor and co-promoter with son visited the researcher on the field in June, 2014. 
 
Nevertheless, through the above mentioned methods, I engaged chiefs, elders and opinion 
leaders who know a lot about the inner dynamics and stories of their settlement history, 
beliefs and practices about the land. The genesis of the land dispute and the causes of the 
periodic escalations and de-escalations of the dispute were equally investigated. It was 
observable that the women were more reconciliatory and hoping to see an end to the dispute 
than the men, who were more resistant, defensive and aggressive.  
There was yet another group: the local elite. They were the most difficult group to deal 
with as they often had well-worked out responses and were very shrewd and evasive with 
their statements. They had the tendency to exaggerate, over- essentialise and over-culturalise 
their stories about who owns the land. There were some of my interviewees who wanted 
monetary favours when they granted me interviews. Though I didn’t want to be seen to be 
paying for information, I could not help but part with some money to certain individual 
elderly men and women who had been very helpful. At certain instances I gave drinks. I took 
part in funerals, marriage celebrations, visited the farms of some of my informants, and 
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climbed the mountain where the ‘disputed’ land is located just to confirm what I was told 
about the richness of the land.  
 
Figure 7. The Author with Mr. Yaw Ellitey, the Regent of Nkonya-Tayi. 
 
I engaged the youth during informal settings such as football matches, under the trees and at 
the village market square. Most of the youth I interviewed were disappointed in their leaders 
(both those on the local front and those outside the locality) for not confronting the issues 
exacerbating the land dispute and about their marginal role in the communities. On the other 
hand they also admitted that some of them were engaged in illegal lumbering themselves. 
Through these activities I appreciated the fears, doubts, anxieties, and hopes of the 
people to end the dispute and look to a better future. I collected a lot of documentation e.g. 
field notes, audio recordings, photographs, maps of the land and the surrounding vegetation.  
With the exception of the Gbi traditional area,
26
 I visited the nearby traditional areas of 
Santrokofi, Akpafu and Bowiri that share a boundary with the Alavanyo and Nkonya. The 
purpose of my visits was to ascertain from the traditional authorities how much they know 
                                                          
26
 It was ultimately impossible to visit this area because of a misunderstanding between the chief of the Gbi 
traditional area and the Muslim community over rights to a burial site which the Muslim community used 
without the appropriate permission from the chief and which eventually generated a conflict that lead to loss of 
life and property. 
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about the land boundary dispute. Moreover, given the interethnic and geopolitical character of 
the dispute, extending the research field beyond the tight borders of Alavanyo and Nkonya 
could give me information that may elucidate certain ‘shady’ areas of the dispute. This 
exercise proved beneficial as it threw light on the dynamics and multifaceted character of the 
land dispute and the base of a comparative analysis of social and cultural processes between 
the two communities and their neighbours.   
 
 
 
Figure 8. The principal street of Nkonya-Tayi which leads to Alavanyo and where the youth gather for 
multiple purposes. 
 
1.4. THE LAND QUESTION: A GENERAL REVIEW 
This aspect of the study is to review from a thematic perspective the theories that underpin the 
land question/debate in Africa but particularly in Ghana.  
I find Amanor’s work “Global Restructuring and Land Rights in Ghana: forest food chains, 
timber and rural livelihoods” (1999), a good entry point to the theories associated with the 
land question. In this work, Amanor shows how the ideals of modernization theory framed 
within global developmental structures such as structural adjustment programs supported by 
the World Bank prompted a renewed debate on land reforms (also see Moyo 2008). 
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Modernization theorists contend that the success of land reforms depended on the state’s 
abolition of traditional agrarian institutions and land practices such as sharecropping and that 
the state should rather offer credit to farmers, title lands, allocate powers of giving land to 
chiefs and local and district communities among others factors (Amanor, 1999). In the 
particular case of Africa, it was believed that the absence of land markets was also stifling the 
initiative of farmers capable of large lands from doing so. Thus, “the emergence of capital 
markets in land and credit markets for the adoption of new technologies” (Harrison, 1987 in 
Amanor, 1999:12) will be advantageous to land reforms. This radical plan according to 
Amanor (1990), did not receive much attention because it was found to benefit the ruling elite 
and their supporters and weaken the ability of poor farmers to have security in land. In Ghana, 
Ubink (2008) observes that land markets especially in peri-urban areas have not only 
increased the cost of land, but have also deprived many poor people of heritable land.  
In recent years, the debate has been championed by environmental governance and 
local-level development theorists who argue that since indigenous land management and 
customary land tenure are sustainable and have proven resilient to abuse by the state, chiefs 
and elite groups in most countries, they should therefore be pushed (Moyo, 2008). This 
approach was found to be favourable but the challenge of extricating the powers of chiefs and 
elite groups in land management was not an easy one to realise.  Besides, as Amanor (2012 
points out, customary land tenure is not inherently equitable and has often discriminated 
against women and youth groups and even rights of pastoralists and migrants may be 
marginalized in this scheme. In contrast, it was argued that land reforms will succeed if the 
state provided new technology, market efficiency for poor farmers and rural infrastructure 
(see Mighot-Adholla et al. 1991). Platteau also advocates for the reinstitutionalisation of 
“indigenous land tenure systems and informal procedures in land administration” (1996 in 
Amanor 1999:13). From these debates, Amanor observes that at the centre of the land 
question is the transaction cost of land reforms which is a major problematic in many 
countries, not least Ghana. To mitigate the challenge of transaction costs the state should 
support “indigenous land tenure systems and community organizations that can administer 
land relations and absorb transaction costs” (Amanor, 1999:15).  
Thus, today ‘the major emphasis is now on promoting endogenous, transaction-cost-
reducing rural institutions” (ibid). To operationalize this, Platteau (1992 in Amanor, 1999) 
argues that a dual system of collective title should coexist with individual title as it pertained 
in settler colonies. The African experience however, indicates that the power structures 
embedded in endogenous institutions (clan heads, family heads and chiefs) that will promote 
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the new style land reforms invariably work to the advantage of the powerful and not the poor 
(see Ubink, 2008).  
More recently, Amanor (2012) pointed out that land reforms and institutional 
arrangements over land in Africa from the early colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods 
underscore how politics, commercial agriculture, forest governance, labour and revenue 
mobilization (among other factors that continue to shape land reforms and debates) have not 
seriously factored in the needs and anxieties of Africa’s numerous poor land owners (also see 
Moyo, 2008). This is still a major hurdle which I think social analysts and land management 
experts must embrace in order to argue for a policy structure in which the needs and anxieties 
of the peasantry will be embedded.  
I also find Amanor’s analysis of land reforms instructive because it brings to the 
surface the global structures of modernization and the impact of modernization theory in the 
land debate, the importance of land to human economy and some of the reasons behind the 
“mess” in land reforms in Ghana and the conflicts they generate. There is therefore, the need 
to rethink endogenous land tenure systems. These are significant points and in my own 
analysis of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, some of these points will help to define and 
explain some of the challenges embedded in the conflict.  
Elsewhere, human rights challenges have also emerged as a factor in the land question. 
Moore (in Lund, 1999) argues that debates over land reforms in postcolonial Africa, 
especially in Tanzania, have engendered a human rights issue because radical land reforms 
have deprived many people of land. This situation indicates the lack of balance between the 
state and local actors in the management of land and also points to reasons why land reforms 
have not worked well in most parts of the continent (also see Mamdani, 1996; Kasanga and 
Kotey, 2001). In line with the human rights argument, Amanor (1999) argues that the new 
institutional economics of land titling is detrimental to women who already lack rights to 
control and to determine the giving of land within established local community structures. In 
Alavanyo and Nkonya, the patrilineal system of inheritance respects only usufruct rights of 
women to land and not allodial rights. This is impoverishing many women and youth and 
creating challenges of land and food security. 
The challenge of Africa’s colonial boundaries has also emerged as a major theme in 
the land debate. Nugent’s (1996) work in the Ghana-Togo border which in the colonial past 
included Alavanyo and Nkonya shows how boundaries can divide clan-based communities 
and at same time be redefined to ‘represent theatres of opportunity’ exploited by locals, 
individuals and state officials for private interests (see also Geschiere, 2009). This border 
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challenge is still at the core of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict and indicates that the 
Gruner boundary map drawn in 1913 must be confronted if the conflict must be resolved. In 
line with the above findings Lentz (2003) relates how a colonial boundary drawn in 1898 
between the Dagara on the Ghanaian border and Sisala on the Burkina Faso border later 
turned into a land conflict. The Dagara youth argued that the linear boundary usurps their land 
rights to also fish in a pond in Sisala territory which is under the ritual authority of the earth 
priest. This conflict shows how state involvement and the modernist construction of 
sovereignty may become counter-productive to traditional structures of right(s) to land vested 
in the leadership of the earth priest.
27
  
In some parts of Africa land reforms have and continue to influence theories of 
citizenship, political participation, and public office. Boone (2007) demonstrates how in 
places like Kenya, Tanzania and Cote d’Ivoire, debates over land reforms are embedded in 
issues of citizenship, political authority, public matters, and electoral processes. As an 
example, she cites the Code Dominial of 1963 in Ivory Coast. This code was instituted by the 
government to manage land reforms which eventually deprived indigenous land owners of 
individual and communal rights to land because of the abuse by state actors. In Ghana, 80% 
of the land belongs to the clans, chiefs and earth priests, so the state has limited influence on 
land. Yet, land laws and customary practices have not been clear, but are rather complicated 
because of abuse by state officials and powerful individuals. In a different body of research, 
Amanor (1999, 2010), Lentz (2006), Ubink (2007, 2008) and Babo (2013), indicate how the 
increasing commodification of land has led to land insecurity to some people and security to 
others. For instance, Ubink (2007) shows how the commodification of land in peri-urban 
Kumasi brought tenure insecurity to peasants and security to elite groups. By contrast, 
Goodwin’s (2013) research in Matabeleland in Zimbabwe reveals that here locals were able to 
gain tenure security in land through social capital and traditional customary practices.
28
  
In recent years however, these measures have been ignored as groups and individuals 
sell land in total disregard for custom. This has often generated land disputes as a single piece 
of land may have multiple claimants.  
                                                          
27
 Also consult Christian Lund’s work (2008) “Local politics and the dynamics of property in Africa” for an in-
depth discussion on how reinventions and reinterpretations of the past as well as the tensions that are generated 
when earth priests who are custodians of land have their rights usurped by chiefs who have little to do with land 
matters.  
28
 Locals must show that in one’s traditional kitchen a ritual bench which has the dual purpose of receiving 
people at birth and when they die can be found and also prove that one’s umbilical cord was buried under the 
doorsteps of one’s kitchen or some portion of the land. 
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Moreover, in sections of Africa, the ancestralisation of land rights and the inclusion or 
exclusion of others (as shown by Boni for the Sefwi of southern Ghana (in Kuba & Lentz, 
2006), by Berry (in Ubink and Amanor 2008) for Ghana and Ivory Coast, and by Shipton 
(1992, 2009) for the Luo of Kenya), has prompted a renewed debate on the land question. 
Shipton argues that in Luoland, rights to land and belonging are linked to kinship ties, thus 
land is rarely sold or mortgaged, for this would amount to ‘mortgaging the ancestors.’ 
Increasingly, pressure from state sponsored projects of land sales and agribusiness, however, 
is challenging the ancestral roots theory and pushes peasants to take loans or mortgage their 
lands. Eventually, the mortgage system leads to a situation where family/clan heads mortgage 
lands, and then die without paying the loans which their families will then have to settle. 
These challenges lead to numerous land disputes. Boni’s research shows a different 
application of the ancestral blood theory. In the Sefwi area it was rather the booming cocoa 
industry and not a mortgage system that increased the value of land and enticed chiefs to 
invent a criterion based on ancestrality so to differentiate between ‘pure’ Sefwi who could 
have land rights and ‘impure’ Sefwi who could not. Inevitably, this criterion led to land 
disputes in the area, because what constituted ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ Sefwi was difficult to 
delineate because of centuries of close intermarriages between migrants and locals. Since the 
start of the land dispute which I will be analyzing, the logic of ancestral blood as means to 
land ownership has also been frequently invoked by elders in Alavanyo and Nkonya to bolster 
their claims to the land. This study will give attention to this issue.  
The literature on the land question also points to the challenge posed by the discourse 
of first comer/later comer, autochthon/non-autochthon, categories that often act as major 
drivers of land disputes in many parts of Africa. But is the first comer/late comer status 
immutable? In this regard, Geschiere (2009) argues that autochthony is a fluid term that is 
often applied as a political tool by actors to include and exclude others not only with regards 
to land rights, but also in relation to the appropriation of other resources. Pelican (2009) 
expresses a similar view in her study of a land struggle between the Mbororo and the 
Grassfielders of Cameroun. She shows how, in this region the argument of “priority in time, 
that is, of being first comers to a certain area, plays a crucial role” (p. 57) in strengthening 
one’s claim to land. With a slightly different research focus, Lentz (2006) demonstrates how 
different versions of history, and the ambiguity and malleability of land tenure systems could 
create confusion between senior and junior earth priests and occasion land conflicts. In a 
scenario like this, “what counts, then, are the social networks and the political power that can 
be brought into play to support one’s own story” (Lentz 2006:54). In relation to this discourse 
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one should also view the politicization of history, which, as Lund (2008) argues, means that 
any struggle over land is invariably also a struggle over history, because actors often reach for 
the past, however awkward that past might prove to be, in order to push claims. The discourse 
of first comer and late comer is a major cause of palaver often in my case as well, enfeebling 
efforts at resolving the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute.   
Moreover, the literature on the land debate also shows that some land disputes are 
rooted in the colonial ‘invention’ of the customary (see Mamdani, 1996; Amanor, 1999, 2008; 
and Berry, 2001, 1992). Drawing on the Ghanaian experience, Amanor explains how the 
colonial administration ‘invented’ a custom that gave some chiefs and the colonial 
administration power over land originally belonging to the peasantry. He says “colonial rule 
also created new roles for chiefs and invented new types of chief, such as the warrant chiefs in 
areas in which secular political chiefs had not previously existed. New secular chiefs created 
by colonial rule often displaced earth priests” (Amanor, 2012). 
This brought land insecurity to the sub-altern as it also led to different Land Bills 
which were strongly opposed by the Gold Coast Intelligentsia of the time. Berry’s (1992, 
2001) research in post-independence Kumasi also indicates how ‘invented’ custom enabled 
traditional elites/chiefs and state actors to expropriate heritable land from locals. The story is 
not different in other West African countries such as Nigeria, where the policies of indirect 
rule gave the colonisers control over land, natural resources and persons (Alao, 2008).  
Additionally, in northern Ghana, the land debate indicates that land disputes are also 
the result of competition between Earth priests, (tendamaa) and Chiefs over the power to 
allocate land in a particular jurisdiction. Lund (2008) argues that over the years, chiefs have 
tried to usurp the rights of earth priests by neglecting the latter’s right to allocate land. At the 
core is the issue of power relations between chiefs and earth priests and the commodification 
of land mentioned above. According to Lund, land disputes resulting from this situation end 
in inconclusive encounters i.e. they go on indefinitely.  
Studies have also shown that ethnicity and agrarian specialization challenges are at the 
root of some land struggles. Tackling this issue, Tonah (2000) shows how struggles over 
grazing and arable land in the Ghanaian border region between Fulbe nomadic pastoralists 
from Burkina Faso and Kasena agro-pastoralists have been the basis of land disputes for 
years. This conflict becomes very intense in the raining season when there is enough grass for 
the cattle and the land is equally fertile for planting/sowing of crops for various purposes. The 
Kasena farmers did not understand why the Fulbe could not restrict themselves to the Burkina 
side of the border. The Fulbe on the other hand did not see any reason to restrict themselves to 
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the Burkina side for the border is so fluid that it allow for easy cross-border activities to take 
place. As the struggle wore on, the anti-nomadic groups among the Kasena politicized the 
presence of the Fulbe, accusing them of misfortunes and the increasing cost of pesticides for 
cattle disease among other things. As result, the Fulbe were compelled to leave the area. 
Greiner’s (2013) research in northern Kenya also shows how cattle raiding, struggles for 
exclusive access to land and ethnic politics might engender disputes over territorial space. 
Greiner argues that the raiding of cattle in this region is a form of organized crime carried out 
by pastoralists with AK-47 guns. This research resonates with some of my own findings in 
Alavanyo and Nkonya where people of both communities have (and continue) to capitalize on 
the fluidity of the Gruner boundary to eat into each other’s farming lands and where ‘raiding 
gangs’ are frequently using guns to raid timber and to loot farm produce.   
The literature on the land question has also indicated that tree tenure in forest zones in 
Africa, and not least Ghana, is a major driver of land disputes. In Ghana, it is a crime for 
farmers to sell trees to chainsaw operators because “timber trees are vested in the office of the 
president to manage on behalf of chiefs who are the owners of timber” (Amanor, 1999:70). 
This law, as Amanor (1999) argues, is based on an invented tradition of the 1960s because 
already in the 1950s, it was normative practice for farmers to sell timber trees to pit-sawyers. 
Yet, since the 1980s, the informal sector of illegal chainsaw logging has been criminalized by 
the state in favour of concessions, especially in farmlands. Ironically, the demand for timber 
in urban and rural areas comes from the informal sector, which today is controlled by “urban-
based bureaucrats, politicians, entrepreneurs and timber operators…. (ibid.71). Estimates 
show that three-quarters of illegal timber production in Ghana goes to domestic markets 
(Lawson & MacFaul, 2010). The story is not different in other parts of the world, as 
Ramcilovic-Suominen et al (2010) illustrates.  
In Ghana, timber governance has become a big problem because of the resistance to 
policy reforms by economic and political elite groups in society. The illegal logging of timber 
is thriving especially on off-reserve areas because farmers who have the right to negotiate and 
to consent with timber companies before they log timber on their farms often have their rights 
violated by the companies as they refuse to pay them the required compensation. Because of 
this, they are enticed to collude with chainsaw operators with whom they strike better deals 
(Lund et al, 2012). This challenge has made the issue of legality in timber governance a 
difficult thing to achieve because the enforcement of forest governance laws and timber 
legislations will mean that all timber/wood users will have to purchase from the formal sector 
where the prices are very high. This will inevitably increase the price of wood products for 
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most of Ghana’s population. Yet, politicians are unwilling to go for such a reform policy 
hence the daylight expansion of illegal lumbering.   
All over the forest zone in Ghana, the abuse of the law by forestry officials who 
collude with illegal chainsaw operators and farmers to fell trees for financial rewards is a 
major problem, depriving many communities such as Nkonya and Alavanyo of the needed 
revenue for ‘development’. The increasing value of timber has become a major source of 
many land conflicts, not least in Alavanyo and Nkonya.  
This review demonstrates that the land debate has generated a renewed interest in land 
reforms, and especially the need to rethink the reinstitutionalisation of traditional land tenure 
and to confront the challenges that may emanate from its implementation. Human rights 
challenges rooted in the marginal rights of women and youth to land continues to be a major 
issue in the appropriation of land in many societies. A great effort on the part of government, 
policy analyst and researchers will be needed to reverse this trend.  
The perennial problem of Africa’s colonial boundaries and how they continue to 
engender land conflicts across the continent and the use of land reforms determine political 
participation, citizenship and public office in some countries have also been elaborated. These 
issues will continue to be a major problem for a long while to come. The configuration of land 
rights to ancestral blood through which people in some societies are deprived of rights to land, 
and the political posture by actors to instrumentalise first comer and later comer categories for 
different ends continue to be thorny issues on the land question. The commodification of land 
and labour issues and the politics of power to control persons and things are at the root of 
these challenges.  
The connection between ethnicity and agrarian specialisation and the potential for this 
relationship to generate land conflict has equally been articulated in this work. I have also 
indicated how the works of some researchers have shown how the ‘invention’ of the 
customary has led to numerous land disputes in many places in Africa. Finally, the 
exploitation of timber resources by a few to the detriment of the majority has also emerged as 
driver/trigger of land conflicts which in most cases has led to loss of life and property. 
While this literature review has certainly not covered every major issue in the land 
debate, it does show that the problems underpinning the land question are the result of global 
economic and development agendas, cultural and historical factors, local power struggles 
among various actors, social networks and transactional agreements and so on. While I 
appreciate the rich body of literature on the land question and will draw on it, I also find that 
the literature has not adequately tackled a major challenge of the land question, namely the 
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issues of interethnic land conflict and protracted intergenerational problems such as the one in 
Nkonya and Alavanyo in which traditional authorities, youth and ‘elite’ groups are involved 
and in which one party has won all the court cases, yet has no control over the land. In this 
area, the disputed land is fertile and extremely well fit for agrarian activities, rich in timber 
and alleged to have deposits of gold, mercury and clay. The baseline of my own theoretical 
argument, which will be framed through the concepts of power and agency and will respond 
to the challenges outlined above, is that the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict is insoluble 
because of 1) the economic interest in the timber by a few, 2) the disrespect for the court 
verdicts, 3) issues of power, ethnic politics and land security, and 4) complex 
intergenerational problems.  
1.5. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study will be guided by a conceptual and theoretical framework that is grounded in the 
anthropological concepts of power and agency. These concepts will explain and undergird my 
analysis of the core issues that are making the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict insoluble. In 
every society, groups and individuals have always had power and agency, but the way these 
are built and expressed/acted out in different contexts varies from one society/group to the 
other.  Power and agency are at the root of conflicts in many parts of the world. For instance, 
(Gledhill, 2000) shows how the micro-dynamics of power in everyday life sometimes 
expressed through the interactions between the local and global realities offer critical insights 
into such issues as state terror and ethnic violence, land conflicts, the politics of rights, and 
gender issues. 
In the specific case of the Alavanyo and Nkonya, I observed that power and agency 
are at the heart of the socio-economic structures, political systems, laws and religion, 
leadership styles, property ownership etc of the people. And as these structures are 
indispensable to the social organisation of the people and deal with actors with agentive 
capacities, I could not adequately theorise the conflict without understanding how power and 
agency are built and acted out within specific socio-political arenas. Agency is about power in 
its multiple manifestations, and power involves agency in its multiple expressions. One 
cannot therefore anchor any discourse on power without agency and vice versa for they are 
intimately connected and are often exploited by actors for multiple goals. This however, does 
not mean that without power the weak/powerless cannot have agency, power is a multifarious 
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phenomenon and the weak/powerless can also access it in a myriad of ways (de Certeau, 
1988; Giddens, 1989).   
Power is a ubiquitous term, and therefore it is variously defined by scholars and can be 
applied to different settings depending on the structures of authority in a given society. 
Nevertheless, power always entails the use of some ‘deposit of influence.’ In Eric Wolf’s 
(2002) theories of power, he talks about tactical power and structural power among other 
forms of power and how these influence the changing structures of society and property 
relations. Tactical power is expressed in the ability of one to control the settings in which 
people may show forth their potentiality/energy flow in interaction with others. Tactical 
power is therefore related to how individuals use power invested in them to control the 
potentials of others in society from being actualised. Structural power is about how one 
organises and creates the settings of power, the distribution and direction of energy flows or 
potentiality. This form of power is grounded on Marxists ideology of how systems of 
production control the means of capital and the distribution of labour power. Structural power 
is related to the social relations of production. In furtherance of the debate on power, de 
Certeau makes an interesting contribution which I find enlightening. He makes a distinction 
between strategies and tactics. He describes strategies as:  
“The calculation (or manipulation) of power relationship that becomes possible as 
soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific 
institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own 
and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets 
or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, 
objectives and objects or research, etc.) can be managed” (1988:35-36).  
 
In relation to tactics, de Certeau elaborates that a tactic is: 
 “A calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No 
delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for 
autonomy. The space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus, it must play on 
and with a terrain imposed on it and organised by the law of a foreign power. It 
does not have the means to keep to itself, at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, 
foresight, and self-collection….. It does not therefore, have the options of 
planning general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a district, 
visible, and objectifiable space. It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It 
takes advantage of “opportunities” and depends on them, being without any base 
where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. 
What it wins it cannot keep. This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but a 
mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the 
wing the possibilities that offer  themselves at any given moment” (1988:37).   
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The analysis of de Certeau posits a theoretical trajectory in which strategies belong to 
powerful individuals/institutions and are fundamentally manipulative in character. Strategic 
power is a form of power in which actors always maintain a place of control and influence for 
their own ends and from where they debar the threats of customers or competitors, i.e. the 
weak. Tactics on the other hand belong to the weak; it is the weapon of the weak (cf. Scott, 
1985). Tactics is an activity of vigilance in which the tactician blow by blow seizes on every 
opportunity and chance to actualise his goals and ambitions. Tactics belong to the 
weak/subaltern who knows why, how, when and what to look for on the contingencies of 
every moment/situation. These narratives of power resonate with the ways power is 
configured and expressed in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict and how traditional 
authorities, the youth and the elite employ one form of power or another for different goals. 
For instance, traditional authorities and the elite groups are more adept in using tactical power 
or strategies to control the practical and discursive spaces of the land dispute, the youth and to 
prevent outsiders from “knowing and interfering” in what is actually going on in the two 
communities. On the other hand, the youth and the ‘powerless’ in the society, employ tactics 
as a way to make themselves heard and to actively participate in the dynamics of the micro-
politics of the conflict and community life. These different applications of power have often 
resulted in tensions between traditional authorities, the elite and different youth groups and it 
seems this will continue for a long time to come because of the different interests of each 
group in the conflict.  
Other social theorists such as Michel Foucault (also talk about power as something 
relational and productive; it is therefore not a thing to hold or keep. Foucault argues that 
power is exercised through the social body and so not localised in the state/government but 
diffused through the most basic level of society or social relations. Foucault’s analysis shows 
that where power relations are at play there are bound to be different forms of resistance 
(Foucault & Rabinow, 1984; Foucault, 1991). Additionally, Foucault argues that power is not 
for its own sake, but is exercised for the acquisition of knowledge which in turn empowers 
groups or individuals to act in a certain direction. He illustrates this by looking closely at how 
the human and social sciences work since the 19
th
 century and argues that these sciences tend 
to see human behaviour and society as a problem/object of investigation to be analysed and 
resolved. This process of investigation invariably leads to the acquisition of knowledge which 
becomes the preserve of a few e.g. sociologists who have the exclusive right of interpreting 
and configuring what is right and acceptable and what is wrong and unacceptable (cf. 
Kritzman, 1988). This shows how power is closely related to systems of knowledge and 
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strategies of controlling and restricting information by experts for certain ends. Hence, for 
Foucault, the birth of the human and social sciences brought about what he calls mechanisms 
or procedures of power. While one can appraise Foucault’s theory on power for its in-depth 
analysis of how power is embedded in different social and political arenas, it appears to be too 
reductionist and too all-embracing as it interprets almost every human action/phenomenon in 
the light of power.  
In the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict, it will be wrong to underrate the use of power 
in understanding and interpreting the dynamics of the conflict and the instrumentality of 
actors; but it will be too presumptuous to reduce the multifarious actions and reactions of 
actors to political power. Other latent but felt interests such as economic interests and the 
acquisition of the land by both parties for current and future generations are equally strong 
determinants of the resilience associated with the conflict. Foucault’s idea of power has 
however, deepened our understanding of power in social theory and practice, and also how 
power is embedded in the structure of penitential institutions, political economy and human 
sexuality (Foucault, 1991).  
Basing his ideas of power on pre-colonial African realities, Herbst (2000) also argues 
that in Africa “power was (quite realistically) conceived of as a series of concentric circles 
radiating out from the core” (p.45). This core is the centre of power localised in local 
authorities such as chiefs and elders or state authorities. This sense of ‘radiating out’ of power 
was conceived not in terms of the position of the chief, but in terms of space or territory in 
which chiefs in the local community measured power and authority in terms of the spatial 
territory under their control. The amount of land a chief owned was significant for the amount 
of authority or power he wielded. This is still very much the case in most parts of southern 
Ghana.  
In this thesis, while I will be inspired by the theoretical positions of the authors above, 
I also be articulating power as the ability of individuals or groups to influence the human 
(political, economic, and socio-cultural) and metaphysical (religious and spiritual) potentials 
of an institution or society for individual and group interests.  
Agency has become a valuable concept in political and social sciences today because it 
reveals how power is mobilised and used by actors. In her analysis of agency, Ahearn says 
“agency refers to the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (2001:112). In this sense 
agency is influenced by socio-cultural factors and is intimately connected to power and vice 
versa. The agentive capacity of actors is expressed within the context of power or some form 
of influence. Without power in any form, agency cannot be acted out. In a related perspective, 
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Ortner argues that agency cannot be properly conceptualised or defined without first closely 
examining human intentions which she terms ‘intentionality’. In her view intentionality:  
“is meant to include a wide range of states, both cognitive and emotional, and at 
various levels of consciousness, that are directed forward toward some end. Thus 
intentionality in agency might include highly conscious plots and plans and 
schemes; somewhat more nebulous aims, goals, and ideals; and finally desires, 
wants, and needs that may range from being deeply buried to quite consciously 
felt” (2006:134).  
 
On the grounds of this, Ortner emphasizes that agency is a capacity that is consciously or 
sometimes unconsciously developed by actors in order to actualize intentions or goals, 
however awkward or well-intentioned they may be. Taking inspiration from the works of 
Anthony Giddens (1979) and Jean and John Comaroff (1991), she argues further that in 
general, human actions are always prompted by some intention; however, intentionality 
denotes a state in which goals are consciously held in the minds of actors in an enduring 
fashion so that outcomes are not only those explicitly intended but also those with unintended 
consequences. In this wise the term can be problematic. At any rate agency is always socially 
and culturally constructed and that is why it can become systemic and enduring especially 
when this is related to youth activities, as argued by Honwana and De Boeck (2005) and 
Argenti (2007). I find Ortner’s analysis in which she configures the notion of intentionality to 
agency enlightening. However, given that agency is not only human and may possibly also 
involve nonhuman entities like machines, signs, spirits and so on, I will conceptualize the 
term to embrace both human and non-human entities/realities. I argue that agency is primarily 
intended to bring about change, forestall or redefine the context in which it is configured, and 
the agentive subject is always one vested with some sort of power.  
In this thesis I embody the concept of agency as a means or as an expression of power 
by leaders or subjects to gain control/influence over persons and things. In relation to youth 
groups, traditional authorities and ‘elite’ groups in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, I shall 
show how the agentive capacities of these groups are instrumentalised in the land conflict 
especially in the ‘raiding’ of timber on the disputed land. The above concepts are interrelated, 
but individuals and groups cannot compete and express their agentive capacities if they lack 
power.  
Today, the land dispute in Nkonya and Alavanyo has occasioned a multidimensional 
expression of power in which the centrality of authority is vested not only in chiefs, queen 
mothers, war leaders and youth leaders but multiple other different actors including youth 
groups, elite groups, individuals, politicians and others. It is this diffusion of power that 
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informs the daunting challenges involved in the effort by locals and state authorities in finding 
a solution to the dispute and the multiple phases of resistance and rebellion expressed in the 
different stages of the land dispute.  
1.6. OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
This research is the first ethnographic study of the land dispute between the Nkonya and 
Alavanyo since it started in the 1900s. In researching this dispute, my intention is to use 
academic theorization as a lens to understand the two communities and the dynamics of the 
dispute, and to proffer some ways through which the land dispute may be resolved. The 
Alavanyo and Nkonya are two different ethnic groups, but both are intimately connected to 
each other and to the land with which they relate as with a ‘human being’. It is on the land 
they live; it is the land they owe their existence to. Similarly, it is on the land the relationship 
between them and the ancestors and deities and with each other is defined, developed and 
acted out. For the two peoples, the land is the field of knowing and understanding the past, 
appreciating the present and foreshadowing the future. The future is always perceived in the 
present, and the present is grounded in the fruits and blessings of the past. Thus, the past, the 
present and the future feed into each other and give meaning to the people’s relationship with 
the physical and metaphysical world and the land. When there is no land to live on and relate 
with, there is no human existence, as some of my informants explained. While the long 
relationship between the two communities has brought them closer, there is no doubt that the 
encounter between the two has gone through a lot of rough times. Hopefully, the land dispute 
may help us appreciate not only the disjunctive dynamics of the dispute but also the social 
junctures and the political manoeuvrings that, over the years, have been sustaining and re-
sustaining the land dispute.      
The first objective of this study is to find out how two different ethnic communities, 
whose forefathers ‘drunk fetish’ (a traditional oath taking rite sealing covenants) and shared 
land and life together for over 300 years, could allow their relations to degenerate into a 
violent conflict leading to the loss of property and human life over a period of 100 years. I 
will endeavour to understand what characterizes the identity of the Nkonya and Alavanyo as a 
people, and why they could not use their intermarriages, common social activities and inter-
boundary agrarian activities to iron out their differences when the land dispute started. If they 
do have a traditional ritual of settling disputes within their communities, was it possible for 
them to have used that to solve the land dispute when it erupted? 
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Secondly, this study also aims to show that while it is generally perceived that the 
courts are the best enforcers of law and order in the event of a conflict in any community, this 
research will show that though since 1953 the courts in Ghana have ruled in all the court cases 
in favour of the Nkonya, the boundary dispute is still far from over. Did the judges err in the 
manner judgment was passed, so that the Alavanyo felt cheated? Is ethnic and power politics 
in the locality and the region responsible for the difficulty in implementing the court findings? 
Is it because the two communities are so intermarried that enforcing the court rulings will 
mean displacing some families and individuals whose relations cut across both divides? Are 
the activities of ‘elite’ groups and individuals, the youth and some traditional authorities 
disrupting the peace in the area and encouraging entrenched positions?  
Thirdly, it is the objective of this study to demonstrate how weak traditional 
leadership, the agency of youth, the overt and covert activities of ‘elite’ groups and the 
commoditization of land is nourishing the conflict among other factors. At present, the socio-
political ‘space’ in Nkonya-Alavanyo is controlled by multiple actors of which the youth, 
traditional authorities and ‘elite’ groups are topmost. And the core of their power has little to 
do with the land boundary, but much with economic interest in the timber. In a scenario like 
this, who maintains law and order or social control? 
Fourthly, this research also aims to gain an understanding of how discourses of first 
comer/late comer and autochthon/non-autochthon categories and belonging are constructed 
along ethnic lines and how colonial and post-colonial power politics have created some of the 
problems related to the land conflict.  
Finally, this study hopes to make a contribution to our knowledge of resource conflicts 
by deepening our understanding and appreciation of what an endowment like land means to 
the two local communities of Nkonya and Alavanyo, and how the findings can inform policy 
formulation and mediation efforts aimed at resolving the dispute/conflict.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND, HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND COSMOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the difficult things in researching long running land conflicts is their historical 
character i.e. how, over time, the conflict has become layered or nested with social and 
political ‘facts’ and ‘fictions.’ Lund’s (2008) work in northern Ghana and Berry’s (1992; 
2001) works among the Ashanti of southern Ghana among others attest to the complexity 
involved in studying land conflicts in which actors instrumentalise history by reworking or 
rereading the past and grounding it in current happenings for various interests. This is 
precisely the greatest challenge in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict, the history of which is 
so heavily nested with reconstructions and contestations that it makes any effort at resolving it 
a distant reality. While the two groups are both appealing to the past to make their case for the 
disputed land, it is not easy to tell whose history is ‘true’ and whose history is ‘wrong.’ In this 
conflict, history has become a ‘shifter’ in which actors, however awkwardly, continue to draw 
on social, cultural and other factors from the past to bolster their claims to the disputed land.  
This chapter will be divided into four parts in order to unravel the different drivers of 
the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict and the worldviews/cosmology of the people within the 
framework of the colonial, postcolonial and the present.   
In the first part I will give a brief outline of the political and socio-economic 
background of the Nkonya and the Alavanyo to introduce my readers to the socio-political 
arrangements in the two communities.  
In the second part, I will try to unravel the historical dynamics in which the land 
conflict has been embroiled over the years in order to situate how the conflict may be 
understood within the context of the colonial and the post-colonial periods and the present. In 
each period, I will address the pertinent issues that have been driving the conflict and the 
intergenerational challenges and how these have affected the people in the different social and 
cultural spaces in which they inhabit today.  
The cosmic worldview of the two communities shall be treated in the third part of this 
chapter. Here, I will underscore the importance of understanding and appreciating the 
worldviews of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya with a view to demonstrating why they do things 
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the way they do. In the fourth part, I will demonstrate how they navigate the challenges and 
chances of life in the context of the conflict in which they are immersed.   
I will conclude with a brief outline in which I will emphasize the salient points of the 
chapter, and stress in particular the challenges of colonial and postcolonial politics, power 
dynamics, issues of identity and belonging, and economic interests of a few in the commercial 
trees among other factors as issues that must be confronted if the conflict must stop.  
2.1. GENERAL BACKGROUND: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE 
  
The political and socio-economic organization of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya will also be 
touched upon in various other parts of this dissertation, but for now let it suffice to acquaint 
my readers with a brief outline of the political and socio-economic life of the two 
communities.  
According to Gavua (2000), in precolonial times traditional political authority in 
Alavanyo and indeed its environs was carried out by chief custodians of land called afetofia. 
These carried out their duties in conjunction with chief priests (trofia) of important deities. 
Both the chief priests and the chief custodians of land “provided spiritual and moral guidance 
of their people, administered land and settled major disputes that usually involved land, 
adultery, murder, witchcraft and theft” (Gavua 2000:11). For example, if someone was caught 
stealing or if someone was accused of murder, such offenders were taken to the chief priests 
and chief custodian of the land for a resolution. Cases of murder were taken very seriously as 
they were seen to desecrate the land, attracting severe punishment from the gods and the 
ancestors. Today, this is hardly the case anymore as the current political organization headed 
by paramount chiefs and sub-chiefs and state institutions has absorbed most of the duties 
hitherto played by the chief priests and chief custodian of land.    
In Nkonya the situation was slightly different. At the pinnacle of the political 
hierarchy the duties were similar to what I have stated above, but they were performed not by 
a chief but by “old men and politico-religious leaders who operated without a stool” 
(Nyinanse 1984:74, also see Amenumey, 2011).
29
 One of such persons was the High Priest of 
the ‘tribal’ god, ‘Nanasia’. This chief could be compared to a paramount chief today. At the 
lower level it was the eldest surviving male of the clan who was responsible for the 
maintenance of law, order and peace (Nyinanse, 1984). However, the encounter of the 
                                                          
29
 The stool is an embodiment of the spirit of the ancestors of the people and a symbol of the chief’s spiritual 
power. The people gave loyalty, respect and obedience to the chief in return for the spiritual protection which the 
stool was believed to offer. There is a twin connection between the chief and the stool (Gavua, 2000, see also 
Bluwey, 2000). 
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Nkonya with the Asante in the 18
th
 century changed their political system and led to the 
adoption of the symbol of the sacred stool and the idea of chiefs, (ahenfo plu. and ohene, 
sing.) which is central to the Akan (Akwamu, Akim, Kwahu and Asante) political system 
(Gavua 2000; Nyinanse, 1984). This process was known as Akanisation. Three reasons 
accounted for this; first, by this time the religious-secular role of the high priest and his 
council had become anachronistic and was no longer capable of uniting the people. Second, 
with the numerous attacks from the Akan, it was imperative to introduce a new form of 
leadership and a strong army, especially to withstand the frequent attacks from the Asante and 
Akwamu, and third, new forms of leadership were needed to combat the penetrating influence 
of the British colonial powers that were beginning to influence local political organisation in 
the area around this time.  
By the beginning of the colonial period, both Nkonya and Alavanyo were already 
operating a centralised political system in which paramount chiefs, sub-chiefs and councils of 
elders were in the helm of affairs at the town and village levels. In both communities, the 
process of Akanisation also led to the adoption of the office of the Queen mother, Nyonufia. 
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, the Queen mothers do not have stools. Their role is auxiliary to that 
of the chief from whom they take directives. Thus, they do not have an autonomous power to 
make and enforce any law in their own right without the full complements of the chief 
(Gavua, 2000). The Queen mother is, however, often consulted, especially when the chiefs 
and elders are deliberating on matters that touch upon the domain of women. Also, during the 
colonial period, the introduction of indirect rule through the Native Authority system around 
the 1920s, and the process of amalgamation by the British led to a situation in which some 
chiefs were elevated to the status of paramountcy while others, who until then had been 
autonomous chiefs with their own jurisdiction, were brought under one paramountcy for 
purposes of advancing British colonial political control over locals. This colonial political 
arrangement affected the nature of traditional leadership in the area and has today become a 
major source of chieftaincy and land conflicts in the Volta region of Ghana.   
Economically, Nkonya and Alavanyo live in one of the poorest areas in the Volta 
region. They have a high youth population of which most are semi-literate, unskilled and 
unemployed. This is a social challenge that has been impacting on the land dispute as idle 
youth are easily mobilized into violent activities.  
The communities of Alavanyo and Nkonya fall within the Forest-Savanna transitional 
ecological zone of Ghana, with the forest part at its north-eastern sectors. Rain-fed subsistence 
agriculture is a major source of livelihood to many people. In the past, the area boasted of 
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cash crops such as cocoa and coffee, but today, most cocoa farms are gone due to land 
degradation. Also, the forest is partly devastated through bad farming practices and the 
destructive activities of illegal lumbering of timber.  
Both Alavanyo and Nkonya can boast of only one clinic each serving the health needs 
of the people. Serious health cases are sent to the district hospitals in Hohoe and Kpandu and 
health services are often very expensive. While the roads in Nkonya are motorable, those in 
Alavanyo are in very bad shape, thus stalling economic activities in the area.  
The production of guns and other metallurgical implements (though on a small 
artisanal scale), sand winning and stone breaking constitute some of the main economic 
activities in the two communities especially among the youth and women. Other youth groups 
also engage in petty trading, hunting, fishing and Okada.
30
 Some also grow marijuana which 
is prohibited according Ghanaian law but constitutes an important source of income since it is 
in high demand in the area and beyond. 
 
2.2. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE AND INTERGENERATIONAL CHALLENGES  
 
The struggle over any resource, for instance land, is always a struggle over the past which is 
often invoked by actors to leverage their competitive potential in order to include or exclude 
others in the pursuit of a resource (cf. Lund, 2008). In Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, history 
has become a strong ideological and political tool not only in the struggle over natural 
resources, but also in local and state politics, art and industry, human and property relations 
and so forth.  
The major challenge I faced in researching the history of the Nkonya-Alavanyo land 
conflict is the lack of scholarly literature on the conflict although scholars such as Bening 
(1983) have mentioned that already in 1914 there were some boundary problems in the 
Kpandu area (which in the colonial past included Alavanyo and Nkonya) which were settled 
through ethnic boundary demarcations (see also Austin, 1963; Brown, 1980 and Apoh, 2013). 
But even this scanty material I was able to collect from colonial records is sometimes unclear, 
as are the oral narratives rendered by locals. I hope, however, that my field notes and other 
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 Okada is a commercial motorcycle that is used as a vehicle in Nigeria. The name comes from the now defunct 
Okada Air, a Nigerian local airline. Okada is compared to an airplane because of its ability to move commuters 
faster to their destinations. Elikem, the leader of Okada boys in Alavanyo told me, Okada is an institutionalized 
system and organizational structure, with its own leaders and members who make monthly contributions to meet 
various needs of the group’s members. Officially, it is illegal to operate Okada in Ghana, but the poor conditions 
and the lack of employment in the area has rendered any restriction to this activity valueless. 
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archival material will allow me to produce a more or less coherent history of the land dispute 
under scrutiny. I will endeavor to capture how, over the years, the dispute has not only 
changed the socioeconomic landscape of the two communities, but has also impacted on 
issues of identity and belonging, while creating new intergenerational and gendered 
challenges between the young and the old and between men and women. Similarly, the 
conflict has reconfigured the role and the activities of traditional authorities, youth groups and 
the elite. I will adopt a diachronic approach to describe these transformations, by using the 
colonial and postcolonial periods and the present as an historical framework.  
2.2.1. Colonial Period  
 
Written and oral narratives relate that the Nkonya settled in the area part of which is disputed 
today around the 16
th
 century, long before the Alavanyo arrived in the early 1800s (Lilley 
1925; Wiegrabe, 1963; Dzathor, 1998; Gavua, 2000). Since this time, relations between the 
two groups has been characterised by intermarriage, and by the common celebration of 
funerals, festivals and other social interactive activities. Both communities lived in relative 
peace and harmony until the emergence of the land dispute during the colonial period 
weakened these harmonious socio-economic and political relations between the two, leading 
to challenges of identity and belonging (cf. Ampene, 2011; Dzathor, 1998).   
At about 1905, the Alavanyo were alleged to have trespassed into Nkonya land 
without performing the proper customary rites,
31
 thus starting a land boundary conflict. The 
disputed land, an area of 6,459.82 acres or 2,616.23 hectares
32
, is rich in timber, fertile for 
agrarian activities and alleged to have deposits of gold, mercury and clay. 
The German colonial administration at the time tried to settle the matter but could not. 
As far as oral sources are concerned, this was the beginning of the German colonial 
interference with the land conflict. The intervention of the Germans led to the Gruner 
boundary map of 1913. This map drew the physical boundaries among six contiguous states 
(Alavanyo, Nkonya, Gbi, Santrokofi, Akpafu and Bowiri). It was meant to forestall any future 
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 At that time, a land seeker was required to provide a sheep, drinks and some amount of money to the land 
owning family through the family head, and the land was given to the seeker before the family head and the chief 
and elders who act as witnesses, so that the whole transaction becomes a community affair.  
32
 The size of the disputed land is contained in the composite map that was drawn by two surveyors in 2007 as 
part of the efforts to resolve the dispute. 
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land conflicts in the area, but today, the boundary continues to be a major source of the 
conflict.
33
  
The earliest recorded account of a British colonial intervention in the Nkonya-
Alavanyo land dispute was written by C.C. Lilley, a colonial official in 1925. In his account, 
he mentioned that “during the German administration a land dispute involving the Nkonya 
and other divisions had been settled. In 1923, however, this decision brought about a riot, 
which, had it occurred prior to the European occupation, must have resulted in war. The 
fighting was localised to the divisions of Nkonya and Alavanyo” (1925:124-125).  
During my fieldwork older informants in the two communities acknowledged the 1923 riot 
and intimated that while it was meant to peacefully settle the boundary dispute between the 
two groups, it rather turned into a violent confrontation. Given the above situation, I tried as a 
researcher to go beyond the situation established by the Gruner map and to understand local 
meanings of boundary/border between the two communities and how it can potentially create 
conflict.  
In former times, and often still today, in both Nkonya and Alavanyo, a land 
boundary/border between two farmers or families was and is drawn not by a line or a map, but 
by using local boundary making trees known in Ewe as Anya and in Nkonya as Ntombe.
34
 
Also, ritual shrines such as the Etikpe shrine among the Nkonya which provides spiritual 
protection to people and property, river ways, or hunting paths are sometimes used to indicate 
boundaries between and among farmers or families within the same locality/community.
35
 
Informants told me that in spite of this seemingly arbitrary geography of sharing spaces, 
farmers and families know their boundaries and one cannot just appropriate any land without 
recourse to due customary process.  
At some point, however, as the two communities continued to mutually share social, 
economic and political spaces and interests, physical boundary problems began to tell on their 
relations.  
In the anthropology of borders/boundaries, scholars such as Paul Nugent and Anthony 
Ijaola Asiwaju (1996) have underscored how, even today, Africa’s colonial boundaries 
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 In a letter addressed to the Mediation Committee (MC) in 2007 by Anane-Quist, spokesman of Nkonya 
recaptured the historical events that led to the land conflict and the position of Nkonya on the matter. This letter 
is in possession of the Nkonya community, but I was able to make a copy of it.  
34
 Informants told me that, these trees were chosen for making boundaries because they could last for centuries in 
the harshest climatic conditions. 
35
 Lentz (2003) shows that the term boundary turbogr in (Dagara) and susubeo in (Sisala) refers to a “continuous 
line of holes” that is a ditch, making visible the boundaries between different fields owned by lineages, within 
lineages and different individuals. Sometimes hedges, shrubs or marks on trees are equally used to demarcate 
boundaries.   
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continue to create land conflicts in many parts of the continent. They argue that Africa’s 
borders “were primarily the outcome of European power-politics and there is abundant 
evidence that they were decided upon with little detailed knowledge of the areas concerned” 
(Nugent & Asiwaju (1996:41). Unfortunately, this colonial legacy has become part of today’s 
politics about boundaries and belonging, and is often reactivated by actors to contest claims 
over land or other resources (Lentz 2006, Lund 2008, Geschiere 2009, Berry 2001). The 
theories advanced by Nugent and Asiwaju, Lund and others find explicit evidence in the 
Alavanyo-Nkonya dispute where the particular events which are recalled to validate claims to 
land have taken place at particular points in time and have become part of different versions 
of history (cf. also Goheen 1992 for the Cameroonian context). Given the constant shifts and 
movements of people along the border between Ghana and Togo in colonial (and post-
colonial) times, the drawing of the Gruner map was inevitable, as is argued by Nyinanse 
(1984) who illustrates how during British rule around the 1920s, the Nkonya and Alavanyo 
area became a settlement territory for a large group of people he termed ‘refugees’. Some 
came  
“from Dahomey in the east and others came there from the gold coast in the west. 
These got mixed up with the autochthones and the whole area came to be settled 
by some “odd people” for whom a permanent union could have no lasting appeal 
or attraction” (p.123).  
 
Administratively, this was a big challenge to the British who had to administer this 
large mix of people. Today, the Alavanyo object to the Gruner boundary arguing that the 
boundary between them and Nkonya had already been established by the grandfathers of both 
communities with local boundary mapping trees (Anya) many years before the Gruner 
boundary was drawn up. Hence, in their reasoning, the Gruner map cannot be used as a basis 
to determine the exact boundary between the two.
36
 Not surprisingly, the Nkonya thoroughly 
disagree with the Alavanyo on the issue, arguing that if the logic of the Alavanyo were 
plausible, Gruner would rather have used the Anya trees to decide who was right when the 
land dispute arose. Or, so they argue, were the people of Alavanyo not party to the Gruner 
demarcation as well?  And didn’t the Gruner map settle matters not only between them and 
Nkonya but also between then and the other states mentioned above? If there was a boundary 
drawn with Anya trees, why didn’t the Alavanyo make mention of it when the case first went 
to court (and subsequently, when the court ruled against them on five different occasions?). 
At any rate did the judges deliberately ignore the Anya factor if indeed there was such a thing? 
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 Two leading chiefs I spoke to during fieldwork were strong on this point. 
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On the grounds of these questions, the Nkonya have flagged the arguments of Alavanyo as a 
deliberate attempt to subvert the historicity and legitimacy of the Gruner map. Today, this 
local understanding of organising territorial and agrarian space, and issues of socio-economic 
and political identity, has become one of the major drivers of the land conflict.  
At any rate, when the British decided in 1931 to conscript part of the forest on the 
disputed land into a forest reserve for ecological purposes, the Gruner map which indicated 
the boundaries of the six states became the blueprint for this exercise. During fieldwork, it 
came to light that there were several land quarrels between neighbouring traditional 
authorities, and between families and clans within the same locality. While stories are rife in 
the area about people losing their lives through witchcraft and sorcery because of competition 
over land, my informants could not give me any specific example of these assertions. As 
elsewhere in Africa, land “has become a form of accumulation as well as a means of 
subsistence” (Goheen 1992:391). Even though the Gruner map was meant to establish the 
boundaries between the two communities, till today it has not succeeded in doing so because 
both communities have been using it as a strong political scheme to raise different registers of 
meaning about boundaries in the different stages of the dispute. The Gruner map theory also 
shows how the selective use of the past can be appropriated by groups to align a particular 
version of history for group/individual interests. In most parts of Africa, not least Ghana, the 
expedient use of history by actors to lay claims is commonplace, as Ubink (2008) and Berry 
(2001) have clearly demonstrated in the case of the Ashanti of southern Ghana, for example.  
In Ghana, as in other African states, in the colonial era, the mobility of labour in view 
of agrarian activity and manageable demographic figures permitted people of different ethnic 
groups to co-exist within the same spatial/geographic space in relative ease. One can thus 
surmise that struggles over land were minimal and controllable at this time. In Alavanyo and 
Nkonya however, the moral economy of land use and property relations radically changed 
when around 1896 the Basel missionaries introduced cocoa into the area with the 
establishment of experimental farms in the Guan communities of Nkonya-Ntsumuru, Akpafu, 
Worawora and Guaman (Nyinanse 1984). Later, cocoa cultivation was also extended to the 
Alavanyo area. Soon, the successes of the experimental farms attracted migrant farmers and 
labour from other parts of the country and led to the cultivation of large cocoa farms. In fact 
“between 1920 and 1945 there developed large cocoa settlements drawing their importance 
from cocoa cultivation and inhabited by migrant farmers notably the Ewe and Anum from 
poorer lands further south” (Nyinanse 1984:6). As time went on, the influx of migrant farmers 
and mobile labour and the desire of both Nkonya and Alavanyo farmers to open new frontiers 
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following the boom of the cocoa industry led to struggles over land. This increased the 
commodification of land which was somehow already in existence in precolonial times and 
challenged the economy of property relations between the two groups and the migrant 
farmers. In the Peki (south-eastern Ghana) area which was also a cocoa growing area, the 
cocoa boom brought a lot of land palavers. This has been articulated by Meyer who mentions 
that in Peki “after 1918, cocoa cultivation steadily increased, but as suitable cocoa land 
became a scarce commodity, this increase led to more land conflicts within and between 
families and lineages” (1999:15). 
Given that local customary practices permitted locals to acquire land under flexible 
terms, farmers from the two communities took advantage of the cash cocoa production 
brought and pushed into lands fertile for cocoa production but to which access was not 
properly negotiated. This scenario eventually created different registers of meaning related to 
land rights use and inevitably led to many land disputes in the area. It equally brought to the 
fore legitimate issues regarding the physical boundaries of the land, and in respect to 
questions of ownership and the authority over the right to determine allodial (root) and 
usufruct rights, for by this time, migrant farmers with only usufruct rights to land were also 
trying to convert this opportunity into allodial rights by seeking the opportunity to make an 
outright land purchase. Although these events were not the only reasons engendering the 
Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute, they certainly constituted a major factor in the intractability 
of the land conflict. 
With the influx of migrants into the area, the instrumentalisation of first comer/late 
comer and autochthon/non-autochthon categories by locals became a major concern feeding 
agitations around the land. The Nkonya have always contended that as first comers, they were 
the first to establish a spiritual and physical relationship with the land. They thus see 
themselves as owners of the land and in the past, in recognition of this status, the head chief 
of Alavanyo periodically and annually brought a part of any game hunted on the land, as well 
as drinks and first crops, to the head chief of Nkonya. Ampene (2011) affirms the historicity 
of this tributary system by showing that the Alavanyo, through their headman at the time, 
 “…drank the usual fetish-treaty and swore never to rebel against the Nkonya 
people; they also paid some tribute to Nkonya and had their headman installed by 
the king of Ahenkro. But when the Germans arrived in 1899 the Alavanyo refused 
to pay allegiance to the Nkonya” Ampene (p. 104).  
 
Eventually, this tributary system was altogether abrogated around 1940 when the British 
policy of amalgamation brought the Alavanyo under the Chief of Kpandu, Head of the Akpini 
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state.
37
 The abrogation embittered the Nkonya who felt that their ritual and political authority 
over the land and the Alavanyo had been eroded by British colonial politics and diplomacy. 
These dynamics clearly reveal how colonial political structures often conflicted and disrupted 
local structures of power, ritual control and property relations, and somehow led to land 
disputes in which they are still enwrapped today.  
The discourse on autochthony and non-autochthony also points to the intergenerational 
challenge posed by issues of identity and ownership. Does the claim of coming first and of 
‘belonging’ to a parcel of land necessarily confer rights to own and use the land to the 
exclusion of others? How is the identity of the Nkonya/Alavanyo configured with regard to 
ownership of the land and vice versa?   
These questions point to the fact that, the longer the land conflict persists, the more 
complicated will the intergenerational challenges of ownership and belonging between the 
rivalling parties become. Over the years however, the Nkonya have been claiming and 
instrumentalising their first comer status in order to strengthen their claim to the disputed 
land. This discourse, which is very central to the politics of power and property relations 
between the two communities, is not without ambiguities, however. In this regard, Geschiere 
(2009) cautions that even though arguments of autochthony have assumed a lot of political 
capital in the contemporary politics of belonging because of the presumed link to land, the 
term ‘autochthony’ itself is very fluid, entailing numerous ambiguities, as it is often used by 
actors who intend to remodel and realign historical narratives to support their claims. In 
relation to this issue, research carried out by Lentz (2006) in northern Ghana also illustrates 
how the status of ‘first comer’, far from being fixed and immutable, is bound to change over 
time because of the multiple interpretations of different actors and stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, in Ghana, the logic of ‘first comer’ (thereby also implying ownership of 
the land) has been widely used to confer land ownership to specific groups. In many instances 
this has generated bitter rivalry and conflict (see Kuba & Lentz 2006, Lund 2008). This aside, 
autochthony claims often backed by court verdicts, remain a most powerful tool for making 
claims of ownership of the land. The protraction of the land dispute, however, exonerates the 
position of Lentz, Geschiere and Lund that the politicisation of autochthony and first comer 
status in the competition over a resource such as land, does not always guarantee the results 
envisaged. This is clearly manifested in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict.  
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 Amalgamation was adopted in the 1920s by the British to bring all sub-chiefs under one head chief in 
furtherance of the policy of indirect rule. The Nkonya and other ethnic groups in the area resisted amalgamation 
and there is no question that they suffered for it. The British saw those who resisted this move as an affront to 
their policies and integrity and so did not take kindly to it. 
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A major historical factor of the dispute is a demographic one. As the two communities 
progressed, they started experiencing demographic changes which brought pressure on arable 
land, increased the younger population and the movement of people, and promoted new social 
interactions at different levels.   
One of my interlocutors Agya Ofori from Nkonya-Tayi told me:  
“The land dispute is also about numbers. The population Nkonya started growing 
and the Alavanyo also started having large numbers and because their land is 
small in size, they started pushing into Nkonya land. That is not acceptable 
because when you are ‘stranger’ and you are given land to farm and ‘eat’, you are 
like a tenant in a house. When a man hires a room in someone’s house and he 
starts having many children, he does not take another room by himself, but goes 
back to the house owner and ask for another room because the house does not 
belong to him, but the house owner.”38  
  
This reasoning enforces the first comer and late comer discourse, which has gradually become 
both an individual and collective narrative, embedded in the historical knowledge of the two 
communities about the conflict. The demographic challenge indeed raised serious concerns 
about how one may keep one’s land from being invaded by encroachers. It also compelled 
heads of families and clans who owned land in the now disputed area to start mapping their 
boundaries and to enter into clearer and more binding agreements with people who needed 
family or clan lands for farming. My observation is that the demographic factor continued to 
be a major challenge as the numbers in the two communities continue to grow.  
2.2.2. Late Colonialism and the Land Dispute 
 
The 1940s marked another turning point in the history of the land conflict. It appears that, 
wearied by the inability to resolve the frequent land quarrels between the two communities, 
the acting chief of Nkonya at the time, addressed the letter below to the British district 
commissioner.
39
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 Interview at Nkonya-Tayi, May, 2012. 
39
 Letter dated 02/4/1945 from Acting Nkonyahene, Kwasi Kokortey X at Ghana National Archives, ADM 
39/1/119, File No. 025. Subject: Alavanyo and Nkonya land dispute. This is the earliest material I could find on 
the correspondence between the two communities and the colonial establishment.  
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Figure 9. Letter of Nkonya chief to District Commissioner 
 
Obviously, the letter refers to the Gruner map as the basis of continuous conflict between the 
two communities, and it shows the desperation of Nkonya to have the land dispute resolved. 
The tone of the letter, however, offended the commissioner. Nonetheless, he replied to the 
Nkonya people on the 16th July, 1945, (see below) and equally referred to other letters from 
Nkonya which, according to the commissioner, were equally in bad taste. 
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Figure 10. Commissioner’s response to letter from Nkonya 
 
Following the response of the commissioner, the Nkonya then wrote a friendlier letter to the 
Alavanyo, which is produced below: 
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Figure 11. Letter of Nkonya to Alavanyo chief 
 
This letter, in addition to others written by the chief of Nkonya, Nana Okotor Kwasi IV to the 
Alavanyo chief on the 4/8/45, 30/8/45, and 4/9/45, remained without reply.
40
 On the 20
th
 of 
August, 1945, however, the chief of Alavanyo replied to his counterpart in Nkonya as 
follows: 
                                                          
40
 This letter is dated the 16/9/1945 and is in private possession of the Nkonya. A copy remains with the author. 
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Figure 12. Letter from Alavanyo chief to Nkonya chief in respect of petition for retracing of boundary 
 
Unfortunately, the elaborate correspondence between the two contesting communities and the 
colonial officials did not yield the desired results. Nevertheless, the letters demonstrate how 
colonial politics of power and diplomacy, and their indifference to important local issues 
aggravated the land conflict. On the 27
th
 of February, 1950, the Nkonya bypassed the district 
commissioner and addressed their petition directly to the colonial secretary M.J.E. Patteson.
41
 
Again, this letter did also fail to yield the desired results (as already mentioned in the previous 
chapter).   
In the meantime, the pre-independence political campaign led by Kwame Nkrumah 
and the Convention People’s Party (CPP), made up of the educated elite of the Gold Coast 
(now Ghana) that was fighting to end British colonial rule, was in full force. The ramifications 
of the political upheavals of this period also had some telling effects on political activities in 
the Alavanyo and Nkonya area. After the defeat of Germany in WW 1, the area became part 
of British Mandated Togoland, but not until some political disturbances had taken place. It 
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 Letter dated 27/02/1950 in Ghana National Archives, ADM 39/1/119, File No. 025. Subject: Alavanyo and 
Nkonya land dispute.   
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happened that “a nationalist group under the name Togoland Congress, led by the late Senyo 
Gatror Antor, vehemently opposed integration and advocated the reunification of British and 
French Togo – also on the verge of independence” (Gavua, 2000:60). In relation to these 
issues, the leadership of the Togoland Congress sent a petition to the UN in 1947, but there 
their plea was not heard. Later on, in 1956, at the threshold of independence, the United 
Nations organized a plebiscite in which the Togoland congress was integrated into Ghana 
(Gavua 2000; Kludze 1973).  
In fact, the leadership of the Togoland congress later suffered under the Nkrumah government 
for trying to secede at a time the Gold Coast was working hard to be independent. When 
Nkonya initiated their first court case in 1953 against seven Alavanyo farmers at the Akpini 
native court ‘B’ (Kpandu), a case which was later transferred to the Lands Division of the 
High Court at Accra
42
 and in which verdict was given on the basis of the Gruner map on 24
th
 
May 1957 in favour of the Nkonya, the Alavanyo refused to accept the verdict. They cited 
political bad-blood between them and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) because of the 
above situation, as well as the unfair procedures by lawyers who were insiders of the CPP at 
the time and a party to which the Nkonya were amenable as the basis for their refusal.
43
  
This late colonial political activity did not only create tension, but it also redefined and shaped 
the conflict into a local-state political problematic which eventually disturbed relations 
between the state and its local subjects, as well as between the two communities.  
 
2. 2. 3. The Postcolonial Period: The Emergence of Deeper Hostilities and Resistance 
 
At the post-colonial turn, the court cases continued to be central to the politics and dynamics 
of the dispute. The first court case, that ended in 1957 in favour of the Nkonya but that did not 
settle the dispute, led to other substantive cases and appeals till 1975 when the Appeal Court 
finally ruled in favour of the Nkonya, and counseled the Alavanyo who had trespassed into 
Nkonya territory to appeal to the latter for land to farm if they so wished. Later, seven 
Alavanyo farmers came and atoned tenancy and were given land.
44
 In 1980, however, the 
Alavanyo appealed the 1975 verdict. Though they lost the appeal, the rampant hostilities and 
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 Suit No. Tr. L. 19/1953, High Court of Justice, Lands Division, Accra. 
43
 Interview with Mr. Paul Dzathor, 14/02/2012 at Alavanyo-Deme.    
44
 The request was contained in a letter signed by Joseph Foli & Eugene Prikutse on behalf of the others and is in 
private possession of the Elders of Nkonya and a copy which remains with the author. A deeper examination of 
the court cases will be tackled in chapter six of this work. 
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the illegal logging of timber
45
 did not stop but rather led to serious confrontations between the 
two groups.   
As already mentioned (in chapter one), the 1980s marked a difficult period in 
Ghanaian political and economic history for various reasons. Political de-stabilization, 
economic challenges, migration problems, famine and environmental difficulties: all these 
elements bedeviled the Ghanaian society (Amanor, 1999; Berry 2008; Daily Graphic, 
19/04/1983). These challenges also deeply affected the already weak job market, and created 
a state of xenophobia and anomie across the country, and especially in poorer communities. In 
Alavanyo and Nkonya this period was marked by a high degree of unemployment, and by 
youth violence, lawlessness, and increased levels of poverty. This also affected family life as 
most families were not in the capacity to access farming lands. Many young people 
(especially males) migrated to the cities of Accra, Kumasi and Koforidua to ‘try their luck’ as 
they say in Ghana.  
In 1983, at a moment when the conflict escalated again, the volatility of the situation 
compelled the central government to deploy the security services (soldiers and the police) to 
the area to maintain peace and order. This intervention was hailed as a good and timely one 
by some locals, but for others it represented an unwanted political intervention, sparking 
further laments that some security officials turned the peace keeping exercise into a money 
making exercise as they started to ‘raid’ the timber on the disputed land, colluding with local 
chainsaw operators, forestry officials, and youth groups of both communities. At the 
ethical/moral level one chief shared his dissatisfaction with the exercise in this way;  
“Due to the protraction of the dispute, it became very difficult for families and 
individuals who could no longer access their farm lands for fear of being shot to 
adequately support their families. This also rendered some of the women 
vulnerable as they struggled to support their families, so when some of the 
security officers who had money to spare approached them, it was difficult for 
them to resist their advances. I am not saying the presence of the security officers 
was bad, but some of them did morally unacceptable things.”46  
 
These activities cast a negative shadow over the intervention of security officers in peace-
keeping operations and question the logic that external agents are better placed than insiders 
to bring ‘peace’ to communities polarized by conflict.47  
                                                          
45
 By this time the State had criminalized chainsaw operations, but in places such as Nkonya and Alavanyo 
where the ‘raiding’ of timber had now become a major issue driving the conflict, people were still engaged in the 
chainsaw business, sometimes with the collusion of forest officials. 
46
 Interview with chief at Alavanyo, August, 2012 
47
 The presence of the security agents also reveals the socio-economic dynamics embedded in conflict situations. 
Conflicts can be layered with multiple goals, drivers and interests. In Africa, while the intervention of security 
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Moreover, in the early 1930s and for reasons my informants could not explain to me, a 
rumour came up alleging that the disputed land contained deposits of gold, mercury and clay. 
This rumour has over the years gained traction and has been fed into the collective 
understanding/interpretation of the conflict as a ‘truth’ which is used by both groups in 
contesting the disputed land. While the fertility of the land and the large presence of 
commercial trees are indubitable, it is difficult to fathom how the alleged deposits became 
central to the narrative of the land conflict. In fact, not even my investigations at the Kwame 
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, the Faculty of Earth Science at the 
University of Ghana, Legon, and the Geological Survey Department in Accra could help to 
give some certainty to the rumour. Yet, the rumour remains very persistent and has been used 
by both communities in their struggle over the disputed land. 
 This reveals how rumour may become a people’s collective belief/conviction and may 
actually fuel the conflict and lead people to attack each other.  
 
2. 2. 4. The Present   
 
The 2000s were very distressful times for both communities as frequent escalations of the 
dispute in 2000, 2003, and 2004 disorganized social and economic life in the area. In 2003, 
another fierce confrontation between the two communities erupted in which lives and 
property were lost. Again, the police and the army were dispatched to keep peace and 
maintain order, but this only brought elusive peace without fully silencing dissenting voices. 
Around this time, two catholic bishops with natal roots from the area decided to confer 
with the Volta Regional Security Council, (REGSEC) situated at the town of Ho, in order to 
help find a solution to the conflict and end the loss of life and property. Following their 
initiative, a clergy-led mediation committee (MC) was empanelled comprising the clergy, 
alongside other bodies and individuals such as chiefs and District Chief Executives. It was 
this clergy-led mediation committee that eventually facilitated the ritual ceremony (known as 
nugbedodo in Ewe) of May, 2006 meant to unify the two communities. During the ceremony, 
a white ram which symbolizes peace was slaughtered and the two communities promised 
never to allow war divide them. Initially, hopes were high in Alavanyo and Nkonya and the 
fact that the mediation committee was clergy-led, was seen as a guarantee for its success, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
officers in conflict situations can bring relative peace in the short term, in the long run it often does seem to be 
problematic as examples in the Great Lakes region, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and other places on the African 
continent illustrate.  
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the religious leaders were well-respected in the area. It was generally believed that their 
presence would have a positive effect on the process and bring peace to the people. In fact, 
newspaper reports following the ceremony of 2006, suggested that the communities were now 
ready to live in peace and mutual respect. For instance, the Daily Graphic of June 2, 2006 
entitled one story: “Alavanyo and Nkonya Swear not to be at loggerheads again” and the 
leading paragraph read: “The chiefs and people of Alavanyo and Nkonya on Wednesday 
invoked their ancestral oaths and spirits to mark the cessation of hostilities between them and 
swore never again to take up arms against each other” (see also, Darkwa et al, 2012). 
As it turned out, however, the mutual commitment to peaceful coexistence did not last 
long and the two groups started attacking each other again between 2007 and 2010. This 
gravely affected the work of the MC and pointed to the fact that in conflict contexts, without 
the active engagement of the disputants to seek peace, the might of religious leaders or 
political big men can do little to negotiate lasting peace. In fact, in the case of the Alavanyo 
and the Nkonya, after the initial enthusiasm for the activities of the MC locals from both 
communities gradually started to accuse the religious leaders of glossing over the ‘truth’ and 
taking sides in the land conflict. This has brought the work of the MC to a standstill, and with 
traditional mediation processes already collapsed, there seems to be no path to push forward.  
As already intimated in the first chapter, historically, in the Volta region, the Ewe 
constitute the demographic majority, followed by the Guan. It appears that over the years the 
Alavanyo have converted this numerical strength into political and social capital for various 
reasons, including the land conflict issue. The Nkonya have accused them of using the 
‘tyranny of numbers’ to receive covert support from their compatriots within the region, but 
especially from the members of SASADU,
48
 a group which seeks the welfare of its members, 
who may also reach out in support of each other in times of war or conflict, as some of my 
informants opined. Though the Nkonya are in the minority, they have also been accused by 
the Alavanyo of benefiting militarily and materially from their compatriots from the 
surrounding towns and villages. In both Nkonya and Alavanyo, those who have everything to 
gain in the dispute will quickly dismiss these conduits of material and military support as 
spurious, but those who are fatigued by the continuing existence of the conflict will readily 
admit to the fact that these are some of the difficult challenges to negotiate in the dispute. In 
Africa, not least Ghana, ethnicity is a strong political device that can be used for multiple 
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 This is an umbrella term for Saviefe, Akrofu, Sovie and Alavanyo, who trace their ancestry to one male 
ancestor and are said to have migrated from Notsie together till they reached their current homes. 
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interests (Tonah, 2007; Lentz in Tonah, 2007). It is a double-edge sword that cuts both ways 
and so can be difficult to deal with, especially in resource conflicts.  
During fieldwork, I also observed (and the story below attests to that) that there is some 
degree of intergenerational transmission of the history and ‘culture’ of the conflict through a 
form of socialization of the younger generation by the older generation. One elder from 
Nkonya told me that  
“our forefathers narrated what happened in the past to us. They told us how our 
brothers and sisters lost their lives because of the land. It is our duty to pass on the 
story to our children so they can stand on their feet to defend the land and our 
people. Our ancestors will not be happy with us if we lost the land they 
bequeathed to us, which is the basis of our existence.”49  
 
Without doubt, this narrative poses a big challenge to efforts aimed at disabusing the minds of 
younger ones about the negative effects of the conflict and encouraging them to seek the path 
of peace. As the narration moves from one generation to the next, the ability of the two groups 
to live peacefully side by side will become complicated and lead to a hardening of positions.  
The events that took place in early 2013 and that were captured in chapter one, page one 
following are a clear pointer to the fact that the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict is 
far from over. On the grounds of these events, in August 2013, the Nkonya Youth Association 
led by one Kwadjo Tetteh, the chairman, held a press conference in Accra. The association’s 
intention was to bring to government’s attention the gravity of the situation, following the 
events that took place in Nkonya and Alavanyo in 2013. They stated among other things that;  
“the Alavanyo have been making deliberate and systematic attempts to twist 
historical facts in spite of the fact that they have lost all the five court cases up to 
the appeal court, then the highest court of the land in 1975. They reject the attempt 
by the Alavanyo to impose upon the Nkonya by force of arms arbitrary boundaries 
that neither have historical basis nor legal support.”50  
 
The chairman raised the issue of timber but argued that it was the Alavanyo who were 
entering into Nkonya land to illegally log timber. Thus, in the minds of the Nkonya, the land 
boundary is the major issue, but this is only one equation of the conflict as illustrated above. 
Challenges of ethnicity, issues of identity and illegal timber activities of chain saw operators 
from both sides are equally major drivers of the conflict. The presentation of the youth 
association is not new, as the issues raised have been raised before in different forums. What 
is new is that, this time around, the youth are becoming more involved as the representative 
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 Interview with Kofi Abebrese, Nkonya-Ntsumuru, June, 2012.  
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 Nkonya and Alavanyo land conflict, www.tvafricaonline.com, August 7, 2013.  
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voices of the communities and as such tend to overshadow and replace the traditional 
authorities. Nevertheless, the blame game continues to be central to the everyday rhetoric of 
the dispute. It was obvious to me during fieldwork that the worldview of the two communities 
partly underpins the way they perceive and interpret the conflict. I will therefore examine the 
cosmology/worldview of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya more closely in the next section. 
2.3. ALAVANYO AND NKONYA WORLDVIEWS: THE EMERGENCE OF A LIFE 
ORIENTATION 
 
In anthropology, the worldview/cosmology of people is mostly studied in the context of 
religion, i.e. in terms of the beliefs and practices of people. Thus, Agorsah (2010) articulates 
cosmology within the realm of African traditional religion and argues that the worldview of a 
people permeates every facet of their life and relationship with supernatural beings (also see 
Wiredu in Coetzee & Roux 1998). Others such as Tengan (1991:2) argue that:  
“A people’s worldview is always a culturally constructed world. As such, it 
results from the double dialogue among humans and between the latter and their 
milieu. Nevertheless, its adherents regard it as given in nature, that is, the natural 
way the world is actually ordered. In this wise, it is taken as the model for the 
structuring of their society. It is also seen as the foundation for their ethical and 
moral norms”.  
 
From the above, one may say that the constitutive elements of a people’s world view are more 
than religious beliefs: they also embrace different social, economic and political aspects of 
human society. It is around these entities that a worldview is structured and ordered.  
I conceptualize cosmology/worldview as a people’s perception of the world around 
them and how they order and structure this world in meaningful ways to respond to their 
needs and beliefs. Like all human processes, worldviews are not static or immutable, but are 
changed and shaped by social and political forces, by national and global 
ideologies/philosophies, and by media productions among other factors (cf. Meyer 1996). 
Thus, in treating the worldview/cosmology of the Alavanyo and Nkonya, my intention is to 
see how all these factors impact on their worldview, and how this cosmology serves as an 
horizon for understanding how they interpret the world around them and do things the way 
they do.  
Any researcher examining the worldview/cosmology of the Alavanyo and Nkonya will 
notice that the two communities articulate a worldview/cosmology based on what they share 
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with the larger Ewe and Guan ethnic groups to which they belong respectively. As such it is 
difficult to talk of a distinctive Nkonya or Alavanyo worldview. 
Central to the Ewe and Guan cosmologies is the belief in a Supreme Being/High God, 
(Mawu in Ewe and Nanabulu in Nkonya) and Deities/smaller gods, Mawuwo, and the spirit of 
ancestors, togbuiwo.
51
 Among the Alavanyo and Nkonya, Mawu/Nanabulu is the ultimate 
frame of reference for perceiving, interpreting and giving meaning to the human world. They 
take for granted the existence of Mawu, who is believed to have always existed (cf. Gyekye, 
1998). Greene, however, points out that 
 “evidence indicates that there did exist the concept of a Supreme Being among 
the Ewe and Fon prior to the nineteenth century, but evidence also suggests that 
this God's attributes shifted and changed over time under the influence of 
changing power relations within the upper and middle Slave Coast where the Ewe 
and Fon were situated” (1996:125). 
 
This being the case, it is possible to underscore the fact that power politics between two 
groups of people can actually affect the nature and definition of Mawu’s place in human 
affairs. 
The Nkonya and Alavanyo believe that Mawu made (me) or formed (wo) human beings 
from pre-existing material and not out of nothing as expressed in the Christian concept of 
creatio ex nihilo or ‘creation out of nothing’ (also see Wiredu about the Akan worldview in 
Coetzee & Roux, 1998). For example, the creation myths/stories of the Ewe relate that  
“the human being is of earth and was “fashioned” by God, whose main task it still 
is to form human bodies. God uses the jaw-bone of a dead man and potters’ clay 
which he kneads and forms for the manufacture of a human body” (Spieth, 
2011:52). 
 
The allusion to the earth (this could also mean land) and clay grounds a belief in the 
sacredness or spirituality of the earth/land. As such the Nkonya and the Alavanyo believe that 
the land is a ‘living being’ (akyankpator in Nkonya or nugbagbe in Ewe), and that, in this 
capacity, it is capable of influencing the movements and orientations of their life-world 
beyond time and space.
52
 It is therefore intimately linked to the numinous. Its symbolic 
influence in everyday life is never in question, as it is on the land that life is attained, lived 
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 The Nkonya call the deities/smaller gods, Ikpi and the Ancestors,  Anain. Similar views have been expressed 
by Greene (1996) among the Anlo Ewe and Meyer (1999) among the Peki of south eastern Ghana.  
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 Awuah-Nyamekye and Sarfo-Mensah (2011) have also observed similar notions of the spirituality of the land 
among the people of Brong Ahafo in Ghana and argue that, a good understanding of the sacredness of the land or 
a people’s worldview which informs the nature of customary land practices could be factored into policies aimed 
at ensuring equitable land distribution.    
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and relived. Thus, “together with the world, God constitutes the spatio-temporal “totality” of 
existence” (Wiredu in Coetzee & Roux, 1998:187).  
Additionally, I also observed that in the worldview of the two groups, the world and 
the experiences of humans are understood and explained in terms of a duality. According to 
this duality, the world is one but made up of two dimensions, namely the spiritual world 
which is also conceived of as the world above the earth (dzi po) and the physical world, which 
is on the earth (anyigba te).
53
 In the eyes of the Nkonya however, the expression of this 
duality is not based on gender, i.e.  male/female, as it is for the Alavanyo, but simply in a 
duality characterised by the categories of good and evil, spirits/humans, the bush and the 
home etc. 
The same duality is further elaborated by Gavua who shows how the Ewe combine the 
belief in a High God/Mawu/Segbo-Lisa.... 
“who is spirit, omnipresence, omnipotent and omniscient, with belief in other 
smaller gods that serve as agents of the High God and as media through which 
humans communicate with this God. The spirit of the high god has two 
components, female and male. The female component is objectified by the earth, 
Miano Zodzi or Anyigba and is responsible for harmony, peace, care, nurture, 
fertility, motherhood, gentleness, creativity, forgiveness, love, rest, joy and 
freshness. Symbolized by power, strength, labour, and toughness, the male spirit 
of God, Lisa, controls and dispenses justice, steadfastness, pain and suffering, 
security, protection and all human strivings.” (2000: 85).  
 
In this cosmic narrative the link between the motherhood of Mawu and the earth is expressed. 
And the values of harmony, peace, care, fertility, gentleness etc… are said to be emanating 
from the earth. I understand this to mean that the people’s relationship with the land is 
potentially a path to discovering how they can live out the values of peace, care, and 
forgiveness.  
In the eyes of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, the ontological status of the spiritual and 
the physical beings is rather different and separable, yet there is an intimate metaphysical 
connection between the two families of beings. In other instances, they also describe the 
spiritual world as strange, dangerous, unpredictable and fear-inducing. Nevertheless, the link 
between the spiritual and physical beings always remains indispensable and inseparable 
because it is believed that the ontological existence of the physical beings is intimately linked 
to the Supreme Being, as mentioned above. The vitality of what is human is always rooted in 
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 Sarpong (2002) and Quarcoopome (1987) have also talked about similar realities among the Asante of 
southern Ghana. Understanding the world in dual terms and ordering and structuring the events of everyday life 
on this duality is very fundamental to the worldview/cosmology of many African societies. 
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the vitality of what is spiritual. It is from this interconnectedness that the human draws not 
only spiritual power but also his origin, essence and worth. It is a dynamic divine-human 
encounter that embeds a life orientation in which individuals seek meaning and power as they 
move back and forth between the fragile and mundane world of the human and the powerful 
world of the spiritual.  
Elsewhere, Awuah-Nyamekye and Sarfo-Mensah (2011) have shown that similar 
metaphysical convictions are expressed among the people of Buabeng Fiema, Dotabaa, Bofie 
and Nchiraa in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. I turn to believe that the divine-human 
dialogue inherent in the worldview of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya is a way in which they 
appeal to the divine as a ‘spiritual and rational buffer zone’ to find answers for and to explain 
the inexplicable events/realities of life.  
In the world of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, there is also a strong belief in deities, 
mawuwo/ikpi, and in the ancestors, torgbuiwo. Cosmologically, the deities and ancestors are 
the intermediaries through whom Mawu/Nanabulu intervenes in human affairs via different 
forms of rituals. In the imagination of the two peoples, even though the geography of the 
spiritual world of the deities eludes clear description, their effect on human affairs in this 
world is not in doubt. I also came to understand that apart from the mawuwo, the world is also 
inhabited by bad or good spiritual forces/powers, the gbogbo von/nyui, whose power can be 
tapped into through incantations/rituals by spiritually-gifted people. These ritual specialists 
are approached by many, including those who want to cause harm to others or those who want 
to avert some misfortune coming their way. Soon, I also realised that the cosmology of the 
two communities posits a political hierarchy of power relations between the Supreme Being, 
the deities and ancestors and their relations with the people. For the people, this structure of 
power relations has nothing arbitrary about it; it is the divine blueprint informing power 
relations in the visible world between the living and the ancestors and between traditional 
authorities and their subjects (cf. Kirby 2006-2007). This explains why, among the Nkonya 
and the Alavanyo, traditional authorities are accorded great respect. It is believed that they are 
the immediate representative voice and authority of Mawu in society and in the daily 
unfolding of life. In this way, to disobey the words of a chief, an elder or clan head, is to 
disrespect Nanabulu and to risk his wrath or close the door to his benevolence and blessings. 
A chief or an elder can however, be challenged if he begins to abuse the power invested in 
him through e.g. drunkenness or adultery.  
The worldviews of the Alavanyo and Nkonya have however, not remained 
unchallenged by the socio-economic and religious changes that have taken place in the society 
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since colonial times. Analysing religion and Christianity among the northern Ewe,
54
 Gavua 
(2000) argues that there is no doubt that Christianity, in a form that in this area was 
championed by the Bremen and catholic missionaries, has, over the years deeply influenced 
local religious beliefs and has profoundly impacted on “the conception of the people about the 
nature of the universe and about the place of human beings in it” (p. 84). In a similar vein 
Greene (2002), writing about the Anlo-Ewe of southeastern Ghana, shows how over the years 
the cosmogonic myths or stories of the people have been influenced by Christian ideas.
55
 
These assertions allow for the observation that, Nkonya and Alavanyo worldviews are very 
much an amalgam of Christian and local religious beliefs which in no little way have 
impacted and continue to impact on the way they order and structure the world around them, 
the relations between the two and attitudes about the land dispute. 
 
2.3.1. The Ancestors and the Spirituality of the Land: “They Own The Land, We Live 
And Relate With The Land” 
 
As already mentioned, through the connection of the ancestors, (torgbuiwo) to the land, it is 
believed that they influence the very source of life, which is the land. But who are these 
ancestors? The ancestors are the living-dead who are venerated for their exemplary upright 
lives and the spiritual guidance and protection they offer the people/community. The 
ancestors are the progenitors of the social, metaphysical and political order and continue to 
assist in the daily affairs of the people towards the collective good.
56
 Thus, in the two 
communities, the elders are very adept in telling the youth stories of how they owe the land to 
the torgbuiwo, how they (the elders) will join them when they die and so on. The elders will 
normally end these narratives with a moral lesson telling the youth to live good lives so they 
can be what the ancestors have been.  
Through such activities, the community ensures the intergenerational transmission of 
ancestral beliefs, values and moral norms that regulate the social and political orders. 
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 Gavua (2000) uses the term ‘northern Ewe’ to encapsulate all ethnic groups in the northern part of the Volta 
region of Ghana because of the cultural, political and linguistic similarities among them.  
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Likewise, during fieldwork, some older informants intimated that the Christianization of the Alavanyo and 
Nkonya area around the 1850s must have influenced their cosmological myths and stories about the High God, 
deities, and ancestors.  
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 Cassiman (2006:53-54) finds a similar belief among the Kasena of northeastern Ghana when she says: “The 
ancestors were first, and are regenerated in the blood of the progeny. The relation between the ancestral world 
and this world defines the rhythm of the generations. The ancestral world models the geographical world of the 
living. The ancestors are the epistemological and ethical presuppositions which guarantee insight into the 
meaningfulness of the world and of the community order.” 
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Becoming a torgbui is, however, not a given. Rather, it is a status that one must merit. To be a 
torgbui “one must, among others, lead a good life, live up to at least middle age, have children 
and die a good (natural) death. Death not considered good is one from any of the following 
ailments, diseases or causes: leprosy, lunacy, swollen body, suicide, accidents executions and 
ulcers” (Nukunya 2007:58).  
Earlier, I intimated that, for the two groups, the invisible and the visible world are 
actually one world in two parts. I tried to seek a further understanding of this belief to know 
how it plays out in different arenas, in order to be able to analytically ground it. Thus, in 
interacting with some of my informants, I discovered that the ‘one world in two parts’ theory 
fundamentally constitutes a way for the Nkonya and Alavanyo to give meaning and purpose 
to the relationship between the world of invisible agents (ancestors) and the world of visible 
agents (humans). In this way they show how both worlds interconnect and interpenetrate, 
which explains why the two groups are constantly supplicating the ancestors for various 
intentions. I give some examples here to drive home the point.  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, when a person dies it is said that such a person is transiting 
from the world of the living to another world where life is lived as on earth but in a location 
that defies human rationality. When a renowned hunter or a farmer dies, it is believed that he 
goes to the land of the ancestors or to the village, and depending on his age, and his marital 
and social status, he is buried with a hoe, a cutlass or a gun. Nukunya (2007) affirms this by 
arguing that in Eweland, special mortuary rites are performed for people of specific 
professions such as hunters, linguists, fishermen and farmers before burial. Similarly, when an 
old woman who has been influencing major decisions involving matters of her lineage/clan or 
the selection of people for chiefly office in the village dies, she is buried with special 
traditional cloths and other paraphernalia. These burial accompaniments are symbolic of 
honour and the good life these people have lived here on earth, and it indicates their status in 
the next world. It is also indicative of “the belief that death is not the end of man and that 
when someone dies, the physical body is survived by a spirit which goes to live in a world of 
spirits from where it is able to influence life in this earthly world” (Nukunya 2007:17). The 
vital link or the daily interaction between the living and the dead underscores the fact that life 
is a progression and an endless movement in which the living and the ancestors are always 
mutually engaged.  
Furthermore, in the eyes of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, the ancestors who first lived 
on the land are the owners of the land (also see Awuah-Nyamekye & Sarfo-Mensah 2011). 
And as the ancestors dwell among them, but are also close to Nanabulu, they have the power 
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to make the land fertile and fruitful, and to grant the fecundity of childbirth to childless 
women. This creed is the basis for the belief in the daily involvement of the ancestors in their 
life. It is a relationship that produces and reproduces the moral norms, rituals and symbolic 
metaphors for the living.
57
 This is also why they constantly supplicate the ancestors and 
endeavour to emulate the moral and spiritual legacies they left among them.  
Undoubtedly, these elements also emphasize how indispensable the land is to the 
Nkonya and the Alavanyo. It shows how a lack of land may become a potential source of 
conflict. Indeed, it may be argued that without the land and the dynamic connection between 
the ancestors and humans, life is unpredictable and will be almost impossible to live. On the 
other hand, the generally shared belief in the ancestors may also lead to the inclusion (and 
exclusion) of others when it comes to the appropriation of land or other resources, as 
demonstrated by Boni (in Kuba & Lentz, 2006) in his work among the Sefwi of Ghana. Boni 
illustrates that in the Sefwi area the booming of the cocoa industry increased the value of land 
and enticed chiefs to invent a criterion based on ancestrality so as to differentiate between 
‘pure’ Sefwi who could have land rights and ‘impure’ Sefwi who could not. This exclusionist 
criterion led to numerous land disputes, showing that an appeal to the ancestors may always 
be instrumentalised by actors engaged in resource conflicts for a myriad of reasons (see also 
Shipton 1992, 2009). 
In the context of Ghana, researchers such as Ubink and Amanor (2008), Awuah-
Nyamekye & Sarfo-Mensah 2011, Lund (2008) and Tengan (1991) have emphasised the 
dynamic link between the spirituality of the land
58
 and land rights/tenure systems and the 
appropriate traditional authorities invested with power in granting land rights. In parts of 
Ghana, this linkage has sometimes turned land ‘palavers’ into deadly matters, leading to the 
de-stoolment or dis-enskinment of chiefs who misappropriate the land they hold in trust for 
the people for personal gains (Ubink in Ubink & Amanor 2008, Berry 2001).  
As already argued in the first chapter, for the Nkonya and Alavanyo the current 
generation must use the land with the view to passing it on to future generations. This ethos is 
grounded in the belief that land is life, and as such constitutes an intergenerational heritage 
whose essence and beneficence transcends the boundaries of space and time. Both 
communities argue that what Mawu has bequeathed to them through the ancestors cannot be 
left to go extinct; this would be tantamount to obliterating the basis of life and history. Elders 
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 By spirituality of the land I mean the reverence the people accord the land as a deity/living being. This is an 
essential aspect of their worldview and common to many African societies, not least those of Ghana. 
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I interviewed in the two communities have explained that this rationale is one factor for the 
emotional, rational and sometimes irrational involvement of the people in the land dispute 
over the years. 
Among the two peoples, land size is often a symbol of wealth and power. This is not 
only the case for traditional authorities, but also for lineages, clans, families and individuals. 
The land is also not just earth/soil enabling agrarian activities, but a ‘living entity’, a mother 
with whom to relate at the metaphysical and physical levels. An Alavanyo elder remarked: 
“the land is a mother and we are her children; we call it ‘anyigba’(also rendered as a-nyi-wo- 
gba), i.e. the great earth which first nurtures the new born child in the spiritual world, before it 
is born to its biological mother in the physical world. Every being according to Nkonya and 
Ewe cosmology has two births: a birth in the spiritual/invisible world and a birth in the 
physical/visible world. As a mother, the land feeds, nourishes, empowers and protects her 
children wherever they are.” Similarly, Spieth (2011:50) shows that in Eweland the land/earth 
is;  
“named mia no, “our mother.” She is the woman, the wife of heaven and together 
with him, they produce human beings, animals and plants, yes, even the earth 
gods. She is the great nourisher of every living thing who does not collapse, even 
when her enemies assault her.”  
 
The Alavanyo and Nkonya believe that as the land is mother, it is from her uterine facility that 
the sustenance of human and animal life is formed and reformed in the course of the 
generations. The land is therefore the substratum on which birth and burial, production and 
consumption, gender relations, healing and the consultative practices of divination and 
soothsaying are enacted and re-enacted to give meaning and purpose to life and to the 
dynamism embedded in the relationship between the people and the land.  
In the eyes of the two groups, the land is the basis of guidance and protection, and it 
provides spiritual and bodily nourishment. Hence, it said that “without the land, there would 
be no food, no shelter, no rituals, no life, and consequently no meaningful human existence” 
(Tengan, 1991:37).  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, what constitutes life is one major path of appreciating what 
people mean when they say “they live and relate with” the land. As a researcher, trying to 
grasp the deeper layers of the idea of life in relation to the land as variously expressed in 
different socio-economic and political contexts, my encounter with Togbe Anane Mensah, a 
sub-chief of Alavanyo, provided me with a better understanding of what life means to the 
Alavanyo. For this chief, “life/agbe means material security, “nunoamesi” and spiritual 
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vitality, “gbogbome nuse”, and is a gift from Mawuga to us through the ancestors with whom 
we have a vital living relationship”. Similarly, according to Nkonya belief, life (nkpa) comes 
from the land and because the land is a living being, human beings living on the land are able 
to perpetually have life because of their connection to the land. The two perspectives are 
complementary and make bare the argument that for the Alavanyo and Nkonya, the land is the 
axis around which life is attained and retained for current and future generations. As 
expressed by Togbe, life is composed of two components: a religious one and a material one 
which is a central tenet of their worldview. It is within the dynamic nexus between the two 
that one attains human wholeness and fulfilment. It is also partly this belief that has sustained 
the contestations, reinventions and agitations characterising the land dispute from colonial to 
postcolonial times and the present.  
Religiously, agbe/nkpa is attained through the eternal relations between the living and 
the gods and ancestors. These relations are ritually re-enacted periodically. Hence, people’s 
constant effort to maintain good relations with the ancestors, so as to secure themselves of 
their divine goodness/blessing. As life comes through these close ties with the land, and as the 
land comes from the Supreme Being through the ancestors, fullness of life is always 
guaranteed when one is in full communion with the deities and ancestors. Hence, any act that 
offends them or is likely to produce a curse, is quickly remedied through votive and 
propitiatory sacrifices so that one may continue to be beneficiaries of the spiritual support of 
the ancestors and deities. Furthermore, the Nkonya and Alavanyo believe that in death, one 
must properly be received by the land in order to get to one’s ancestors. Thus, the land which 
“assumes in itself the two fundamental axes of human existence (life and death) needs to be 
approached with all reverence and awe” (Tengan 1991:38). Individuals and families always 
try to maintain a good relationship with the land in order to be received by it at death.  
In the material sphere, life means good physical health and social health, i.e. a good 
relationship with one’s household/family as well as with neighbours. The fullness of 
agbe/nkpa is felt when the youth are vibrant, and collectively alternate in assisting each other 
on their farms, help each other to build houses, and celebrate marriage, funerals and other 
festivities together. Also, nkpa is deeply experienced when community members greet each 
other: in Ewe ‘Ele agbea’ means ‘Are you existing life? And the respondent will reply: ‘Mele 
agbe’ meaning ‘I am existing life’. Have a good night is expressed as ‘do agbe’ meaning ‘go 
and sleep life’. Similarly, among the Guan, ‘thank you’ is expressed as ‘nkpadzi wole’ 
meaning ‘life is yours’ (Dzobo in Wiredu & Gyekye 1992). Through such phrases and 
activities, the community enriches the life of individuals and vice versa. As agbe involves 
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relationships, it is articulated as a way of living such that one’s good acts and good 
neighbourliness will become the conduit for the constant transmission of more life. So, an 
Alavanyo or Nkonya will not say ‘we live on the land’, but ‘we relate with the land’, which in 
Ewe means, “miele anyigba dzi o, ke bon la mieduna anyigba”59 thus expressing their 
profound dependence and bonding with the source of life. This in effect “is about attachments 
between people, and between people and things – and what these two kinds of ties have to do 
with each other. In short, it is about belonging” (Shipton 2009: ix).   
Additionally, when a man has acquired wealth (in things or in people: in the form of 
cocoa and other cash crops, for example, or in the form of wives and children), and is 
hospitable to people (especially strangers), such a person is said to have life and share life. 
Such a man will never lack the blessings of the deities and ancestors. He is an example to be 
emulated in the community and he is considered a ‘big man’ with considerable networks 
(Utas et al 2012). Joseph Owura, a 73 year old elder of Nkonya, however, cautions that such 
persons can easily attract the jealous and wicked eyes of persons who may seek to destroy 
them because of their magnanimity. Communities have life when the old and young can fend 
for their families and defend the resources of the village, especially water and land. Life is 
lost when they are no longer capable of carrying out these functions.  
The gift of nkpa or agbe is also connected to the respect and honour they accord the 
environment because “the environment shares its bounty with humans just as humans share 
with one another, thereby integrating both human and non-human components of the world 
into one, all-embracing ‘cosmic economy of sharing’” (Ingold, 2011:44). As the environment 
is an essential dimension of the land, any destruction of the environment is a destruction of 
the land, which will become unfriendly to human habitation/survival.  
Any person who has agbe/nkpa must be a transmitter of life through the sharing of 
material things but also spiritual gifts and talents within the community and beyond. Then 
there is the distinction the Nkonya make between “bad life”, nkpa lalahe and “good life”, 
nkpa wang klan.
60
 Bad life expresses a state of living in fear; it refers to famine, to lack of 
freedom, the absence of peace, shortage of rain for farming, threats from neighbours, or a 
general state of uneasiness, when the social environment is full of land and marital litigations. 
On the other hand the community has good life when there is enough food to feed families, 
when there is absence of war/conflict, when there is good health, freedom and peace and 
when young men and women can meet the reproductive needs of the respective families and 
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 In Nkonya the phrase is expressed as “ane tsie  ɔsulu amoso, tame anea ɔsulu amo abusua”. 
60
 In Ewe bad life means agbe bada and good life means agbe nyui. 
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society. Against this background, some elders have described the current situation in the area 
as a state of lifelessness.  
An 80 year old informant commented:  
“The communities have lost life because we don’t have enough to feed ourselves, 
we have lost farms, we are poor, we are sick, and we cannot nourish good 
relationships among ourselves and with our neighbours. Even our gods and 
ancestors seem to have deserted us. Our capacity to generate life and transmit it 
among ourselves is destroyed.”61  
 
For the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya, who are life-affirming, this scenario is a fault 
line/weakness that challenges the core values of their worldview about life. It also brings to 
the fore that good life is not a given, it must be consciously cultivated and guided at the 
community and individual levels, through a healthy relationship between the ancestors and the 
living, and among the living. In this way the ever-presence of life within the community will 
be guaranteed.     
What I deduce from the above is that the more the conflict goes on, the more people 
will be deprived of life, and the more people are deprived of life, the more the chances of 
conflict gain ground in the area. At a deeper level and in the longer term, the conflict over the 
land is about more than the economic gains a few are making; it is about the very foundation 
of existence.  
Furthermore, among the Alavanyo as well as the Nkonya, it is believed that the land is 
capable of acting and reacting, feeling and knowing. As the land is sacred, having sex on the 
land, killing one’s neighbour or a stranger, or falsely dispossessing people of their land are 
tabooed actions. When offences against the land are committed they are quickly expiated 
through libation by fetish priests, lineage heads or clan heads. It is equally a taboo for the 
Nkonya to work on the land on every sixth day and for the Alavanyo on Thursdays and 
Sundays. This is to allow the land to rest and revitalize, while also allowing humans to rest 
from their labours. It is said that the gods have their own way of meeting out punishment to 
offenders. However, my observations during field work indicate that today, these taboos have 
lost some of their importance. For example, I often met people going or returning from their 
farms on a resting day, with the excuse that they went to just ‘carry foodstuffs’ and not to 
‘work’. What constitutes work in this context is very fluid and subject to different 
interpretations. 
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 Interview with Agya Ofori, Nkonya-Wurupong, March, 2012. 
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Among the Alavanyo and Nkonya, the relationship between the torgbuiwo and the 
land as a living being/nugbagbe is a twin relationship and explains why the people respect the 
rituals and symbolic norms that fertilise the relationship between them and the torgbuiwo so 
the latter will continue to enrich the land for the community’s benefit. In my relationship with 
the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, I came to realise how important ancestors really were for the 
people. Both the young and the old continuously kept referring to the ancestors. Writing about 
the Akan and drawing on other experiences within the African continent, Gyekye (1998) also 
observed a similar experience where the living tend to give a lot of attention to the ancestors. 
It seems that the frequent reference to the ancestors is a programmatic discourse often 
employed by the older generation to give compelling foundation to custom and ‘tradition’ and 
to ground their power over the interpretation of history and cultural practices which are 
sometimes inexplicable. In this sense the discourse on the ancestors may be said to be a 
discourse about power and control over property, history and persons. 
Again, while the ethos of reverence for the land and belief in the ancestors is essential 
in the worldview of the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, some of my informants have also argued 
that it is equally true that, over the years of the conflict, this ethos has been over-essentialised 
by some elders and local elites to cover up their involvement in the illegal timber business and 
other material/pecuniary benefits following from the conflict. The ethos of ancestorship and 
reverence for the land thus both constitute instruments of power and authority vested in elders 
who are said to be living representatives of the ancestors (cf. Kopytoff, 1971; Mendosa, 1976 
and Awuah-Nyamekye & Sarfo-Mensah 2011, but who may also abuse that power).  
2.3.2. Ordering and Structuring the Land: The Domestication of the Environment 
 
The Nkonya and Alavanyo, not unlike the Dagara of northwest Ghana, “view the ordering of 
the cosmos as a concrete process of ordering the environment in terms of locations consisting 
of farms, homesteads, village stead, the bush, hills, rivers etc and of dealing with atmospheric 
conditions as personified agencies” (Tengan 1998:75). This cosmological ordering of the 
environment is a meaning-making process and explains the meaning of domestication and its 
influence on the settlement patterns of the two communities, as we shall further see in chapter 
four. Domesticating the land and turning it into social and agrarian space/order and building 
relationships with spirits of the land and with humans is also key to understanding how late 
comers are accepted and integrated by autochthonous communities.  
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Among the Alavanyo and Nkonya, a distinction is made between the land around the 
homestead, afe, and the bush, egbe, which is beyond the homestead. The bush is said to be 
composed of farmable land and the forest, ave, which is more a space for hunting, for 
collecting medicinal herbs and for interacting with spiritual beings. The land around the 
homestead is personified as feminine, it is mild and friendly, a place for the cultivation of 
legumes and vegetables, a task usually carried out by the women. The bush, on the other 
hand, is personified as masculine. It is a fierce space and the place of bravery and courage. 
Cassiman’s work among the Kasena of north-eastern Ghana illustrates how the rendering of 
the concept of bush in Kasena cosmology is similar to that of the Nkonya and the Alavanyo. 
She says:  
“When the Kasena speak of the bush, they refer to the uninhabited land beyond 
the boundaries of the village. It is the realm of the beyond. In popular discourse 
the bush is described as a dangerous space, where one gets easily lost, since there 
is no univocal orientation there. Wild animals and dangerous invisible beings 
inhabit the bush. One should be afraid to enter the bush alone, since one can never 
know the danger that lies hidden there. To die in the bush is a very mysterious 
thing and loaded with omen (2006:89).”  
 
It is believed that the forest is the abode of malevolent spirits that hover around and may stray 
to the homesteads to destroy human life. That is why even today, people (and especially 
children) are hesitant to move into the bushes around the homestead for fear they may be 
taken away or be harmed by some evil spirit. Persons who venture into the darkness of the 
night or the ‘field of the unknown’ are said to be spiritually powerful and humanly 
courageous. It is said that in the night the agents of the forest move to the homesteads. The 
forest and its beings move into the homesteads in the night and then move back at daybreak.  
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Figure 13. A view of the forest area in part of the disputed land. In the picture is Innocent Ohene, 
one of the youth who took the author round the disputed land during field work in 2012. Later, he 
was shot to death by some youth alleged to be coming from Alavanyo when he was returning 
home from farm with his wife and child who were spared.  
 
Cosmologically, the forest is the place of the wild, but is domesticated through the activities 
of hunting and farming. Through the act of domestication, the forest is turned into a 
praxiological and spatial map on which the people chart paths of movement and bridging the 
fields between undomesticated and domesticated space, the wild and the unwild, and the 
unknown and the known. Elsewhere Hagberg (1998:63) argues that “cosmologically this 
implies that ‘the wild and uncultivated space’ must be turned into village life of social order. 
The first settler of a site, i.e. the Master of the Earth, must enter a relationship with the spirits 
of the earth to be able to settle and farm there.” 
The domestication of the forest has other pragmatic benefits; it allows farmers to stay 
as long as a week on their farms before coming home and also to hunt at night and to avoid 
the long and arduous mountainous distances they often cover to reach farming lands. It also 
helps farmers to watch over their crops/plants, especially when they suspect that predatory 
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animals of the wild may come to destroy them. As the dispute over the land intensified, many 
farmers, fearing that their farms could be vandalized and their produce looted by unknown 
figures, have been spending more days on the farms in order to protect their produce from 
being looted. This phenomenon demonstrates how the land dispute has compelled a 
redefinition and a reinterpretation of nocturnal and diurnal times and spaces, and has impacted 
on social life and agrarian practices. Today, for the two communities, the day has become as 
dangerous as the night; the two periods interdigitate in an uncomfortable synchrony that 
potentially expresses fear, doubt and anxiety.  
In the course of my field research, I also came to understand that the process of 
domestication is a way of discovering how different herbs, medicinal plants, and other healing 
products may be found and used for treating humans and animals. The people believe that 
Nanabulu/Mawuga has imbued some trees, rivers, herbs with some spirit or power which can 
be tapped into by spiritually-gifted men and women for healing purposes, for self-protection, 
even for eliminating one’s enemies and so on. One of my informants Togbe Kodzo, a 
herbalist, told me how, through his grandfather, he inherited the gift of treating or healing 
people from different ailments and chronic diseases by using river water, barks and roots of 
trees. It is believed that these ‘ecological gifts’ i.e. the trees or rivers can be used for bad or 
good purposes and what becomes dominant depends on the user’s intention. In a sense these 
natural endowments are perceived as ‘raw materials’ that can be used for different purposes. 
Since the genesis of the land conflict these benefits, which ultimately promote life, have been 
weakened or in some cases even destroyed because the bush/forest has become a precarious 
zone for a majority of the people. 
 
2.4. SPIRITUAL NAVIGATION: THE APPROPRIATION OF CELESTIAL BEINGS 
AND AGENTS IN THE CHALLENGES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
I am Openi Kojo Adu, 75 and a Christian. In Nkonyaland we believe there is a 
cause for everything including death. No one dies for nothing even if the medical 
reasons are known; there is a spiritual component to things. Two experiences took 
place in my life that I would like to share with you. Once my son and another 
man’s son were walking home from the farm, and a snake came from the bush to 
bite my son and not the other man’s son. He did not die but got home and was 
treated. I knew there was a reason why the snake got my son and left the other 
man’s son, for this is not by chance. So I consulted the diviner (boko) and it came 
out that my son had disrespected an elder in the community by calling him names. 
So in anger, he caused the snake to bite my son. I followed the instructions of the 
diviner and my son lived. The second story is this: my daughter who is married to 
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a polygamous man could not have children, she either had miscarriage or the child 
died at stillbirth. My son in-law and I consulted a pastor and a juju man
62
 and it 
came out that it was the work of one of her rivals who was jealous of her success 
in business and was destroying the babies in her womb. With the assistance of the 
two spiritual men we inverted the process and now my daughter has two children.     
So life in our area [here he included Alavanyo] is precarious and has many 
dimensions composed of good and bad/dangerous moments and events, so there 
are spiritual forces/powerful people like soothsayers or those with witchcraft  who 
help us mitigate/negotiate these precarious moments. I know people whose wives 
can’t get children, those whose lands are forcefully taken, and those whose farms 
are not doing well, and they have remedied these situations by consulting juju 
men and pastors.   
 
I was told many similar stories by individuals in Alavanyo. What is important in such 
narratives is the salience of the political economy of power between evil and good forces 
which can be tapped into by various agents (medicine men and women, but also pastors, for 
example). One might seek their intervention to handle the challenges of life in the competing 
arenas of domestic life, human relations, power relations, agrarian life and land struggles. I 
term the process or human effort by which individuals or groups resort to agents such as 
medicine men and women, juju men or pastors in order to gain control over life’s challenges 
as illustrated with the story of Openi Adu, as spiritual navigation. Fundamentally, spiritual 
navigation is a problem-solving ‘device’ or ‘scheme’: it offers a pathway on which to 
navigate around the burdens and problems of life. In this way, spiritual navigation is political, 
in that it entails the acquisition of power by people who are challenged by problems and are 
seeking some force to navigate the challenge. 
From the story of Openi Adu, it is clear that while he calls himself a Christian, he does 
not restrict himself to its orthodox tenets, but goes or gazes beyond that to navigate a 
pragmatic way to handle his predicaments by consulting a diviner (afakala) or a pastor, or 
both.  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, since precolonial times, the relations and impact of Mawu, 
the deities, ancestors, and other spiritual forces, on human activities has formed the most 
compelling and definitive matrix of faith and practice. Among them, it is believed that human 
life is not just a linear movement of undisturbed events but rather that life unfolds along a 
curvilinear pattern, unpredictable and dangerous. In such a world, spiritual navigation is 
necessary to successfully negotiate the precarious and uncertain.  
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 Juju is a fetish, a charm, amulet or bangle that is believed to be imbued with some power that can protect 
people and can also aid people cause harm to those who hate them. A juju man is one invested with the power or 
the technique of empowering people with amulets, charms or powdery substances for various reasons/intentions.  
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In living and relating with the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, I observed that they have a 
strong belief in lineage, clan and community gods, (troga in Ewe and wulubulu in Nkonya). 
These gods, I was told, are involved in human affairs on a daily basis, and have numerous 
responsibilities, including that of protecting individuals and groups against witchcraft, 
sorcery, juju or epidemics among other things. There are also personal gods which are said to 
be guardians of individuals, protecting them from various forms of harm. Aggrieved persons 
within the community can seek the intervention of a community god to dispense justice, 
which is often said to be instant and severe. This is why the community god Nanasia is of 
great importance to the people of Nkonyaland. Nanasia is said to grant good fortune in the 
form of wealth, success in business, safe travel, the gift of childbirth and protection to people 
involved in local and state politics etc. In fact, in the Ghana, both the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya are known for their prowess in juju, witchcraft and sorcery. On the grounds of this 
recognition one of my interlocutors described the ongoing land conflict not only as a battle 
over land, but also as a battle between the gods and the spiritual forces of the two 
communities, a battle in which the question becomes whose gods are stronger and supreme. In 
both communities, it is strongly believed that there is something ‘spiritual’ about the conflict 
and that this is one of the reasons why the conflict is often deemed insoluble, and why 
spiritual navigation is needed so that the way may be cleared for the ‘true’ owner of the land 
to emerge. But the uncertainties involved in navigating the spiritual world make this 
expectation a challenging task.  
Furthermore, given the precarious nature of life and more so because of the land 
conflict, people of different faith persuasions in the two communities have great recourse to 
Voodoo priests, diviners, and medicine men and women, as mentioned above. These agents 
are consulted when the rains fail and the fertility of the land is diminished, or during the 
selection and enstoolment of chiefs, when people want to avert some calamity, when people 
are chronically ill, and for a host of other intentions. Greene (1996) gives credence to this 
dimension of spiritual navigation by showing how a belief in the reincarnation of the soul, 
luva, required all Anlo of southeast Ghana to consult a diviner in order to determine who the 
new-born infant was a reincarnation of. She argues that the Deity whom the diviner consulted 
was Mawu or some other named Supreme Deity. Divination and other forms of oracular 
consultations were and continue to be of vital importance to the way both the Alavanyo and 
Nkonya handle the unknown and the realities outside the contours of human rationality. An 
elderly informant told me:  
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“Diviners and juju men and women are people with special powers who hold in 
their hands the capacity to blur social and spiritual boundaries and demonstrate 
the ability to heal and to destroy, cover and uncover the ‘secrets’ of individuals 
and groups and to broker peace or engender dispute if they want to.”  
 
Nukunya (2003) explains that divination has become popular and somehow lucrative in 
Ghanaian society because “its operation and success lie in the notion that a supernatural 
phenomenon can only be understood through supernatural means” (p.64).  
As part of the professional stratagem, diviners “also keep their ears and eyes open to 
what is happening in their communities so that they have a store of working knowledge which 
they use in their divination” (Mbiti 1999:172). There is equally some form of secrecy around 
them which invariably adds up to the respect, power and honour they command in the 
community. Thus, their fixity and immobility is itself a source of power because of the 
different people within and without the community who regularly consult them.  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya today, it is observable that Christians are visiting shrines and 
consulting fetish priests and pastors, juju men and women when they have to contend with 
‘forces’ or ‘problems’ beyond their control as in the case narrated above. While the story of 
Openi Adu may be perceived by some Christians as a form of ‘betrayal’ of his faith in the 
Christian God, others would see it as a form of a ‘religious tactic’ that has allowed him to 
navigate a challenge confronting him. Analysing how spiritual navigation has been 
mainstreamed into everyday life in the Volta region, not least Alavanyo and Nkonya, Gavua 
(2000) argues that, “even the most devout Christians and church elders still believe in the 
power and potency of gods and other spirits associated with the indigenous religion” (p.85). 
The capacity to benefit from the ‘graces and blessings’ of both the Christian God and the 
consultation of fetish priests or visiting shrines is even more present in Nkonya and Alavanyo 
today than ever before, according to some of my informants.
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 In the words of Meyer (1999), this is equally expressed in Ewe as Yesu vide, dzo vide i.e. “a little bit of Jesus, 
and a little bit of magic”. 
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Figure 14. This picture is the image of the Archangel Michael who is seen piercing the devil 
symbolised by the serpent to death. Though many people of Nkonya-Tayi and the surrounding 
villages are syncretic in terms of religious practice, they nonetheless believe that Archangel 
Michael has been the reason for their ability to withstand the Alavanyo since this statue was 
erected in the 1980s. 
 
This is so because in the worldview of the Nkonya and Alavanyo there is no contradiction in 
vacillating between two faiths because there are two sides to every phenomenon and people in 
difficult circumstances navigate their way to both in order to attain the desired results. Indeed, 
according to some older informants, in the past and during different escalations of the land 
dispute more recently, both communities (individuals or groups) have consulted fetish priests, 
diviners and medicine men within and outside the respective communities for direction and 
mystical power to protect themselves or to do their opponents in.
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Belief in witchcraft, sorcery, magic and malevolent spirits is also very strong among the 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya. It is argued that Mawu/Nanabulu created ‘bad’ and ‘good’ spirits 
(gbogbowo in Ewe or One in Nkonya), magicians, witches and sorcerers, and one can 
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 During field work, I met with some youth in Alavanyo and Nkonya who told me how they drunk concoctions 
and smeared their bodies with substances meant to protect them from gun shots and unforeseen attacks by their 
opponents. The youth equally intimated that the concoctions and medicinal balms did not always work and that 
some of them died through failure of these spiritual arsenals.   
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‘manipulate’ these spirits for good or bad ends. To be given witchcraft substance or to acquire 
it is not necessarily bad; it depends on the use to which it is put, for a witch may use his 
witchcraft for various purposes including offering protection to his family or help other 
people succeed in some venture and so on. However;  
“…the philosophy of witchcraft also makes it clear that individual agency alone 
does not determine social outcomes. People act, with good or evil intent, but the 
social effectivity of their actions depends not only on their own capacities but also 
on their access to sources of power that lie outside the individual and beyond his 
or her control” (Berry, 2001:xxv).  
 
In the eyes of the Alavanyo and Nkonya, when the rains fail and lead to a poor harvest, it is 
the witches and malevolent spirits who may be punishing the community because of some 
wrong done them. To overcome this challenge, farmers will ‘spiritually barricade’ their farms 
against the intrusion of witches and evil spirits. In these communities, as elsewhere in Africa, 
the belief in witchcraft and malevolent spirits is very strong, but while young girls or boys 
may be accused of witchcraft in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, in 
Alavanyo and Nkonya it is older women who are often accused of witchcraft and doing harm 
to society (cf. Honwana & De Boeck 2005; Gavua, 2000; Sarpong 2002).  
Today, while on the surface Christian denominations of the Catholic and the 
Presbyterian variant and the Pentecostal-charismatic churches are dominant in Alavanyo and 
Nkonya,
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 beneath the surface and in everyday praxis, what is actually dominant is the 
consulting of magico-spiritual agents like diviners, medicine men and women and so on. 
Thus, the expression of everyday religious practice in Alavanyo and Nkonya is syncretic, 
consisting of Christian and ‘traditional’ beliefs and followers. This religious syncretism has 
been mainstreamed into the process of spiritual navigation leading to a marketisation of 
‘spiritual powers’ which are ‘purchased’ by different people in Nkonya and Alavanyo in order 
to negotiate the blessings and burdens, the good and evil and the known and unknown 
challenges of the conflict situation in which they are encapsulated.  
From the foregoing, I opine that the world of the Alavanyo and Nkonya constitutes a 
localised network of spiritual beings and forces that can be approached by the people for 
multiple favours which may be good or bad but of utility to individuals and groups. 
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 During fieldwork, some of my informants told me the story of two female-headed spiritual churches in 
Alavanyo– Come to Jesus, founded by Sister Alice and Kristo Nye fia (Christ is king) founded by Esinu Ntem 
and how these churches are well-patronized by adherents from Alavanyo and the surrounding towns of Nkonya, 
Kpandu, Hohoe and the cities of Accra and Tema. The interesting thing is that the two women started together, 
but later had to break up because Esinu started to accuse Sister Alice of consulting satanic powers and shrines for 
powers in effecting healing and other activities, so the former started her own church. Thus, even within the 
Christian groups and among pastors, syncretism is very much a practice of everyday life.  
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Additionally, I argue that the proclivity of the people to negotiate and gain control over the 
problems of life through spiritual navigation is a way they seek to access power through the 
agency of spiritual men and women in the competitive environment of the land dispute. It is 
also a way of maintaining social balance in living on and relating with the land and 
neighbours.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have shown that a holistic exegesis of the genesis of the conflict and its 
escalation and de-escalation through the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial periods until 
today, points to the fact that the conflict is not about a boundary map, but a combination of 
socio-economic, political, ethnic and intergenerational factors. I have also observed that an 
appreciation of the worldview or cosmology of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya offer an 
eloquent lens through which to understand some of the reasons and meanings behind their 
actions and reactions towards the land and the conflict.  
In Alavanyo and the Nkonya, the land is ‘everything’ for the people. It is the substance 
for which one can live and which one can relate to, and this relationship forms the basis of a 
meaningful human existence. The land is life, and to lose the land is to lose the source and 
foundation of life itself. For the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, to have lived fully, is to have lived 
well with the land and all it offers in this life and in the ancestral world beyond. This explains 
why the two groups see the land as the basis for everything and are ready to go to any length 
in order to guide it for the current and future generations.  
The events that took place at the beginning of 2013 challenged the existing processes 
of mediating the conflict through the MC and the state, and brought them to a lame end. This 
further complicated issues of identity and belonging between the two groups. It is to mitigate 
some of these challenges that, over the years, the people have resorted to the agency of 
celestial beings through diviners, voodoo priests, but simultaneously, they have also resorted 
to arms and ammunition 
 86 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
POWER AND AGENCY: A DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE AND 
IMPACT OF ACTORS IN THE DISPUTE 
INTRODUCTION 
In many parts of Africa, because land confers wealth, property and power over persons and 
territory, it has become a site of competing interests and an attraction point for different actors 
whose activities often lead to intractable social and violent land conflicts. 
This chapter will try to analyze the dynamics of power and agency of the various 
actors in the land conflict and how individually or collectively they have been contributing to 
the resolution or irresolution of the conflict. The chapter will be divided into four parts. 
In the first part, I shall analyze the dynamics of traditional authority at the local and 
state levels from the colonial and postcolonial periods and the present. In Ghana, traditional 
rulers are important in the political and social landscape and have been incorporated into 
many state and non-state institutions. Thus, traditional authorities have a lot of authority and 
are highly respected. In Alavanyo and Nkonya, however, while one cannot ignore the effort of 
traditional authorities to bring an end to the conflict, today, it is obvious that the problematics 
of the dispute has bifurcated the authority and identity of chiefs and elders, making it difficult 
for them to maintain law and order, and to contribute decisively to the resolution of the 
conflict.   
The second part will be devoted to the activities of the youth. The agency and power 
of the youth in the dispute has been an ambivalent one, and perhaps this explains why, over 
the years, state and local efforts to provide opportunities for the youth to give meaningful 
expression to their energies and agency have not worked well. With the analytic concept se 
sen na du, or ‘be strong if you have to eat’, I will show why and how, the youth ‘manage’ life 
or ‘get by’ in the everyday challenges imposed on them by the conflict. The role of Youth 
Associations in the dispute will equally be examined.   
I will treat the influence of the elite in the third part. The elite are the most difficult 
group to analyse because their agency far more than any other group has been very 
instrumental in defining and redefining the contours of the dispute, encouraging entrenched 
positions. Here, I will emphasis that the agency of the elite will continue to impact on the 
 87 
conflict for a very long time to come because of the power they command over persons and 
over the definition of the dispute.  
I will devote the fourth part to examining the role of women and how the agency of 
these actors is equally shaping and influencing everyday issues of the conflict. Women are 
generally defined as ‘vulnerable’ and bear the brunt of conflicts when they do arise, and 
indeed this is the case in many conflicts. But, are women really without power and agency? 
Here, I will demonstrate that though women in the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict seemingly 
stand in a powerless position, they in fact exercise a lot of influence in different scenarios. 
The chapter ends with a concluding narrative on how the power and agency of the different 
actors will continue to determine the inner logic and goal of the land dispute.   
 
3.1. POWER AND IDENTITY: STATE AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Nana Okoto Kofi III, Paramount chief of Nkonya and Togbega Tsedze Atakora VII,       
Paramount chief of Alavanyo.                                                                                        
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3. 1.1.Traditional Authorities and the State 
 
In Ghana, colonial and postcolonial discourse on traditional authority has been an interesting 
and debatable one in which;  
“while the early British colonial rulers encapsulated traditional authorities into a 
system of indirect rule, the leaders of independent Ghana perceived them as 
traitors and curtailed their power, claiming that traditional authorities were 
impediments to development and should be replaced by modern and rational 
institutions” (Boafo-Arthur, 2003).  
 
Today, while there is a visible presence of traditional authorities in local and state institutions, 
there is at the same time an ongoing debate that is casting doubt over their significance and 
continuing existence. The debate is generally framed in two ways. First, it is believed that 
given the involvement of traditional authorities with the colonial administration (an alliance 
chiefs exploited to their advantage and to the disadvantage of their peoples), and the fact that 
most of their traditional roles such as settling disputes have been taken over by state agencies 
such as the police and the courts, traditional leadership should be confined to local matters 
within their local communities. Second, it is argued that the inability of the post-independence 
state to erode the power and influence of traditional authorities, and the fact that over the 
years successive governments have been incorporating them into state governance and 
democratic institutions, proves their mettle and continuing significance to state and local 
politics (Gavua, 2000; Addo-Fening R, in Awedoba and Odotei, 2006).  
In spite of this debate, traditional authority has become a “primary substratum of 
Ghanaian society; consequently the political leadership dares not undermine its credibility 
without experiencing political and socio-cultural repercussions” (Owusu-Mensah, 2013:31). 
Undoubtedly, most Ghanaians still believe in their traditional authorities even if some are 
perceived to be abusing the power vested in them (Crook, 2005). More so, the 1992 
constitution recognizes the position of traditional authorities and their legitimacy to rule/lead 
their subjects without undue government interference. Additionally, government is required to 
set up a Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs to advise local rulers on chieftaincy issues, but also to 
cement relations between government and traditional authorities for the mutual good of the 
two institutions and the Ghanaian people. 
The relations between government and traditional authorities is, however, complicated 
by the state’s policy not to interfere in the affairs of traditional authorities; a policy that is 
giving room for some traditional authorities to expropriate stool lands and other fiduciary 
 89 
benefits for personal gain (Berry, 2001; Lund, 2008). Whilst in most cases this has been 
creating tensions and conflict in communities, it has not obliterated the influence and power 
of traditional authorities. For example, despite the services rendered by the police and the 
courts, traditional authorities continue to perform various functions related to law 
enforcement, dispute settlements, religious acts, and community development among others 
(cf. Odotei and Awedoba, 2006; Owusu-Mensah, 2013). In other jurisdictions, “they are able 
to implement governmental law and policy and to facilitate, explain, and attain popular 
support for development projects in their traditional area, on the other hand they can provide 
information from the locality” (Ubink, 2008:139).   
Additionally, traditional authorities are acknowledged and well respected because they 
embody the aspirations and hopes of the people and deep cultural values and practices in 
relation to fertility of the land or festivals. Also, the fact that traditional authorities have 
custodial authority/control over land either in the stool, family or clan, invests them with 
considerable power over persons, territory and property. In some cases traditional authorities 
have become powerful because of their ability to strategically turn local power into personal 
power through their involvement in party politics, as some covertly act as agents or actors for 
political parties, often for their personal interests.  
Moreover, today, some traditional authorities have become agents of infrastructural 
development and the maintenance of peace and unity in their communities (Crook, 2005). 
This has offered some chiefs a newly found power as some international agencies are 
bypassing central government and providing traditional authorities with financial grants and 
technical support for the improvement of the living standards in their communities.
66
 
At the moment, the Land Administration Project (LAP) which began in 2004 to 
overhaul and reform the land sector is relying heavily on traditional authorities and Queen 
mothers for its success because of their involvement with land matters (cf. 
www.modernghana.com, 04/02/2014). Doubts have, however, been raised about the 
sustainability of this project because as a donor-driven project, it can become a failure when 
funds are misapplied or dry up.  
Furthermore, the appointment of traditional authorities to statutory boards and 
commissions, such as the Forestry Commission, the National Aids Commission, the Ghana 
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 The world bank’s ‘Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project’ in Ghana is an example where 
the world bank provided a US$ 5 million grant directly to two traditional authorities of the Asanteman Council 
and the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council for the enhancement of health and education in the area as well, 
thereby empowering the traditional authorities and strengthening the capacities of the traditional councils 
(Ubink, 2008).  
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National Petroleum Corporation and many others have given traditional authorities a powerful 
leverage in the governance of the state (Owusu-Mensah, 2013).  
Whilst the above examples indicate the resilience of traditional leadership through local 
and state structures, it is equally observable that traditional authorities have been the grounds 
for numerous land, chieftaincy and political conflicts. Further, some continue to abuse office 
by interfering in the election of chiefs in other local communities, or by misappropriating 
community land and other fiduciary properties for personal fulfilment (cf. Tsikata and Seini, 
2004; Tonah, 2012). More often than not, these situations have led to fights or violent 
conflicts involving traditional authorities, elite groups and youth associations, especially 
where there are succession problems and protracted land litigations (cf. Berry, 2001; Amanor, 
1999). One can thus argue that, bar the culture of abuse of office by some traditional 
authorities, their power and identity as embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of their 
people cannot be done away with, at least in the foreseeable future.  
3.1.2. Traditional Authority, Roles, Identity and the Land Dispute 
 
“The President of the Volta Region House of Chiefs, Togbe Afede XIV, has 
announced that the House would henceforth impose sanctions on the two 
paramount chiefs of Nkonya and Alavanyo, Nana Okotor Kofi and Togbe Atakora 
Tsedze, if further violence continues in the area. He explained that part of the 
sanction would include the exclusion of the two chiefs from the deliberations of 
the House, until they make conscious efforts at ensuring lasting peace in the area, 
which he stressed was a prerequisite for the development of the area and the 
region. Addressing the first emergency meeting of the House in Ho, Togbe Afede 
made it clear that the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict was not only retarding 
development in that part of the region, but also a total embarrassment to the chiefs 
and people of the region. Togbe Afede, who is also the Paramount Chief of the 
Asogli traditional area stressed that the House was not against the two members of 
the House, but rather would support them in their efforts to bring peace to the 
area, noting that it was vital for the two paramount chiefs to commit themselves to 
the peace process. The President of the House said the two chiefs would be held 
responsible for any further violent activities in the area, noting that it was time for 
the chiefs in the conflict area to distance themselves from the conflict by exposing 
those involved to the law enforcement authorities.”67 
 
The reaction of the Volta Regional House of Chiefs on the Nkonya-Alavanyo land conflict 
offers a framework for understanding the daunting challenges confronting traditional 
authorities in the dispute and their relation to regional and state power structures. The 
president’s acknowledgment of the power of the traditional authorities to stem the tide of 
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violence and hostilities and to withdraw the two chiefs from the House, and sanction them if 
they did not expose those fomenting troubles in the area comes as good news to the local 
population, who think that this time around, with the force of ‘soft power’ from the Regional 
House of Chiefs, the local authorities will actively engage a process that will lead to a 
resolution of the dispute, but till today, this hope has remained a mirage. Chiefs challenging 
their fellow chiefs, this is a novel idea and somehow shows the gravity of the issues at stake. 
In the bigger picture, the statement of the Regional House of Chiefs brings into sharp 
focus the truism that the conflict is not only a local matter, but also a regional one, as 
expressed through the president’s statement that the actions and inactions of his colleagues in 
Nkonya and Alavanyo are denting the image and integrity of traditional authorities, people 
from the region and the area in particular.
68
 This observation demonstrates that local political 
discourse associated with the conflict is rarely local, but is also implicated in the regional and 
national political discourse about the dispute and the people. In my view, it is the 
mainstreaming of these two discourses into the politics of the dispute that has been 
contributing to the complexity of finding a solution to the land conflict. When local matters 
such as the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute assume a national character, they risk being 
crowded out by powerful actors who may have a poor understanding of local power 
dynamics, and yet are very influential in determining the contours of the issues at stake.  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, while it is no secret that some Chiefs are complicit in the 
fomentation of trouble and in the entrenchment of positions on the conflict, people are afraid 
to openly talk about this because it will be seen as a betrayal if one were to expose a chief in 
public, especially on important matters such as land. This will normally attract strong 
sanctions from the royalty.   
Among the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, land is everything for the people and a 
traditional authority or a chief builds his authority on his connection to the land on which he 
places the royal stool, a symbol and source of his chiefly power. Hence, without land, 
chieftaincy or traditional leadership is inconceivable (cf. Herbst, 2000). In fact, among the 
Alavanyo and Nkonya, it is said that a good chief, clan or family head is one whose people 
can go to sleep and wake up to find their land untouched or undisturbed.  
In Ghana, while most chiefs in the south have stool lands which they hold in trust for 
the people, those in the northern Volta region, where Nkonya and Alavanyo are situated, do 
not. Here, land is owned by families and clans; but the chiefs have custodial authority over all 
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 Some of my informants lamented that because of the violence and hostilities associated with the dispute, 
people from Alavanyo and Nkonya are attracting a bad name among their neighbours and in the country.  
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lands under their territory because of their office. Chiefs, however, cannot expropriate any 
land unless it belongs to their own clans or families. In spite of this, since colonial times when 
the land dispute began till today, traditional authorities are compelled by the vows of their 
office to stand behind the communities affected by the land dispute, even if they do not have a 
share in the disputed land, otherwise they would be seen to be betraying the people, and in 
some instance they may be destooled.  
In the mind of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, then, if land is a sine qua non for a 
chief’s position, then a chief cannot call himself a chief if the very basis of his office is taken 
away. A chief will be making himself unchiefly or a laughing stock of the people if he is 
unable to defend and protect them and the land at all times. This rationale has implicated the 
chiefs and elders in the conflict in a manner that is somehow compelling them to keep shifting 
position on the dispute because they sometimes have to defend issues of the land that are in 
reality indefensible. Chiefs cannot appropriate any parcel of land even for community 
purposes when they have no endorsement from clan and family heads. Given the culture of 
land commodification in Ghana, families that are willing to give land for community projects 
tend to ask for huge sums of money from developers with the excuse that ‘they have to eat’ 
and the land is all they have.
69
 This has in most cases stalled projects that would have 
otherwise benefited many communities.  
Thus, in Nkonya and Alavanyo, while traditional authorities may be said to have 
authority over the people, in actuality they have very limited authority over them when it 
comes to land issues. In the wake of recent escalations, this limitation and the demands of the 
land dispute have compelled some traditional authorities to ask to what extent they must be 
involved in a land conflict that is demanding so much of their time and energy?  
In chapter two, I indicated that the 1975 ruling which was meant to settle matters 
between the two communities once and for all, but failed to do so, led to the 1983 and 
subsequent escalations. From this time on, the identity of the chiefs and what role they should 
play in the conflict became paramount. It appears that unrestrained elders and a mixed group 
of youth began to demand a more radical and confrontational approach to the conflict. In 
Alavanyo, this radicalization led to the death of the late paramount chief Togbe Anku Atakora 
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 During fieldwork, the paramount chief of Nkonya told me a grinding mill and other machinery that were 
offered by the UNDP to the women folk in 2007 as a livelihood support project were still sitting in his court yard 
because families are unwilling to offer land for free to set up the machinery. 
 93 
V because, “he was accused of selling ammunition to the Nkonya, given them protection and 
custody in his palace and was charged that his mother came from Nkonya”70  
Also, in Nkonya, the local youth whose mob actions were destabilizing order and peace 
in the communities, did not spare the paramount chief as he was perceived to be too soft in his 
approach towards the Alavanyo. The actions and demands of the youth and elders eventually 
introduced a new local discourse about traditional leadership in which traditional authorities, 
especially the paramount chiefs, were now to show robustness in issues related to the land 
dispute. They were also to show capability of using their leverage to mobilize the youth, war 
leaders, and the community to claim the disputed land.  
Additionally, the paramount chiefs were to do all within their power to tap into local, 
national and transnational networks and use their connection to powerful personalities from 
the area whose agency could possibly sustain the community’s resilience and eventually tilt 
things in favour of the people. Fundamentally, this was about how the chiefs can employ 
strategic power (cf. de Certeau, 1988) to fence off potential enemies, and at the same time 
(and most importantly) mobilize “possibilities of influence” either in the form of monies, 
logistics or persons to advance the cause of the conflict.
71
 This new discourse placed the 
paramount chiefs in a very delicate position as they were compelled to do everything in their 
power to claim the disputed land for the owners. In fact, the chiefs were forced to properly 
play the locally expected role of peace builders and negotiators and at the same time show 
robustness and tactical ways to strengthen the community’s resistance to any effort leading to 
a loss of land to opponents (cf. Wolf, 2002; de Certeau, 1988).  
In effect, it was this tension and dilemma to negotiate and navigate between what they 
really must be, as opposed to what they have become as a result of the land dispute that partly 
explains the struggles of identity, the contradictory roles and the powerlessness of the chiefs. 
Till today, this dilemma continues to be a big challenge to the paramount chiefs as they 
sometimes incur not only the wrath of the people, but also of regional and national actors such 
as the Volta Regional House of Chiefs when things go wrong. Perhaps, the biblical saying that 
“from the one to whom much is given, much will be expected” is at work here. Much power 
has been given the chiefs and so much is expected of them. One of my interlocutors, however, 
disagreed with the huge expectations placed on the chiefs and observed that:   
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 These words are contained in a letter the chief wrote to the mediation committee of 1992. The Daily Graphic 
15/04/1983 pp 4-5 captured some of its contents (see also, Tsikata & Seini, 2004). 
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 Later, this became the responsibility of the women folk, individuals, and anybody who saw the conflict as a 
community affair. During fieldwork, some traditional authorities acknowledged that they had received logistics 
and monetary support especially during the period from 1980 to 2007 from some among the elite. 
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“Too much is expected of the chiefs because the generality of the people believe 
that as custodians of the land, the chiefs know the ‘truth’ about the history of the 
land dispute and the most sustainable path to solving it, but are not doing so 
because of some vested interests. I don’t think so because, the conflict has become 
too big and gone out of the hands of the chiefs, some of them are even confused. 
The youth and elite have assumed too much power and they find it difficult to 
listen to the chiefs.”72  
 
To some extent, I do agree with my interlocutor that “the conflict has become too big and 
gone out of the hands of the chiefs” primarily because the longevity and pendular movement 
of the dispute has allowed different powerful actors to keep introducing and reintroducing 
new layers of understanding and interpreting the dispute, thereby complicating efforts aimed 
at resolving it. Further, in the two communities there is a palpable tension between youths 
who are colluding with traditional authorities and the elite in the illegal timber business and 
adopting a confrontational approach to the conflict, and those who are opposed to the illegal 
timber trade and violence, and are advocating for a non-violent approach to the dispute. Given 
the agency of the elders and youth in the dispute, these challenges have also thrown the chiefs 
into an uneasy dialectics of closure and openness to views and opinions of the elite, elders and 
youth about the dispute, however plausible they are. The chiefs have become more and more 
uncertain about the commitment of the elite, youth and elders to promote a culture of peace in 
the area. These challenges are impacting negatively on the various relations among and 
between the elite, youth, elders and the chiefs, weakening the authority of the chiefs to 
confront the hard issues of the dispute in the process.   
Apart from these challenges, today, as chiefs fend for their families and other 
responsibilities associated with the stool, they must also seek innovative ways of bringing 
integral development to their peoples. This is no novelty as chiefs have been involved in the 
progress or development of their communities since precolonial times. What is new, however, 
is that, in Ghana, as Kleist illustrates, 
“the contemporary chiefs face particular challenges which are of a novel nature, 
such as demands of good governance, the introduction of information and 
communication technologies (ICT), and expectations of international connections. 
Therefore, in addition to royalty and seniority, education and access to powerful 
networks have become central qualifications for chieftaincy election” (2011:634).   
 
Through some of these connections chiefs are expected to lobby NGOs and other institutions 
to provide water, schools, toilets and other needs for their communities.  Indeed, some have 
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done great work in this direction. Traditional authorities in Alavanyo and Nkonya are also 
affected by this perception of the ‘modern’ chief who must be seen to be drawing on some 
network to provide good education, good drinking water and other significant social services.  
In precolonial and colonial times, fines, taxes, tributes and sanctions provided for the 
material welfare of chiefs, but this is hardly the case today, as people are disinterested in 
making contributions towards the welfare of chiefs. The monthly allowances from the 
government and the occasional free labour chiefs enjoy from locals are also woefully 
inadequate in meeting the demands of the royal office. It has thus been observed by some of 
my informants that it is partly to meet some of the demands of the royal office and some 
personal needs of the traditional authorities that a number of them was enticed to join the 
illegal timber business which has now become a major driver of the dispute while creating a 
lot division between the chiefs and the people.  
Another major challenge facing the chiefs today is the increasing lack of moral and 
material support they previously enjoyed from their compatriots in nearby towns and villages. 
In the long history of the land dispute, traditional authorities in the Nkonya communities of 
Tayi and Kadjebi that owe parts of the disputed land have enjoyed unflinching support from 
their compatriots in Ntsumuru and Ahenkro on the basis of kinship ties, intermarriage and the 
fact that in the longue durée the conflict affects them all. Similarly, the Alavanyo 
communities of Kpeme and Wudidi have also enjoyed great support from their compatriots in 
Deme and Abehenease.   
During fieldwork, however, it was observable that the support and corporation of chiefs 
and peoples of the non-conflict communities towards those in the conflict enclave could no 
longer be taken for granted. Traditional authorities and peoples outside the conflict area 
started asking if there still was any compelling reason(s) for their involvement in a conflict 
that has no ‘lasting benefits’ as those in the conflict area continue to exploit the timber and 
fiduciary benefits of the conflict for themselves? Some of these chiefs I interviewed lamented:  
 
“You see, our area is not in dispute and we don’t get any benefits from the timber, 
but when there is trouble/when the conflict erupts, because we are leaders, we are 
also summoned before the police for questioning. Those who are benefiting from 
the timber business sometimes avoid questioning or arrest though people know 
them, but will not dare point them out for fear they may be victimized.”73   
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 Interview with different chiefs in Alavanyo and Nkonya at different times between March and August, 2012. 
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The statement of the chiefs that; “we don’t get any benefits from the timber” is as revealing as 
it is disturbing. It depicts how compelling the timber issue has become in the conflict and how 
it has turned the area into a site for groups and individuals to pillage resources for their private 
ends rather than for developing the community. It also points to the fact that though the forest 
trees on the disputed land belong to families and clans, the continuing existence of the conflict 
has provided some traditional authorities with the opportunity to turn the trees into a ‘no 
man’s property’ and to collude with youth groups to “raid” the trees for mutual gain. The 
interest of some chiefs in the forest trees and the divisions this is creating has rather flattened 
a major argument of the traditional authorities that they have been battling over the land 
because they want to safeguard it for current and future generations. As custodians of the land 
and the people, it is the responsibility of traditional authorities to protect and care for what 
belongs to the commons, i.e. the community property that must be used wisely for the benefit 
of all members; but this is not happening. Rather, some traditional authorities within the 
conflict communities seem to be exploiting the resources for themselves. In a sense, this is 
another enactment of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) in which common property 
is exploited by a few for private gains without considering the effects of their actions on 
current and future generations (see also Bromley, 1992).  
Lately, chiefs and people in the non-conflict area realised that the conflict is not only 
creating violence but also creating fiduciary benefits for others, and as a result they have 
threatened to withdraw the moral and military support they offered to those in the conflict 
communities over the years in any future escalations. This threat has however remained 
dormant because of the intermarriages and strong blood ties between and among the 
communities. Kwabla Antwi, a leading youth leader in Alavanyo-Deme told me: “how can 
you stand and watch someone kill your brothers and sisters with whom you share a common 
ancestor? Besides, the conflict can also spill over to our area as it happened in 1983 and 
2003.”  
This observation comes as little surprise because in the two communities, in spite of 
their differences, there is a strong and thick tissue of community feeling connecting the people 
together when it comes to matters of the land dispute.
74
 This in a way throws some light on 
why the conflict has stubbornly defied any sustainable approach to resolve it.  
Following the redrawing of the Gruner map in 2007, which was part of the process of 
finding a resolution to the conflict, Togbega Tsedze Atakora VII, the Paramount chief of 
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Alavanyo, in all good intent declared that “the peace vehicle in which we are today is fuelled 
by goodwill. It does not have a reverse gear and its name is forward forever.”75 This 
statement was corroborated by his counterpart in Nkonya, but the chiefs’ strong verbal 
commitment to peace could not be sustained as groups and individuals started to foment 
trouble again. There is thus an obvious distinction between what the chiefs say in the open 
and what actually happens in the communities. In fact, in Nkonya, communities that are 
locked up in the conflict started to pay little attention to the counsel of the paramount chief 
arguing that he does not owe land in the disputed area, and therefore his attitude in recent 
years has been less supportive of their effort to claim the disputed land.  
In Alavanyo, the paramount chief also came under pressure from royalty who 
emphasized that as the chief participates in negotiations towards a settlement of the land 
dispute, he must not lose family and community land in the process. This narrative is yet 
another demonstrable picture of how the social and moral relations of power, and the shifts 
and movements of interests and objectives of the dispute, have been weakening the influence 
and power of chiefs and bringing to the fore the observation that the challenge of finding a 
sustainable solution to the land dispute is still far afield. Today, in Alavanyo and Nkonya, the 
agentive capacities of traditional authorities are largely determined by the exigencies of the 
dispute which inevitably compels them to play the ‘double’ if they want their identity and role 
as leaders of the people to survive the test of the conflict and time.  
 
3.2. UNDERSTANDING YOUTH POWER AND AGENCY: GLOBAL AND LOCAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
In the social sciences, the social category of ‘youth’ is conceptualized or described differently 
by many scholars because of its applicability to various different social, cultural and political 
contexts. The discourse on youth and the way they express their power and agency across 
many parts of the globe, not least Africa (because of its numerous conflicts and social 
challenges) has become a topical issue engaging the attention of different social scientists. 
Researchers such as de Waal and Argenti, (2002), Honwana and De Boeck, (2005), Honwana, 
(2012), Christiansen et al, (2006), Abbink and Kessel (eds), (2005), Argenti, (2007), van Dijk 
et al, (2011), Durham, (2000), and Rasmussen, (2000), are among a few who have researched 
into the ‘worlds’ of youth or ‘youthscapes’ (Christiansen et al, 2006) from different 
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perspectives and have profoundly underscored how the power of young people is shaping and 
reshaping the socio- economic and political contexts in local and national arenas that embed 
their subjectivities and identities.  
In analyzing youth as a social category, Dijk et al, (2011) advance the argument that 
the youth should be theorized not only as people at risk, but also as risk.
76
 In other words, the 
youth are not just vulnerable people in need of adult salvation; they also have potentials that 
can be harnessed. They argue that, the perception of the youth as people ‘at risk’ has 
somehow led to the proliferation of Aid agencies and NGOs whose work of getting the youth 
out of risk has not actually worked to their advantage.  
In a different body of research, Christiansen et al (2006), assert that the discourse on 
youth should be analyzed within space and time, i.e. youth should be understood in terms of 
the social context or situations in which their agentive capacities are built and expressed. The 
youth should be conceptualized as both social being and social becoming which means that 
“youth is both a social position which is internally and externally shaped and constructed, as 
well as part of a larger societal and generational process, a state of becoming” (Christiansen 
et. al. 2006:11).  
Drawing on African notions of youth, de Waal and Argenti, (2002) also argue that in 
most parts of Africa, youth transcends age/biological requirements and deals more with men’s 
‘social age’ which is expressed through “the level of economic importance that would permit 
them to acquire wives, build their own compounds, and become economically viable agents. 
Childhood thus refers to a position in a social hierarchy more than it does to biological age” 
(Argenti 2002: 125). In their view, the category youth is a movable feast that can be employed 
in different contexts by different actors to express ever-shifting groups of people. Further, 
these authors contend that young people are very versatile and as such have the power to 
always seek social paths and social outlets for self-definition and self-making.  
Additionally, in the introduction to a volume  by Honwana and De Boeck, (2005) the 
editors demonstrate that in Africa youth is conceptualized as a social category in which the 
youth are constantly “at the frontier of the reconfiguration of geographies of exclusion and 
inclusion and the categories of public and private (p.1).” The youth are ‘makers’ as much as 
‘breakers’ who inhabit a complex world whose realities become the site for shaping and 
reshaping their lives and destinies as well as that of the broader social formations of which 
they are a part. The analyses of de Waal and Argenti, and of Honwana and De Boeck, 
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resonate with notions or perceptions of youth among the Alavanyo and Nkonya for in these 
communities as well youth is more of a social category than a biological state. 
More recently, in her work: The time of youth: Work, social change, and politics in 
Africa (2012), Honwana has described the uncertain condition of most youth in Africa as a 
form of ‘waithood’ - a suspended period between childhood and adulthood. In my view, 
Honwana’s concept of ‘waithood’ is comparable to Arnold van Gennep’s idea of liminality 
which he describes in his book Rites du passage (1977). In this classic on ritual theory, van 
Gennep explains that in most local societies the passage from childhood to adulthood entails 
that the neophyte should pass through three stages, namely, separation, liminality and 
aggregation or return to the community. The liminal stage which is at the heart of ritual is also 
the most precarious stage because the neophyte is uncertain of making the transition to 
adulthood successfully. In this sense, Honwana’s description of ‘waithood’ cannot be any 
more true than in the case of youth in Alavanyo and Nkonya, most of whom are biologically 
and customarily old enough to get married, find jobs and own families but are unable to do so 
because of economic and socio-cultural challenges. I tend to agree with Honwana that any 
effort to study youth in Africa must face up to the challenge of ‘waithood’ seriously.  
Dwelling particularly on Ghana, Lentz (1995) argues that in Ghana the youth are very 
vibrant and significant actors in various social and political arenas. Focusing particularly on 
Youth Associations, Lentz relates that in Ghana, youth associations express themselves as 
community ‘development’ agents whose major objective is to develop their communities in 
terms of infrastructure, and to lobby with state powers so to get a share of the ‘national cake’ 
for its people. These objectives have made youth associations a formidable force in local and 
state politics. Furthermore, Lentz also indicates how the elite among these youth associations 
have been turning the group’s goals into personal goals and have redefined its objectives in 
terms of their own personal interest, of their identity construction, for personal honour, and a 
host of other strategic pursuits.  
Examining the involvement of the youth in state politics in Ghana van Gyampo (2012) 
argues that since the postcolonial period, but especially during the fourth republic, the youth 
have assumed a center stage position in party politics not because they are convinced of the 
political ideology of parties, but because politicians are very good at enticing them and 
manipulating their numerical majority for their own political ambitions.  
Today, the general consensus among scholars is that the category of youth is complex, 
fluid, ambiguous and analytically difficult to pin down. There is also a general consensus that 
in many parts of the world, the agency and power of the youth have become more 
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pronounced, visible, and strongly impacting on many spheres of human endeavor – politics, 
sports, science, art, industry, media et cetera. In spite of this, the youth continue to be 
sidelined and marginalized in many forums and spaces that are supposed to give them the 
opportunity to tell their story. 
In the particular case of Ghana, political and social analysts have observed that, 
generally, the state and local leaders have foundered in articulating the aspirations, needs and 
anxieties of the youth across the different social and ethnic divides in the country. For 
instance, in the immediate post-independence era, many Ghanaians had hoped that Nkrumah 
would use the Young Pioneer Movement to articulate a national policy framework for 
harnessing the potentials of young people, but it rather became a tool for advancing his own 
political interests. Thus, the activities of the young pioneer movement did not benefit the 
majority of the youth (cf. Botchwey, 2010).  
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, the revolutionary and political ideology of grassroots 
participation favoured by Jerry John Rawlings, a young military officer who came to power 
through a coup d’état and later moved on to become a democratically elected president, 
attracted a large following amongst young people. The young saw Rawlings as a shining 
example of their own aspirations and dreams. This, however, did not lead to a sustainable 
program for the youth as state and non-state actors continued to exploit or instrumentalise the 
youth for their own ends. 
In 1974, a National Youth Authority with a statutory decree (NRCD 241) was 
established by the government, and the Minister for Youth and Sports was to serve as the 
coordinating and implementing agency for this Authority. Subsequently, this led to the 
establishment of the National Service Secretariat (NSS) and the Ghana Youth Employment 
and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA). The latter was to assist the youth to 
acquire employable skills, and indeed many a young Ghanaian benefited (and continues to do 
so) from these state interventions. However, it was also revealed that ever since 2013, 
GYEEDA has been marred by massive corruption in which monies meant for youth programs 
have gone into other, individual pockets. Currently, the offenders are standing trial and it is 
not clear what the outcome will be since the embezzlement involves political actors of the 
ruling government. They are likely to be protected from prosecution in spite of the firm words 
of the president that anybody found to be complicit in the ‘rot’ will face the full might of the 
law
77
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In Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, the tendency among government officials, 
politicians, local authorities and other actors is to tap into the power of the youth for 
politically motivated ambitions rather than to create an environment where the aspirations and 
needs of the youth will be well-articulated (cf. van Gyampo, 2012).  The discourse on youth 
as the future and as hope of the state/nation is not yielding the desired results because, rather 
than opening up sustainable opportunities for youth’s development, the rhetoric of such 
discourse is often nothing but a strategic device for ambitious groups and individual ‘big men’ 
who continue to reach for the talents of young people to advance their own interests.
78
  
While most of Ghana’s population is young, the possibilities for them to participate in 
local and national debates and discussions that impact on their well-being are largely 
curtailed. They have rather become ‘shifting subjects’ who are “utilized and abandoned” by 
government, chiefs, business men and women, politicians and so on. This partly explains why 
the youth, especially the unemployed, are easily mobilized into violent activities and other 
disturbing practices.  
3.2.1. Youth in Alavanyo and Nkonya: Some Conceptual Views 
 
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, the category youth, (sohe in Ewe and nyasubi in Nkonya), is a 
social construct, that elicits different social meanings. This makes the category a very 
complex one as men and women who are biologically adult continue to be defined as ‘youth’ 
or ‘children’ under given social and cultural situations (cf. de Waal and Argenti 2002, 
Honwana and De Boeck 2005). In my encounter with the elders and youth of Alavanyo and 
Nkonya, I came to understand that since the genesis of the land dispute, the expression “se sen 
na du” which in Ewe means “be ‘strong’ if you have to ‘eat’”, has become the most apt way 
of conceptualising the agentive capacities of the people, but especially the local youth (and 
especially the men).   
Se sen na du has two different meanings: first, it expresses the general state of struggle 
and the anxiety of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya to meet the basic survival needs of food and 
water through what Honwana (2012) aptly describes as debrouillage (making do), otherwise 
known as “to manage” in Ghanaian parlance. Second, it expresses the creativity, the 
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 In Ghana, this has led to the establishment of youth wings among students in tertiary institutions. The leaders 
of such youth wings have become conduits for political parties to amass votes during elections for and to receive 
favours like ministerial appointments if their parties won the elections. In recent times, some analysts have been 
asking that politicians desist from using student leadership for their political ends, because of its negative 
consequences on the student body.  
 102 
 
manliness, as well as the physical and spiritual powers a young (male) person needs to fend 
for and defend his family and community.  
In its broader application, se sen na du denotes how a young man surmounts the 
challenges of the conflict, shows mastery over the use of his gun, works to meet the basic 
needs of his family and has the possibility of consulting diviners, afakala, or other ritual 
specialist so as to navigate the burdens of everyday life. For those engaged in ‘raiding’ timber 
in the disputed land, be strong if you have to eat has come to signify the ability of a ‘raider’ to 
evade notice or arrest, to engage with and overcome rival raiding gangs, and to possess the 
knowledge to escape with one’s lumber. In this sense ‘be strong if you have to eat’ embraces 
multiple narratives of how groups and individuals within the two communities endeavour to 
navigate the daunting challenges of the land dispute in which they seem perpetually engulfed.  
From the foregoing, I argue that among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, to be ‘strong’ if 
you have to ‘eat’ is a way of life rooted in the nexus between social being and social 
becoming, as articulated by Christiansen et al (2006). In this way, because the process of 
becoming is not always predictable and is susceptible to contingent social and political forces 
which can enhance or de-enhance the potentials of the youth from being actualised, it will 
always remain precarious. For example, in the past, in Nkonya and Alavanyo, every girl and 
boy looked up to the ritual movement from girlhood/boyhood to adulthood with expectant 
joy. In agrarian communities these rites of passage were symbolically very significant and 
emboldened young people to take up the duties of adulthood responsibly. Today, this is no 
longer the case because the challenges of the conflict  have weakened this ritual process and 
engendered a culture of uncertainty and ‘danger’ in which social being and social becoming 
have been spatially and socially impaired.  
My observations during fieldwork indicate that the protraction of the land dispute has 
entrenched the youth in Alavanyo and Nkonya in an uncomfortable interstitial state in which 
the paths of socially navigating the way to responsible adulthood are patently at large. Kwaku 
Bour, a youth in Nkonya, told me; “we are living on a fertile land with diverse agrarian 
possibilities but because of the conflict, we live in penury. This is making it difficult for us to 
marry and build our own homes.” 
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3.2. 2. The Land Dispute and the Youth: The Praxis of Everyday life  
 
The instrumentalisation of the youth in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute has always 
been strongly present ever since the early years of the conflict, but from the 1980s onwards 
their agency and visibility in different social arenas assumed a more radical trajectory. The 
youth could no longer be placed at the periphery of the social and political spaces which they 
inhabit; they have become active actors whose force or energy, (nuse) is now shaping and 
influencing the social order of society as a whole. Two major factors account for this: first, 
the social and economic crisis of the 1980s already described had a telling impact on the two 
communities (mostly the youth) which are located in one of the poorest areas in the Volta 
region. Second, the legal battle between the two communities which ended in the 1980s did 
not signal the end of hostilities, but rather polarised the relations between the two groups. As 
it were, the two communities began to re-strategise on how to do each other in, and how to 
maintain a strong cohesive and resistant front in the event of further escalations.  
This is the framework that undergirds the way the youth position themselves in the land 
dispute. It frames how they cope with the state of uncertainty and confusion occasioned by the 
conflict, and how they act and react to everyday events that shape and reshape their identities 
and subjectivities. Before making a detailed analysis of youth activities in the two 
communities, let me first introduce the youth and war leaders from whom the generality of the 
youth took orders and inspiration.  
3.2.3. Youth leaders 
 
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, the political position of youth leaders/chiefs (Nyasubi Owie 
or sohefia) was adopted and integrated into the political organisation of the two communities 
during the colonial period through contact with the Akan (e.g. the Ashanti and the Akwamu) 
who had a well-organised political system (Nyinanse, 1984). Among the Nkonya and the 
Alavanyo, the status of youth leader is not based on age, but on bravery, valour, etc. When a 
young man (chronologically speaking) is made a youth leader, he is considered a ‘man of 
weight’ (De Boeck, 2005:199) and his word may not be disobeyed. In this sense, the position 
of youth leader blurs the lines between the old and the young and configures a position of 
authority that confounds conventional practice.  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, each town/village has a youth leader who comes from a 
particular clan and family. One from the paramount chief’s clan is made head of all the youth 
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leaders. He works closely with all the other youth leaders Nyasubi Owies/Sohefiawo and acts 
as a liaison between the youth and the traditional authorities. 
The position of youth leader is hereditary and as the society is patrilineally organised, only 
males can be youth leaders.
79
 When the position is vacant, it is heavily contested by 
candidates from the clans and families that are eligible to contest. Youth leaders do not have 
stools, but the line of succession is said to be unambiguous. This notwithstanding, however, 
some older informants mentioned that in the past there were instances when some confusion 
ensued among clan and family members over which youth is more suitable for the position. In 
the past, (and still today) it was/is the responsibility of a youth leader to bring the youth 
together to execute community projects such as farms, run errands for the chief, assist in 
constructing community structures (schools/clinics) and any other works he may be assigned 
by traditional authorities.  
3.2.4. War Leaders  
 
Historically, war leaders became vital to the political organisation of the two communities on 
account of the frequent wars their forefathers had to fight with different communities on the 
journey to their present home. War was inevitable in the past as different ethnic groups 
migrated from place to place in search of fertile lands and water for agrarian possibilities and 
settlement. In Ghana, one can think of the wars between the Ashanti and the Akyem, and 
between the Guan and the Akwamu and the Kwahu. War leaders are thus indispensable to the 
political systems of the Alavanyo and Nkonya, as is the case in most ethnic groups in Ghana 
and indeed other parts of Africa.
80
 The office of a war leader, Asafohene is hereditary and 
patrilineal. He comes from a clan and family whose ancestors are said to have demonstrated 
bravery, courage and resilience in the many wars they had to fight in search of land till they 
reached their current homeland. It is said among the Nkonya and Alavanyo that without good 
Asafohenes they would not have been where they are now, thus underscoring the importance, 
power and agency of the Asafohenes to guide, protect and defend the people and the land. 
Agya Boateng from Nkonya explains that; 
 “A young man is made an Asafohene when he is brave, courageous, can mobilize 
the youth, is responsible and possesses supernatural powers as going to war is also 
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 Among the Alavanyo and Nkonya, a war leader is called Asafohene, a term derived from the Ashanti and 
shows how much the political structure of the two communities has been influenced by the Akan political 
system.  
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perceived as an encounter/battle between seen and unseen forces and he must 
have the capacity to confront both with equal prowess. He supervises the activities 
of the other asafohene and the youth and also provides bodyguards for the 
chief.”81  
 
This also brings to the fore the authority of the asafohene in land matters and how his position 
is defined not only by his military and political power but also by the social and property 
relations of land. Without land the position of the asafohene would be non-existent. Some 
Asafohenes have stools and others do not. Those who have do not claim equal rights with the 
Ohene/Dufia or Town/village chief for their stool is subordinate to that of the Ohene.  
In the political tradition of Alavanyo and Nkonya, no woman can become an 
Asafohene, because the avoidance rule of menstruation bars them from this office. It is said 
that periodically and during war, the oracles and gods are consulted for protection and counsel 
and this requires not only soundness of mind, but most importantly bodily purity; and since 
menstruation renders women impure, they could not be war leaders.  
Today, due to the widespread of xenophobia and violence, and the sensitivities 
surrounding the land dispute, the roles of youth leaders and war leaders have been redefined 
to include their ability to work closely together and to mobilise capable youth who can 
withstand the onslaught of their opponents in the event of any escalation. This has placed the 
youth on the centre stage of events, and it has demonstrated how the uncertainties of the social 
and political circumstances of the protracted conflict changed and were indeed redefined by 
means of local structures of power and authority vested in youth leaders. In this way, the 
leadership of youth and war leaders in Alavanyo and Nkonya is contingent, fluid and a 
shifting phenomenon subject to multiple applications in different social and political contexts. 
This dynamic explains why today, there is a thin line between the roles of a nyasubi owie and 
asafohene and the different templates of meaning they express. Let me return to the events of 
the 1980s which have been very decisive in shaping many of the things happening in 
Alavanyo and Nkonya today.   
An obvious evolution beginning with the events of 1983 is the loss of political clout on 
the part of traditional authorities to maintain social control and order in the two communities 
and to instruct the youth and war leaders on what to do and what not to do. This evolution led 
to an inversion and polarization of the power structures in the two communities as the youth 
and war leaders started to capitalize on the state of social chaos to entrench their authority 
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over things. The ‘mess’ created by the youth further deepened the sense of insecurity and 
anomie in the two communities. One older informant narrated that;  
“at this time there was little control and not even the security forces who have 
been dispatched to the area could restrain the youth. It was the ‘strong’ who could 
now do whatever they could to ‘eat.’ This is how and why ‘se sen na du’ started 
and has since become a way of life.”82  
 
Newspaper reports indicated that during this period, the spate of hostilities led some irate 
Alavanyo youth to visit Nkonya farms and kill local farmers and labourers from other parts of 
the country doing farming under sharecropping arrangements. The Nkonya too besieged some 
Alavanyo towns/villages and killed some of the people there (cf. Ghanaian Times, 
09/05/1983). According to my interlocutors, these retaliatory killings engendered an uncanny 
culture of insecurity and led to a negative expression and expansion of se sen na du in the 
praxis of everyday life. As agrarian communities, people were now afraid to visit their farms 
as the youth, most of whom were jobless, began to hide there and to indiscriminately loot 
farm produce.  
This posed a major challenge to the communities as the livelihood and sustenance of 
many families who hitherto depended on the land for survival became threatened. One youth 
who escaped a gun shot, told me;  
“During this period, only those who had some spiritual powers or were brave 
enough dared to go to their farms. Many others provided security to themselves by 
going to and from their farms in groups. It was extremely difficult to freely visit 
relations on either side engaged in the conflict and return safely.”83  
 
On the grounds of the hostilities and increasing violence, central government dispatched the 
security services (police and the army) to the area to keep peace, but this yielded little success 
as the youth disobeyed their orders and in some instances fought the security personnel when 
they tried to prevent them from looting and destroying property (Daily Graphic, 09/05/1983). 
On the other hand, this state of confusion became an avenue for some youth and war leaders 
and elders who started colluding with some of the security officials to illegally log timber in 
the disputed area for mutual gains. This is why one needed to ‘be strong’ in order to ‘eat.’   
As earlier mentioned, in many parts of Ghana Youth Associations, sometimes called 
‘Development’ Associations, are very instrumental in local and state politics. In Alavanyo and 
Nkonya, the involvement of youth associations in the conflict has been a vacillating one. 
While they are generally seen to be ‘development’ oriented, they are also perceived to be 
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‘undevelopmental’ trouble shooters when they sometimes use their power to keep shifting the 
meaning and trajectory of the conflict. For instance, some of my interlocutors shared that in 
the heat of the dispute in the 1980s and the 2000s the youth associations in Nkonya and 
Alavanyo became the conduits for the supply of arms and ammunition and monies from 
national and transnational elites and actors from the area.
84
  
The youth associations, however, are not only conduits for military, social and political 
negativities, but also for their far reaching positive contributions to attempts aimed at ending 
the conflict. In the past and in recent years, they have proactively engaged traditional 
authorities, governments and mediation committees, e.g. the current one, with the view to 
seeking a solution to the land dispute. In this direction, in 1997, it was the appeal of the 
Alavanyo Youth Association that encouraged central government to set up the Acquah 
committee to investigate the land conflict and proffer paths to resolving it (cf. Letter by 
Kwame Dzathor, vice president, Alavanyo Youth Association, Ghanaian Times, 15/11/97). 
Moreover, in 2004, as a way of proposing a solution to the dispute, the Nkonya Youth 
Association addressed a letter to the Mediation committee through its representative 
mentioning that,  
“it is therefore the view of the Association that what is left to be done (which the 
people of Alavanyo are failing and or refusing to do) is for the Alavanyo people to 
comply with the judgments of the courts. It may not be necessary to state that it is 
in the interest of society that the judgments of the courts of competent jurisdiction 
must be respected.”85   
 
Additionally, in 2006, when the reconciliation ritual was enacted, the District Chief 
Executives of Hohoe North and Biakoye appreciated the agency of the youth from the area in 
the peace process and so advised them to take center stage in community affairs in order to 
pave the way for development to take place (Daily Graphic, 02/06.2006).  
Furthermore, during the events of 2011-2013 it was the Alavanyo Youth Association 
that called on the president to “do something about the situation” (24/4/13, 
www.modernghana.com). 
These examples/narratives underscore the constructive agency of the youth and their 
ability to help turn things around for their good and the good of the communities. During 
separate interviews I held with the leadership of the Alavanyo and Nkonya youth associations 
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living in Accra, my informants indicated that in spite of the sporadic killings and hostilities 
that disrupt social life in the area, they are resolved to keep discussing and deliberating with 
the central government and other significant stakeholders so to draw a ‘road map’ that can 
lead to a resolution of the land dispute. This resolution, however, is not yielding the intended 
results because some of the leadership of the Youth Associations are profiting from the state 
of insecurity and the fragile local structures of control to do things they would normally not 
do.  
Besides, some youth who are disappointed by the lack of concerted efforts on the part of 
traditional authorities and the state to seriously tackle the conflict and the deplorable social 
conditions in the area, are migrating to the cities hoping to find a job that can earn them 
money so they can periodically remit their parents and siblings. 
In Nkonya, two senior secondary school youths shared their thoughts on the impact of the 
conflict:  
“We grew up only to be told by our mothers that our fathers died in the conflict. 
So we have never seen our fathers. Today, we have to wake up early in the 
morning go to the farm and get some foodstuffs before going to school. We have 
to make farms to support our mothers and our education because our mothers are 
unable to care for us and our younger siblings. At the moment we are thinking of 
moving to the city of Accra or Kumasi as soon as we finish with our secondary 
education, maybe we will get something better to do there.”86  
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Figure 16. Some youth of Nkonya-Tayi during an interview, three of them have lost their fathers to the conflict    
 
While migration to the city may be attractive, the youth also know that the challenges of 
navigating the complex social spaces of the city do not offer an easy solution to their 
predicament. Their story is not an isolated one; but indeed, it is the story of many young 
people in Alavanyo and Nkonya who are disenchanted by the devastating consequences of the 
conflict and are seeking new ways of making a livelihood. They are tired of having to 
constantly employ some form of tactics (de Certeau, 1988:37) in order to express their agency 
in ways that are not only physically and emotionally demanding, but also precarious. For 
many of the youth, their story is a story of a ‘lost generation’ that is not what it wants to be, 
and does not find the possibilities of becoming what it wants. The youth seem locked in a 
practical interstitial narrative in which the daily events of life are providing them with ‘fake 
identities’ of some sort, obliterating the possibilities of bringing their potentials to bear on 
issues affecting their wellbeing.  
Additionally, as I interacted with the youth, it became clear that the ‘management’ of 
life through ‘being strong in order to ‘eat’ or se sen na du seems to be an inevitable way of 
carving out “niches of opportunities” to ‘get by’ in the demands of everyday life. This 
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challenge, in combination with the chronic joblessness in the area, is compelling some youth 
and war leaders in whom the youth confided to compromise their positions by taking 
monetary and other favours from the traditional authorities and the elite. Today, this move has 
affected the collective agency of the youth and is casting a negative shadow over the 
genuineness of their commitment to finding a solution to the dispute. At a deeper level, it is 
the weight of the above realities on the larger society, but especially on the youth, that has 
engendered the different senses/meanings of the land dispute expressed in the actions and 
reactions of the youth.  
3.2.5. The Youth and Timber: “the sheep eat where they are tethered” 
 
In some parts of Africa, forest resources such as timber have brought some benefits to 
communities, but in the local terrain of Alavanyo and Nkonya, forest resources seem to have 
been a curse that is creating violence, loss of life and property. In Alavanyo and Nkonya, the 
harsh economic conditions brought about by the 1983 escalation of the conflict rendered the 
commercial trees on the disputed or undisputed land ‘ownerless’ and led to a scenario where 
some youth colluded with traditional authorities and certain elites to ‘raid’ the timber for 
mutual monetary gains.
87
 One youth described this period as a “state of criminality”, but also 
added that “the sheep or goats eat where they are tethered’: if we live on the land, we ‘eat’ 
from the land.” High quality timber such as Odum (milicia excelsa), Mahogany (khaya spp.), 
Wawa (triplochiton scleroxylon), Samfra, Antiasis Africana Sapeley and many other tree 
species are found in the area and they offer good money. Within the area itself, timber is used 
for various purposes including roofing, furniture, and other lumber needs, and there is a high 
demand for it in the nearby towns of Kpando, Kwamekrom and Abotoase where boats and 
canoes are built for fishing, and the transportation of persons and cargo. Some timber is also 
carried off to the district capital of Hohoe, and the cities of Tema and Accra.
88
 This is why 
illegal lumbering is such a lucrative business in the area.  
The criminalization of informal lumber activities is not restricted to the communities of 
Nkonya and Alavanyo. It is a national phenomenon because in Ghana, it is lumber from the 
illegal chainsaw business rather than from the large concessionaires whose prices are 
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 According to unofficial figures from informants, about thirty percent (30%) of the timber is for domestic use, 
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exorbitant, that provides lumber at affordable prices to the local market for most Ghanaians.
89
 
In this regard, Amanor succinctly describes how a network of youth involved in chainsaw 
activities developed a tactical scheme to profit from the illegal timber trade:  
“The criminalization of informal timber activities has dissolved informal timber 
activities, but has forced them to go underground. Emboldened by their 
criminalization, youth are not only processing timber on farmlands but moving 
into forest reserves. The criminalization of informal sector timber activities has 
resulted in increasing domestic prices for timber, and large urban interests have 
moved into chainsaw timber, commissioning youth to fell timber in the forests and 
paying off all the security taskforces on the roads that police timber. Frequently 
violent conflicts have occurred between forest guards and youth over illegal 
timber, while the Forestry Department has brought in military support to help 
manage the forest reserves” (Amanor, 2005:109).  
 
In Ghana, the political economy of timber governance has become a nightmare because the 
state is helpless in instilling order and discipline in this area. For instance, “no official 
statistics or information on existing timber rights and who holds them is publicly available” 
(Lund et al. 2012:122). Additionally, it has been difficult to implement policy reforms to 
check illegal chainsaw lumber and to legalise the timber sector.  This is primarily so “because 
the governance regime has served the entrenched interests of an economic and political elite 
in the exploitation of timber in Ghana. This elite has subsequently and with considerable 
success resisted any attempts at reforms that could threaten its favourable position” (Lund et 
al, 2012:117). Moreover, illegal chainsaw activities provided an estimated job opportunity for 
about 80,000 people in 2005 (Marfo and Acheampong, 2011:4) and since then the numbers 
went up to 97,000 in 2007 (Marfo and Acheampong, 2011:5). 
 Today, the numbers could even be higher. In all of this, estimates show that three-
quarters of illegal timber production in Ghana goes to domestic markets (Lawson & MacFaul, 
2010). Thus, as most Ghanaians rely on illegal lumber, the issues of legality and illegality will 
continue to pose enormous challenges to timber governance and will also engender land 
conflicts in the forest regions of Ghana for some time to come (see chapter one).  
In the Nkonya-Alavanyo land conflict, the issue of timber is not the only major trigger, 
but it is certainly one of its most important drivers and as such it is attracting the attention of 
multiple actors whose competing interests and propensities is depriving the people of the 
needed revenue for ‘development.’ This challenge is becoming commonplace in a number of 
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 In relation to this challenge, Amanor (2005) recounts how in the Atewa forest reserve in Ghana, the expansion 
of concessionaires and the infiltration of chainsaw activities in farmlands often leads to conflicts between 
farmers who had no legal right to timber on their lands and chainsaw operators, their accomplices with whom 
they collude for mutual benefits. 
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African countries, such as Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Liberia where the nexus between abuse of 
natural resources such as timber and oil by elites and youth groups and the inability of local or 
state leaders to manage these resources for the benefit of its people, is engendering continuous 
conflicts (cf. Obi 2013). 
 
3.2.6. Skills and Technological innovations: Further Elaboration on the Art of “Being 
Strong in Order to Eat”  
 
The experience of two informants will provide a good lead into my analysis of how the youth 
‘raid’ timber in order to ‘eat’. Madam Adzo Amedeka, is a trader who has lived all her life in 
Alavanyo and knows a lot about the illegal lumber business. In an interview with her, she told 
me:  
“here we know the youth who have been cutting the wood for the big men who 
buy the chainsaw machine for them. The raiders, (nugblelawo) sleep in the day 
time and work in the night. They are paid by the big men when they come to carry 
the wood away. These youth are protected by some of the elders and chiefs who 
benefit from this activity. People are afraid to talk because they may be 
victimized.”90  
 
In Nkonya, the story is not any different. Informants told me how the illegal timber trade is 
carried out:  
“In our community, some of the traditional authorities and the elite are aware of 
youth involvement in the illegal lumber trade, but they cannot do anything 
because they also benefit from the wood. Because of this it is extremely difficult 
to apprehend the youth and you cannot report things to the police or try to make 
‘noise’, it is dangerous.”91 
 
The revelations of my informants underscore the powers behind the timber trade, the pattern 
of networks that sustain it and the difficulty to undo these networks so the conflict may be 
resolved.  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, the art of raiding timber by the nugblelawo or ‘raiding boys’ 
as they are generally called, demands a lot of skill. It is a risky job because a raiding boy can 
easily lose his life, yet there are youth who show interest in the trade and are ‘trained’ by 
those who are more experienced. One of my interlocutors told me:  
“In the art of raiding timber or illegal lumbering, the use of guns, strong beaming 
lamps, mobile phones and chainsaw machines is indispensable. This ‘arsenal’ is 
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 Interview held at Alavanyo-Kpeme, August, 2012. 
91
 Interview with Kojo Brenya, at Nkonya-Tayi, May, 2012 
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always handy for the young men who are engaged in the trade. The illegal timber 
business is also part of a strong network and as such actors must have the facility 
to work with others and be people of few words, i.e. know how to keep their 
mouths shut and their ears closed, mu nu, na mu nku. These are highly appreciated 
qualities for they ensure the group that a participant in the trade can be trusted.”92  
 
In some parts of the forest regions of Ghana, practices such as the use of guns, strong lamps 
and night raiding have been employed in the exploitation of forest resources as the research of 
Amanor in an Oil Palm plantation owned by the Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation 
(GOPDC) in the Kwae area in the Eastern Region illustrates. Here, Amanor shows how a 
youth group decided to harvest palm fruits belonging to the GOPDC in the night because they 
felt the land which is their source of livelihood had been expropriated from them by the 
GOPDC. They “rationalize their nocturnal harvesting activities by saying that ‘they have to 
eat too’. They argue that the land belongs to them anyway and was taken away unfairly so 
they have a right to harvest the fruits” (Amanor 1999:109).  
In recent times, in other parts of Ghana, illegal surface mining, known as galamsey has 
also led to the exchange of fire between different groups of illegal miners, who carry out their 
trade with guns and lamps, and with the help of youth groups. One such situation took place 
in Manso-Nsiena in the Ashanti region where the youth exchanged fire with Chinese nationals 
who were engaged in illegal gold mining on land that was not properly negotiated (cf. Daily 
Graphic, 20/06/2012). It is however, observable that powerful politicians and chiefs are 
behind these illegal mining activities which are destroying the land.  
Similarly, in Nkonya and Alavanyo, the use of guns and lamps constitutes an old 
practice previously used in hunting activities and today in illegal timber activities. The use of 
the mobile phone among the ‘raiding boys’ is a new phenomenon however. As I understood 
from informants who know some youth involved in the illegal timber trade, mobile 
communication technology offers the raiders the advantage of tracking rival gangs and 
forestry officials and to maintain connectivity with their partners in the villages. The latter 
will hint them of any suspecting persons approaching the logging area. Thus, the mobile 
phone helps them to carry out their diurnal, but especially nocturnal activities in relative 
certainty and security. Sometimes, when raiding boys carry out their activities in the day, it 
leads to exchange of fire between rival gangs resulting in loss of lives (cf. Ghanaian Times, 
23/4/2001). In other instances, gun battles take place between the police and timber sawyers 
in the disputed forest (cf. Tsikata and Seini, 2004).  
                                                          
92
 Discussion in Alavanyo, July, 2012 with Efo Akwasi Tetekpor. He is not involved in illegal logging, but his 
interaction with some of them has provided him enough knowledge of their activities which he shared with me. 
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Clearly, in the conflict, mobile phone connectivity has not only become a device for 
blurring recognition, bridging distance among users and building virtual or real relationships, 
it has also become a symbol of power and an indispensable surveillance gadget/tool for those 
involved in the illegal timber business. Similarly, timber raiders are profiting from the simple 
but effective community Frequency Modulation (FM) radio stations set up by a cross section 
of the youth in the two Nkonya towns of Ntumda and Tayi. These community radio stations 
anchor different programs: marriage and funeral announcements, different genres of songs, 
and various announcements about community security issues. It appears that the transmission 
of the community radio stations is gradually replacing the work of village/town criers who in 
the past announced important messages from the chiefs to the communities with a simple 
metal tool or a small local drum called dondo.   
Furthermore, in Alavanyo and Nkonya, the timber trade has also assumed a trans-
border character as youth from nearby towns/villages and others from the western part of 
Togo have been migrating temporarily into the area to transport lumber (a very laborious 
work), from the forest to the foot of the mountains for a fee. This activity is well-known in the 
two communities and goes unchallenged because of the ‘powerful people’ supporting the 
business. People who dare to challenge this practice sometimes receive death threats and are 
told to mind their own business. Again, the logic of tactical agency or se sen na du that is 
expressed by the youth defies the conventional ways of doing things in the two communities.  
More so, while living among the two groups, I came to understand that monies accrued 
from the lumber business serve a dual purpose: they are used for advancing the cause of the 
conflict as well as for lining the pockets of some traditional authorities, individuals and the 
youth.  
Alao (2007) argues that in conflict situations the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
such as gold, oil or other minerals by rebels, politicians and other interest groups for private 
interests and to advance the cause of war and violence is commonplace. More often than not, 
this exploitation impoverishes communities. In fact, in Nkonya and Alavanyo one of the 
consultative committee members lamented that,  
“Some of the consultative committee members who were selected by their 
communities to represent them at the mediation level are complicit in the illegal 
timber business and other acts of violence because of the power and influence 
they wield in the community. How can those who are supposed to check the 
people engaged in the illegal lumber activities control themselves when they 
become the offenders?”93  
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 Interview with Mr. Nyinanse, a consultative member at Nkonya-Akloba, July, 2012. 
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Individuals and groups relate similar stories about the clandestine character of the timber 
business and how difficult it is, even within the same community, for people to challenge 
those involved. Again this is a manifest illustration of the power dynamics at play in the 
conflict. Those who hold some office by virtue of local political structures or by virtue of their 
role in mediating the conflict keep manipulating or redefining their position for group or 
individual benefits. This is not only an expression of a ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 2009), 
but also a dismal picture of a ‘politics of every day tactics of abuse.’  
Today, youth who are not involved in the illegal timber trade and are not happy with 
what is going on, try to report the beneficiaries to the police or forest guards, but this is not 
working because some of the police or forest guards who are supposed to arrest the raiders are 
covering them up and taking monies from them.
94
 This has been creating tensions in the two 
communities between youth who are not benefiting from the timber trade and those who are. 
The former group is often accused and threatened anytime the activities of the latter group are 
disrupted.  
In the light of the above facts, the majority of the youth who are not benefiting from 
the timber trade, perceive the land dispute as a destructive ‘machine’ that is eating away the 
future and marginalizing their capacity to convert the possibilities of the land into productive 
ends. As the different narratives of interests and discourses at play continue to erode the 
natural and human resources of the communities and complicate the intergenerational 
relations between the youth and the older generation, the youth are increasingly unable to 
actualise their potentials, thus making the process of becoming an unrealisable venture. In this 
way, one may describe the actions and reactions of the youth as ways of making themselves 
heard and also to exercise some influence in shaping what goes on especially in the public 
spaces that order and shape their identity and subjectivity.  
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 In Ghana, this practice is expressed as ‘chop make I dey chop no dey spoil work.’ In relation to the link 
between the police and the raiders, the expression here means that if the raiders share the monies accrued from 
the illegal lumber trade with the police, the police will always provide them security because they mutually 
benefit from the trade. 
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Figure 17. Mr. Kwadjo Tetteh, the chairman of the Nkonya Youth Association rejecting the report of the 2005 
mediation committee during a press conference in Accra.   
 
3.3 THE ELITE  
 
In this part of the chapter, I shall analyze the role of the elite within the framework of the 
existing power relations in different settings. The “elite”95 are the politicians, lawyers and 
influential individuals and groups who sent (and may still be sending) monies and logistics to 
the area and to those engaged in the illegal timber business (see general introduction). They 
are the most difficult group of actors to pin down analytically, as they continue to use their 
identity, power, and agency to keep changing and shaping the practical circumstances 
embedding the conflict.  
Among the elite, the timber contractors are the actors whose activities have turned the 
land dispute into a ‘timber conflict’. My encounters with locals indicate that while the ‘raiding 
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 They are sometimes called Amegawo or honourable, a title that is used for people with considerable influence 
in society. 
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gangs’ come from the area, most of the timber contractors do not, but are influential because 
of the relationship they maintain with people who come from the area popularly known in 
Ghanaian parlance as “connection men.”96 It is such connection men who front for traditional 
authorities and notable individuals. The latter try to avoid notice because if their involvement 
in the illegal lumber trade became known, it would bring their name into disrepute. This 
interplay of actors and actions expressed through the collusion of connection men, raiding 
gangs, traditional authorities and timber contractors is making any effort to clamp down on 
the illegal timber business a futile attempt. Fundamentally, this is about power in which the 
different groups try to exploit whatever means they have at their disposal in order to 
maximize returns/benefits on the state of confusion and disorder which has come to 
characterize the conflict.   
During fieldwork, some informants who observed the movement of lumber from the 
area told me how timber contractors buy off forestry officials, the police and individuals who 
might make ‘noise’ about their activities in order to get away with lumber that is sent to near 
and far away places/markets.
97
 In my opinion, the continuous survival of the illegal timber 
trade is a manifestation of the weakness of the political authority vested not only in the chiefs 
and elders, but also in the youth and war leaders who are supposed to check or watch over 
abuses on the land but who have somehow become abusers themselves. In other forest regions 
of Ghana, the collusion of actors comprising of chiefs, elders, youth, state officials and timber 
contractors in the illegal timber logging activities is a major problem to which an answer is 
yet to be found. Using natural resources such as timber for private purposes by state and local 
actors is not peculiar to Ghana, however. It is common place in many countries in the world. 
For instance, in a research conducted by Johnston (2013) in Liberia, it is demonstrated how 
the weakness and fragility of the state during the civil war of the 1990s led to the exploitation 
of the country’s timber by a collusion of state and local actors and foreign firms. This 
predatory activity, Johnston argues, worsened the already weak Liberian economy and led to 
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 These are men who act like middle men between the timber raiders and the contractors, but they are more than 
middle men. For instance, their relationship with the raiders transcends business deals and includes seeking the 
general welfare of the raiding gangs. Connection men do not involve themselves in the lumbering, but feed on 
the raiders and timber contractors. A raiding boy who disrespects a connection man may risk losing his link to 
the timber contractors and thereby his job. Generally, in Ghanaian society, connection men and women are very 
versatile people and their activities can be applied to different social contexts, - from the acquisition of a new 
passport, a job, admission to a school, travelling abroad, wanting a parcel of land or a house to buy et cetera.  
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 During my stay in the two communities, I observed on several occasions that trucks full of lumber covered 
with tarpaulin were driving out, mostly at night. On a number of occasions when I tried to enquire how the 
lumber was acquired, I was told that some of it was acquired legally and some not. But other locals objected to 
this explanation arguing that, lumber that is carried away in the night in this fashion is mostly illegally cut 
lumber. 
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deeper social and political problems for local people, as the timber revenues that would 
normally go to social services went into individual pockets instead.  
Another category of elite whose role has been very instrumental in the dynamics of the 
dispute are the legal practitioners. As legal practitioners this group of actors has strategic 
power by virtue of their position and their authority in legal matters, and it is no secret that 
they have been relying on this leverage to encourage entrenched positions not only concerning 
legal matters of the conflict, but also in relation to other pertinent issues. Even though the 
court verdicts have not been able to solve the land dispute this far, the Nkonya continue to 
rely on them to press their claim to the disputed land because they have won all the cases so 
far. Here, the Nkonya seem to be emphasizing what is known in Ghanaian parlance as ‘book 
no lie’, i.e. what has been decided upon and written down cannot be false or untrue, thus 
cannot be ignored. One example will suffice. In 1996, following the report of the Mireku 
Committee that the government should acquire the disputed land, The Ghanaian Times, a 
national daily, published in its editorial column that a “solution appears at last.” A Nkonya 
legal practitioner swiftly responded that  
“On the recommendation that the government should acquire the land one is 
tempted to ask to whom will compensation be payable by the government? Article 
20 (2) (a) of the constitution provides that the state must make ‘prompt payment 
of fair and adequate compensation’. Will compensation be paid on the strength of 
court of Appeal judgment which Elavanyos do not accept?”98  
 
The lawyer also rejected the committee’s call that the Gruner map be translated towards 
encouraging reconciliation and peace in the area, arguing that this was done years ago by one 
Henry Hagan, a licensed surveyor. He then concluded that he did not think the 
recommendations of the Mireku committee would bring peace to the area. This position was 
not palatable to the Alavanyo or the central government, but it does indicate how the legal 
experts use their legal leverage to interpret realities of the dispute and their strategic power to 
entrench their influence in the legal battle about the land. The employment of strategic power 
is enabling the legal experts to bar prospective enemies from derailing their effort to claim the 
disputed land for the people, while at the same time, employing tactics in isolated actions, 
blow by blow, taking advantage of “opportunities” and using them to strengthen the position 
of the people on the conflict (cf. de Certeau, 1988:37).  
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 These statements are contained in a letter written by the legal counsel of the Nkonya at the time. This letter 
was sent to the editor of the Ghanaian times in November, 1996. This letter is in private possession of the 
Nkonya, but I was able to make a copy. 
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In my opinion, the legal or court verdicts (which will be treated in detail in chapter 
six), will continue to impact on the dynamics and trajectory of the conflict as long as the legal 
practitioners of both communities continue to activate and reactivate them to shore up 
resilience in the conflict.  
The trans-local actors (intellectuals, business men and women, wealthy individuals etc) 
are yet another group of the elite whose agency has also been defining and redefining the 
tenor of the conflict. According to some informants, trans-local actors have been very 
instrumental in the improvement of living standards in the communities and they have also 
been helpful to many other individuals. However, since the 1983 escalations of the conflict, 
some of them have become part of those who have been sending monies, arms and other 
logistics to support their kith and kin locked in the dispute (cf. chapter one). The activities of 
the trans-local actors suggest that somehow the land dispute is not only about the will and 
beliefs of the people themselves. As a researcher, I tried to find out why these actors would 
disburse monies to support a dispute which shows no signs of ending? Two of my 
interlocutors, a leading chief and an elder told me: 
“The trans-local actors were those who during the escalations of the dispute in 
1983 and the 2000s sent monies, guns and ammunitions to support our people. 
These people understand that the dispute is a community affair; it is about their 
homeland where their ancestors are buried and where they also hope to be buried 
one day when they die. Some of them also have properties here. So they saw the 
need to protect and safeguard their homeland.”99  
 
In most parts of Africa, in spite of the impact of social change, technology and Christianity on 
most societies, the perception that one’s homeland is where one’s ancestors lie buried is still a 
very strong belief that is well-anchored in the psyche of the rural and the urban populations, 
the young and the old, and the lettered and the unlettered alike.  
Thus, in most parts of Ghana, people have a strong attachment to their homeland. 
When people die outside home, they still want to be buried in their natal villages, so as ‘to rest 
with the ancestors’ (in Ewe: mia nɔ, tepe deka kple torgbuiwo). For example, among the Ewe, 
if a dead person cannot be brought home for burial, his soul, luvo, comprising the hair and 
finger nails, are sent for a symbolic burial in the ancestral home (cf. Nukunya, 1969). 
Obviously, this is a major reason why the land is of vital importance to the Nkonya as well as 
the Alavanyo.  
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 Interview with Openin Kwaku Mesah of Nkonya and Efo James Anane of Alavanyo respectively, June, 2012.  
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Additionally, some of my informants observed that the involvement and agency of the 
trans-local actors in the dispute is the result of the large cocoa farms some of their relations 
possess in the disputed area, together with various other properties which might be lost if not 
protected. Lately, however, the pains and hurts of the conflict, the lessons learnt and the desire 
of the people to move into a better future, have compelled some trans-local actors to start 
turning monies for conflict into monies for providing good drinking water and health facilities 
for the communities.
100
  
In Africa, not least Ghana, relationships of patronage and clientelism have often turned 
politicians into powerful and versatile figures whose positions can be used in different 
contexts/scenarios. There is, therefore, the ‘pretension’ that politicians can use their power to 
‘do anything’, including involving themselves in land matters such as the Nkonya-Alavanyo 
land dispute. In this particular dispute, the role of political actors has always been 
underscored, but since the violent escalations from 1983 till today, their agency has become 
more accentuated. A number of factors accounts for this.  
First, since the late 1970s it has become commonplace for the two ethnic groups to 
align themselves with the PNDC/NDC government, leading to the ethnicisation of politics in 
the area. This ethnicisation is being exploited by politicians, and especially so when elections 
are approaching. For instance, in February 2003, when the then MP for Biakoye, Dr. 
Kwabena Adjei, stood on the floor of Parliament and said that government should deploy 
soldiers to the area to “stem the tide of frequent conflicts and its attendant loss of lives” while 
also pleading for the establishment of a high powered committee to investigate the conflict 
and define the boundaries of the two areas, the MP for Hohoe North challenged the statement 
in a manner that nearly inflamed ethnic tensions, but for the timely intervention of the 
Majority leader (Ghanaian Times, 1/3/03 quoted in Tsikata and Seini, 2004).  
Second, the longevity of the land dispute eventually led to a big power vacuum in the 
area because the traditional authorities lost the clout to enforce law and order in their 
respective communities. It appears that this vacuum was filled by the politicians and the 
lawyers who have become bedfellows in order to bolster the claims of their people to the 
disputed land, and in whom the traditional authorities and individuals have come to trust so 
much. Given that politicians can use their leverage to do ‘anything’, the chiefs, elders, queen 
mothers, youth leaders etc began to see them as “messiahs” who would bring them economic 
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 I am aware of one translocal actor in Alavanyo who has helped to improve the situation of drinking water in 
the community, while another has built a clinic in Nkonya to improve community health delivery. 
 121 
and social salvation. Till, today, this ‘messianic’ expectation has not materialized, yet the 
politicians and the lawyers continue to meddle in matters of the conflict.  
In Ghana, the meddling of politicians in local matters is no novelty as politicians, ever 
since independence from British rule, have been strongly involved in land, political and 
chieftaincy conflicts which in most cases result in deaths and loss of property (cf. Tsikata & 
Seini, 2004; Lund 2003; and Tonah 2012). It therefore comes as little wonder that in early 
2013, when the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict escalated again and a parliamentary committee 
visited the area to appeal to the people to lay down their arms and talk peace, the majority 
leader observed that people from the area (including the politicians themselves) might be 
supplying arms for the people to kill themselves (Daily Graphic, 29/03/13, 
www.modernghana.com). In other instances, however, the interventions and activities of 
politicians calmed tensions and brought peace. This was the case with the District Chief 
Executives of Jasikan and Hohoe, who saw to the implementation of the 2005 reunification 
and peace ritual which brought relative peace to the area (Daily Graphic, 2/6/2006). 
In the longer term, it can be said that the strong agency of the elite in the dispute is the 
result of a certain degree of political disorder, in terms of local leadership. Some elites have 
been profiting from this disorder to exploit the human and natural resources in the area for 
group or personal ends. Furthermore, the agentivity of the elite demonstrates how the dispute 
itself has become a trans-local palaver and why the elite’s sentiments should be factored into 
any attempts to resolve the dispute. In fact, the elite will continue to define and redefine the 
contours of the conflict because locals who suffer the most in the event of escalations tend to 
rely too much on the counsel of the elite, and especially on the politicians and lawyers whom 
they believe are more knowledgeable in national and global issues. In the two communities, 
the word/counsel of the elite is hardly questioned and most informants whom I met during my 
research confirmed this. One of them told me: how can we challenge people who are 
knowledgeable, live in the city and can use their power to get the land for us?
101
  
In a closer analysis of how the elite ground and entrench their power, I discovered that 
they have access to a considerable network across a wide spectrum of horizontal and vertical 
relationships. Horizontally, the elite and especially the politicians, the educated and the 
wealthy, have numerous friends and associates with whom they have built networks of power 
and material relations and who then have been drawing on that for multiple purposes.  
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 Interview with Agya Ofori Atta, at Nkonya-Ntumda, July, 2012.  
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Vertically, on the basis of the circuit of networks they have, the elite are able to 
influence the dynamics of power relations from the local level to the state level and to exploit 
these power relations in different socio-political settings to their advantage (cf. Utas, 2012). 
This is one major reason why it is difficult to apprehend or challenge the elite. While some of 
them are known especially within the local arena for their covert input in the dispute, the 
considerable networks at their disposal make any effort at undoing or dissociating their 
influence in local matters a very herculean task which is likely to flounder. 
I tend to believe that the agency of the elite in local matters which are sometimes 
pushed to the national level is rooted in the general culture of informality which over the 
years has characterized African politics and societies. By informality, I mean the ways in 
which groups and individuals create social and political networks to bypass state structures in 
order to reach determined goals/interests. In this regard, Utas (2012) argues that in Africa, the 
informalisation of the state machinery and by extension the local political arena, has become a 
‘space of opportunity’ which is negotiated and drawn upon by individuals or groups for 
different ends. This in my view is how informal power over persons, property and processes is 
constructed and expressed in both the informal and formal contexts of the Nkonya-Alavanyo 
land dispute.  
In the bigger picture, it is this informality that allows the elite to keep shifting the 
discursive and practical boundaries of the dispute, but also to keep appropriating the conflict 
to enhance their status, image or personal identity and to build social and political capital for 
different ends. 
Thus, while on one level the conflict remains a land dispute in which traditional 
authorities may constantly be threatened or forced to come to the negotiating table to talk 
peace in order to end the conflict, those who are actually making the conflict insoluble and 
should be approached are the powerful elite (cf. Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Fanthorpe and 
Maconachie, 2010).  
Drawing further on the Ghanaian context, I argue that the culture of informality 
whether in local or state structures/institutions tends to serve the needs of a few while 
disadvantaging the majority of people. On the other hand, one cannot also ignore the fact that 
given the slow and bureaucratic processes people go through in the local and state systems, 
what is really operating in most settings in Ghana is the informal way of doing things.  
At any rate, any effort to map out a sustainable process of resolving the conflict must 
seriously factor in the sensitivities of the elite.  
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3.4. WOMEN AND THE LAND DISPUTE    
 
General anthropological literature on the impact of conflict and war on women and children is 
broadly framed within two fundamental discourses. First, the discourse portrays women in 
conflict zones as weak and vulnerable people who bear the brunt of conflict and hardly have 
any agency to react to the situation in which they find themselves (cf. Duncan and Brants, 
2004). Second, women are depicted as people who, in spite of the harshness of the conflict, 
are able to exercise agency to mitigate the impact of the conflict on them and to remain 
defiant to any attempt at abuse. In my view, the two discourses are mutually inclusive rather 
than exclusive and what becomes dominant in a particular conflict context depends on the 
coping strategies available to the women in the conflict.   
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, while it is observable that the long running dispute has taken 
its toll on the womenfolk and has deprived some the possibility of accessing the land, it would 
be too simplistic to describe the general state of women as a powerless one. On the contrary, 
in my encounters with the women, I observed that the majority of the women have displayed 
incredible agentive power throughout the many years of the conflict. In fact, as I will argue 
below in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute women have always had some form of power 
and have always exercised some form of agency.    
Among the Alavanyo and Nkonya, local discourses on gender relations involving land 
ownership, the patriarchal inheritance system, marital status, local traditions and customs, 
have generally placed women in a disadvantaged position in relation to their male 
counterparts. This notwithstanding, women have always played roles that cannot be said to be 
any less productive in comparison to that of men.  
In the past, it was readily acknowledged in the two communities that women could 
(and did) engage and lead in war. Today, while the women are not openly seen to be leading 
the battle over the disputed land, they have not ceased to express their agency in covert and 
overt ways in matters related to the land dispute. In this way any perception that the women 
are powerless just because they are women is grossly erroneous and does not capture the 
reality on the ground.
102
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 Mr. Obiri Paul an elder in Nkonya-Tayi told me the story of a fetish priestess from the community who 
actually led the men in battle during the early years of the land conflict, but said he could not give the name of 
this woman nor details of her family background because he was also told by his grandfather who did not give 
any details either. This however, could not be taken to mean that the story was false, because some older men 
from other communities in Nkonya and Alavanyo also insinuated similar stories.   
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Additionally, in Alavanyo and Nkonya, the impact and visibility of women’s power is 
observed in consultative professions such as divination, soothsaying or juju, and some serve 
as widely consulted pastors and so on.
103
 These power-related activities have profiled women 
very high and turned them into key actors who are being consulted by people in their effort to 
navigate the challenges of everyday life, but especially the challenges of the conflict.  
In the domestic sphere, though it is part of local practice that the man is the head of the 
household, and that it is his duty to provide shelter, food, security, pay school fees and so on, 
the contribution of women is equally obvious as some are able to own farms equal in size to 
their husbands’ while also engaging in household chores such as cooking, cleaning and taking 
care of children. Besides, women are consulted on major decisions such as funerals and 
marriage. 
Thus, in the domestic space women have power even if this power is generally 
recognized and expressed in asymmetrical ways. In this sense, women in Alavanyo and 
Nkonya are not peripheral, but central and active actors in the big as well as small matters of 
life. Through their agentivity, they are able to shape and recast womanhood as powerful and 
productive in both the domestic and the public spheres. 
 
                                                          
103
 The two female-headed spiritual churches in Alavanyo– Come to Jesus, founded by Sister Alice and Kristo 
Nye fia (Christ is king) founded by Esinu Ntem are widely-patronized by adherents from Alavanyo and the 
surrounding towns of Nkonya, Kpandu, Hohoe and the cities of Accra and Tema. Also, in Nkonya, the founder 
of Christ Peaceful Church, Prophetess Mary Donkor is widely consulted on different spiritual problems from 
people coming from nearby towns and the cities of Accra and Tema. 
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Figure 18. Mamaga Ametor II, Paramount Queen mother of Alavanyo. 
 
 
 
 126 
 
3.4.1. From 1983 to 2013: Women and the Politics of the land conflict  
 
The period between 1983 and 2013 offered a further elucidation of the activities of women, 
showing how these activities have increasingly impacted on different dimensions of life in the 
two communities.  
The 1980s were very distressful moments for most women as they were physically and 
psychologically displaced by the conflict. Many women lost their husbands in the conflict, or 
could no longer access their farmlands for fear they may be shot. As a result, they were 
compelled to migrate and join relations in nearby towns and villages.  
 
Figure 19. Some women and children who were evacuated to Nkonya-Ntumda during the 2003 
escalation of the conflict. 
 
This situation was however more disturbing for some women who came from Alavanyo but 
married to men in Nkonya and vice versa. In an interview with a woman from Alavanyo who 
is married to a Nkonya man, she shared this experience with me:  
“I come from Alavanyo but for many years I have been married to a man in 
Nkonya. I went home anytime there were funerals and local weddings and other 
activities, but since the 1980s when the conflict escalated, I have always been 
afraid to go home because anytime I go home, my people accuse me of coming to 
 127 
spy for the Nkonya. And when I return to Nkonya, I am also accused of secretly 
taking messages to my people back home.”104  
 
Today, this narrative still runs deep in households with women who come from 
Alavanyo and have been married off to men in Nkonya and vice versa. It shows how women 
inadvertently become ‘silent victims’ of conflict in a manner that further diminishes their 
capacity to give off their best. The dilemma of women married off to either side expresses a 
certain degree of xenophobia and suspicion that has come to define relations among people 
living in the same household and between peoples of the two communities.
105
  
This state of affairs places not only women, but anybody who comes from Alavanyo 
but living in Nkonya and vice versa in a risky situation because one can easily be accused of 
spying for one community or the other. In my opinion, while the sense of xenophobia and 
suspicion may not make sense to people outside the conflict area, it does make a lot of 
political sense to the two combating communities for it allows them, as one informant put it, 
“to stay awake and confront issues and processes of the land dispute before they overtake us.”   
Furthermore, in my relationship with the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya, I also 
discovered that for a very long time, women have been making financial and nutritional 
contributions towards the conflict. These contributions go through the youth leaders and end 
up with the war leaders. Some Nkonya women told me:   
“We have been contributing money and food to keep the men in the bush to fight 
for our land especially in 1983 when the conflict escalated with a lot of violence. 
If some of the men are wounded and brought down the hills, we try to treat them 
with herbs and concoctions so that they can get well. It even became the 
responsibility of the Queen mother and the women’s folk to help take care of 
children who have lost fathers and to support women who have lost husbands to 
the conflict.”106 
 
The contributions of the women, as some further explained, are fundamentally the result of 
the rationality that the land is everything for them and that they must protect it, use it and pass 
it on to the future generations. Also, the feeling that the land dispute is a community affair is 
equally a motivating factor for women’s contributions.  
 
 
                                                          
104
 Interview with Xolanyo Ablavi, at Nkonya July, 2012. 
105
 See Darkwa et al, (2012) for an elaborate presentation of some of the challenges women married in both 
communities go through as a result of the land dispute. 
106
 Interview with some womenfolk at Nkonya, April, 2012. This is common practice in the Alavanyo 
communities as well and women have also been making contributions in many ways to support those engaged in 
defending the land.  
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Figure 20. Nana Otubia II, Paramount Queen Mother of Nkonya 
 
Today, most women are unable to make any contributions at all because the land 
which is a major source of livelihood for most of them is difficult to access. Besides, lately, 
some of them became disenchanted when they discovered that the youth and elders who are 
involved in the illegal timber business have been making ‘dirty money’ to support their 
families while some of them live in penury. Thus, for these women, the conflict has become a 
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means of sustenance for a few powerful individuals and groups while the majority are 
neglected. This is a fault line and casts a negative shadow over the discourse about 
community feeling and the collective contributions that are needed to safeguard the land for 
current and future generations that has so often been used by the traditional authorities. 
In the Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict, one cannot overlook the agency of queen 
mothers in the escalations and de-escalations of the conflict and the mediation process which 
began in 2005. In 2003, when the conflict erupted again amidst a lot of violence, the Queen 
mothers of Alavanyo and Nkonya formed the Queen Mothers Association, comprising of 
Queen mothers from the two communities, in order to petition central government and NGOs 
to intervene in the conflict in order to stop the violence and hostilities (cf. Ghanaian Times, 
23/04/2001; 06/12/2003). The queen mothers also believed that they would have a stronger 
voice on matters of the conflict if they came together as a group. In separate interviews with 
Mamaga Ametor II and Nana Otubia II, paramount queen mothers of Alavanyo and Nkonya 
respectively, they mentioned that the urgency to reach out to government and NGOs is 
informed by the fact that, at this time, any attempt to mobilise the men and the local youth to 
listen to reason and stop the attacks and hostilities had collapse. It was patently clear that the 
traditional leaders had also lost the clout to implant order in the area. According to the 
paramount Queen mother of Nkonya, the first meeting of the Association was held at Kpandu 
under the auspices of the Catholic Bishop of Ho, Most Rev. Francis Lodonu. Following this 
meeting, the Queen mothers mobilised the generality of the women and sensitised them on 
how to protect the children, and advised the youth to refrain from fomenting trouble and to 
comport themselves. In one of several petitions, they mentioned among other things the 
problem of low food production (as they cannot access their farms) and increasing family 
dislocation as parents and children are frequently moving from one set of relations to the 
other. The appeal yielded two good results: it led to the provision of financial and logistic 
support to the women from the UNDP office in Accra, that also made a contribution to the 
current mediation committee to sensitise the people about the need to live in peace.  
These interventions provide a demonstrable evidence of the effort the queen mothers 
have been making to improve the living conditions of women and children who often suffer 
from the burdens of conflict (cf. Odotei and Awedoba, 2006). In this way Queenship has 
become a source of strategic power that can be enabled to transcend the hegemonic authority 
of chiefs and elders and configure a new style of leadership that is gender sensitive and 
equally productive to local and state governance practices or systems.  
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Additionally, in 2007, in the effort to sensitize the youth and the public about the 
significance of peaceful coexistence, the paramount queen mothers and the womenfolk 
organized a peace rally in Nkonya-Tayi. During the rally Mamaga Ametor II, Paramount 
Queenmother of Alavanyo talked on behalf of the women and stated among other things that: 
"We also want to renew and pledge our unflinching faith and support for the peace that is 
blowing over the length and breadth of Alavanyo and Nkonya." Her Nkonya counterpart, 
Nana Otubia II, also said: "Never again shall we women of the two communities sit down and 
allow our men to go to war. We have seen that dialogue is mightier than the sword and the 
gun" (www.modernghana.com, 05/02/2010). As a way to engage the idle youth, the two 
paramount queen mothers asked central government to create jobs in the area to engage young 
people who are easily mobilized into violent activities.  
In this land dispute, one of the challenging issues for most women has been the care of 
children who are the most affected in the conflict. In different interviews with women, it was 
evident that the escalating periods of the conflict have been very traumatic for children as well 
as their mothers. For example, in April, 1983, the parents of a nine year old boy were shot to 
death in front of him while he sustained gun related injuries and was admitted to hospital (cf. 
Daily Graphic, 15/04/83).  
Stories involving the death of parents of children, some of whom are now under the 
responsibility of surviving relations or of traditional authorities and queen mothers, are rife in 
Nkonya and Alavanyo. Locally, in these communities it is the expected practice that men and 
women fend for their families through working the land. This has been extremely difficult 
since the events of 1980s and the 2000s, thus compounding not only the nutritional needs of 
the family but also the health and educational needs of children. In the given situation, the 
children have become a ‘burden’ to their caregivers, whose inability to take care of them is 
making them vulnerable to wanton behavior and abuse from older people. Quite apart from 
these challenges women have also had to contend with the shootings which often disrupt 
farming activities and create a general feeling of insecurity.  
In spite of this, I argue that women in Alavanyo and Nkonya have as much power as 
their men and are very agentive in the weaving and unweaving of everyday life in the 
communities. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have shown that the immediate post- independence government’s negative 
perception of traditional authorities as a ‘nuisance’ to the new political dispensation has not 
succeeded in weakening the power and agency of traditional authorities in local and state 
matters. Ghanaians have great respect for traditional rulers in spite of the manifest abuse of 
office by some. Besides, the ability of ‘modern’ traditional rulers to use their leverage to 
influence national and local affairs and to also facilitate developmental projects such as 
schools, water and health facilities etc in their communities has further entrenched their power 
and influence. In Nkonya and Alavanyo however, while traditional authorities are generally 
perceived to be helping to bring an end to the conflict, the continuous involvement of some in 
the illegal timber business and their inability to expose those fomenting trouble in the area has 
bifurcated their authority and identity and put them in bad light before regional and national 
actors. I emphasize that traditional authorities in Nkonya and Alavanyo need the support of 
the state and other stakeholders if ever they can use their leverage to maintain law and order 
and to help solve the land dispute.  
Furthermore, I have demonstrated through the concept se sen na du, or ‘be strong if 
you have to eat’ how youth in Alavanyo and Nkonya express their power and agency in the 
myriad of social and economic challenges that confront them, and how they maximize the 
opportunities of the environment to build and rebuild or shape and reshape their identities and 
subjectivities. I have also underscored the instrumentality of the Youth Associations in the 
two communities and how the effort by some to help end the conflict is frequently weakened 
by the complicity of some in violent activities and the illegal timber business. While the use 
(sometimes negatively) of the mobile phone and community radio has offered the youth the 
opportunity to participate in global media culture, it remains to be seen if these technological 
mechanisms will help to end the conflict or accelerate it. As significant actors in the conflict, 
the sentiments of the youth should be factored into any effort aimed at resolving the land 
dispute.  
Additionally, I have argued that the agency of the elite in the conflict is a duplex one 
in which some are seeking a resolution to the conflict, while others are seeking personal or 
group interests. This ‘double’ has been disabling efforts at resolving the dispute and points to 
the fact that the elite will continue to use their power to control the discursive and practical 
boundaries of the dispute for a long while to come. Additionally, the activities of the elite will 
continue to have a telling impact on life in the communities as traditional authorities and the 
people continue to trust them to turn things around for the better.  
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Finally, in my discussion about women, I have shown that while the women in 
Alavanyo and Nkonya may be said to be weak, they have equally tactical ways of navigating 
and negotiating the challenges of life to meet daily pressing needs and therefore have power 
and agency. The effort of the queen mothers to continue lobbying NGOs, state institutions, 
and other individuals to help improve living conditions of women or to sensitize women on 
how to ‘be strong if they have to eat’ is also an example of how women endeavor to mitigate 
the impact of the conflict. The power of women is not only in the background, but also at the 
centre stage of daily events in the communities.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MIGRATION, SETTLEMENT AND LIVELIHOODS 
INTRODUCTION 
From time immemorial the movement of peoples across different geographical and social 
fields constitutes the most fundamental avenue of international, intercommunity and 
interethnic interaction. In most parts of Africa, not least Ghana, land and water are the main 
drivers of human migration, mobility and interaction. In most cases, these interactions have 
promoted healthy mutual benefits, but in other instances they have occasioned protracted 
conflict between communities and nations. In this chapter, I will analyse how the pursuit of 
land, water, agrarian possibilities and the sense of autonomy brought the Nkonya and 
Alavanyo together, but how simultaneously, these were also the factors that eventually 
destroyed the relations between the two. The chapter will be divided into five parts. 
In the first part, I will examine the origin, migration and identity of the Alavanyo and 
the Nkonya. I will outline the social and political situations that precipitated the migration of 
the Alavanyo in particular from Kpandu to Nkonya, and how they eventually moved to a 
different location.  
In the second part I will treat the settlement narratives of the two groups. I will treat 
the emergence of the names Nkonya and Alavanyo. The social relations between the two and 
the dynamics of the land conflict will also be treated in this part. 
The third part of the chapter will be devoted to analysing the social organisation of the 
people. In this part, I will closely examine how one’s belonging to the lineage, clan and 
family are vital for one’s access to status, land, socio-economic support and spiritual 
protection of the kin group. 
Land rights and tenure systems of the Nkonya and the Alavanyo and how these have 
been impacted by colonial and post-colonial state reforms will be examined in the fourth part. 
Here, I will argue that the challenges associated with land rights and tenure practices in 
Nkonya and Alavanyo and at the state level, have come about as a result of a discourse of 
power between the state and local authorities on the one hand, and between the local 
authorities and the youth, women and the peasantry on the other hand. This discourse of 
power has created gender inequalities in which the youth and women continue to be 
disadvantaged in the use of land.  
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In the fifth part, I will treat the livelihood challenges and possibilities within the 
communities of Nkonya and Alavanyo, and how the devastating effects of the land conflict 
have pushed people to develop new and creative ways of meeting their livelihood needs.  
I will conclude by emphasising the significant points of the chapter and stressing that 
some of the drivers of the land dispute are linked to the historical matters at the genesis of the 
relations between the two.  
 
4.1. ROOTS AND MIGRATION  
 
In the previous chapters, I have demonstrated that while the land conflict is officially 
‘christened’ as a land boundary dispute, what is actually driving it are the economic interests 
of a few, but also specific power relations and matters of ethnicity, among other factors. 
These factors have emerged as a result of struggles over identity issues, migration narratives 
and settlement patterns, and are furthermore linked to the livelihood capabilities of the two 
communities.  I argue that appreciating the migration, settlement and livelihood endeavours of 
the Alavanyo and the Nkonya permits one to understand the dynamics and the different layers 
of individual and collective interests/intentions that are making the land dispute insoluble.   
 
4.1.1. The Alavanyo and their Migration  
 
Who the Alavanyo are, and what their history of migration looks like, are two issues 
intimately connected to the history of other Ewe groups such as the Anlo of Ghana, with 
whom they migrated from Notsie, and other places in Togo. It is thus difficult to appreciate 
the life-world of the Alavanyo without taking into account their longstanding relations with 
other Ewe groups in Ghana and Togo. The paucity of record keeping in precolonial and 
colonial times, however, poses a great challenge to the credibility of the oral (and written) 
sources that underpin the identity and migration narratives of the Ewe now living in Ghana.  
As far as the written narratives are concerned, Spieth (2011) states that  
 
“the oldest historical memories of the Ewe people are legendary in nature and 
deserve attention only as far as the testimonies of the various tribes tally with each 
other. But even with this assumption, there is still a lot of room for speculation on 
how and what it actually might have been” (Spieth 2011: 36).  
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He goes on to say that the accounts agree that the Ewe were not the original 
inhabitants of where they now live, but have immigrated over a long period from the northeast 
of Togo to their current locations.  
In the specific case of the Alavanyo, Dzathor’s “The Ewe Nation and SASADU: A 
Brief History” (1998) is the most comprehensive and authoritative work on the history, 
identity and migration history of the Alavanyo. However, given that Dzathor’s work was 
written at the end of the 20
th
 century, a long period after the Alavanyo settled in Ghana, it 
means that one is dealing with a document that is most certainly wrought with a lot of 
‘floating gaps’ (Vansina, 1988:23) and thus may be the grounds of considerable contestation 
and multiple interpretations. While drawing on Dzathor’s work, I will also use the works of 
other scholars such as Kojo Gavua and Divine. K. Amenumey.  
According to Dzathor (1998), much of what we know today about the migration of the 
Alavanyo is closely tied up with the Fon in Togo, and the Ewe, Ada, Dangbe, Krobo, and Ga 
who now reside in the West Coast of Africa and probably come from Ketu and Oyo in 
Nigeria/Nago. Under the leadership of clan heads, hunters and war leaders, the Alavanyo 
probably moved from Ketu and Oyo to Notsie in Togo, settled there for centuries and later 
migrated to their present home (also see Greene 2002; Akyeampong 2001; Ward 1956). It is 
important to underscore the point that already at this time, the power and agency of hunters, 
clan heads and war leaders in the political organisation of the Alavanyo was very central to 
the development of local leadership. In fact, this category of leaders would later become the 
traditional authorities among the people.  
When the Alavanyo left Notsie in the company of their kinsmen and women from 
Akrofu, Saviefe, and Sovie (who are also known as Saviwo because they are 
descendants/children of King Sa) is very difficult to establish. Dzathor (1998) argues that the 
Alavanyo and the people of Kpandu left Notsie around the 16
th
 century, but Amenumey (1986 
in Gavua, 2000) says it was around the 17
th
 century. However, we know from Bluwey (in 
Gavua, 2000: 62), that the Kpandu arrived at their current home in the second half of the 17
th
 
century and were settled before the Alavanyo arrived. This means that the Alavanyo arrived at 
their present home later during the 17
th
 century or sometime in the 18
th
 century (as the 
Nkonya alleged). Writing about the Notsie migration in relation to the Anlo-Ewe of southeast 
Ghana, both Akyeampong (2001) and Greene (2002) also find it difficult to establish the 
period of the migration, even though the latter seems convinced that it took place in the mid-
seventeenth century.  
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The periodization of the arrival of the Alavanyo at their current place has become very 
important to the politics of the dispute because today, it constitutes a major contentious issue: 
the Nkonya are using the inconsistencies to emphasis why the Alavanyo are late comers and 
do not own the disputed land. Oral traditions of the Alavanyo recount that while they were in 
Oyo and Ketu, their leader was Amega Sa who is considered a hero and a founding ancestor 
and from whom they got the name Saviwo. By the time they migrated from Notsie they had 
come under the leadership of another great leader, King Da, under whose reign the Alavanyo 
finally settled in Notsie with five other clans, namely, the Alinu, Agbaladome, Tako, Adime 
and Tegbe.  
Under King Da, Notsie prospered and became militarily, economically and politically 
strong. Wars were rampant in those days and King Da, who was a great warrior with a strong 
army, was often called upon to assist neighbouring towns/villages who were at war with other 
groups. According to the accounts, life in Notsie at this time was the best thing that could 
happen to Saviwo. The land ‘anyigba’ (a nyi wo gba, which means ‘the land nurses first’, or 
the earth on which every being is ‘first nurtured’) was in abundance and families had more 
than enough land for agrarian activities, building and so on. As agrarian people, the 
abundance of land meant ‘fullness of life’: the land offered food for domestic needs and for 
sharing with neighbours, and also served as the basis for the nourishment of religious rituals 
and supplications (which explains why since the days in Notsie the keeping of goats, sheep, 
and birds has been part of daily life.)
107
 Part of religious practice, a special site, known as the 
‘House of God’, was designated as the centre for all religious activities. This site was known 
as ‘Da Kpodzi’ i.e. Da’s high place/ground where chiefs were installed until 1937 when the 
tradition was finally abolished. Religion has thus always been very important to the life of 
Saviwo and the Ewe in general as is well articulated by Sandra Greene (2002), Birgit Meyer 
(1999) and Kodzo Gavua (2000) among others.  
Life in Notsieland, however, took a different and much more difficult turn when King 
Agorkoli 1 became leader. It was during his reign that the great-grand fathers of the current 
group of Ewe including the Alavanyo left Notsie, led by able hunters and military men. There 
are different oral accounts explaining the reasons behind the flight. One account which is 
popular among the people compares the Ewe migration from Notsie to the escape of the Jews 
from Egypt under the leadership of Moses. They perceive the hunters and war leaders of the 
community as the ‘new Moses’ who led them to the ‘promised land’ i.e. the current location.  
                                                          
107
 For instance, a white sheep is used for sacrifices in which one is seeking expiation from an offence against the 
gods or sacrifices sealing marriage or dispute over land or territory. 
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There are two other related accounts. The first says the migration was the result of the 
harshness, cruelty and maladministration of King Agorkoli 1. This position is supported by 
W.E. Ward who wrote an extensive history about the Gold Coast from around the 1800s.
108
 
The second suggests that the migration was due to changes in population density, anomie, 
criminality and lack of social control in Notsie. My interviews with elders of the Alavanyo 
community, however, suggest that the two latter reasons were far more responsible for the 
mass migration of the Ewe including the Alavanyo from Notsie to different parts of the Volta 
Region than any other.
109
  
Greene (2002) however, thinks the Ewe roots in Notsie are sometimes overemphasised 
and over-politicised because of the desire of the Ewe people to build a strong cultural and 
ethnic identity around a common origin. But in fact, even though the Alavanyo share a lot 
with other Ewe, they are more connected to their kinsmen and women in Akrofu, Saviefe, and 
Sovie with whom they share a common founding ancestor, namely Sa, hence the name 
Saviwo, i.e. Sa’s children.  
From the above exposé, it is obvious that the pursuit of land and agrarian possibilities, 
the escape from the cruelty of king Agokorli, and the quest for a sense of belonging around a 
common ancestral and geographical location compelled the Alavanyo to leave Notsie. The 
struggle over land in the ongoing dispute seems to indicate, however, that the dreamland 
which the ancestors of the Alavanyo envisioned before leaving Notsie is still not within reach. 
4.1.2. The Nkonya and their Migration 
 
There are different myths/stories about the beginnings and identity of the Guan ethnic groups 
to which the Nkonya belong. These stories relate how they spread over a wide geographical 
area in Ghana. The accounts are so disjointed that it is difficult to articulate a coherent 
narrative as Kwame Ampene, acknowledges; “Very little has so far been done on the history 
of the Guan, and any student who has to rely on secondary works has very little to go by” 
((2011:10).
110
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 W.E. Ward is a historian of the colonial period who has written a lot about the history of the peoples of the 
Gold Coast now Ghana. 
109
 During fieldwork, when I tried to find out from the chiefs and elders of Alavanyo if there were oral narratives 
(myths or stories) recounting the beginnings, migration and settlement narratives of the group, what most of 
them said was largely what has been narrated in Dzathor’s work (1998). It seems that over the years the oral 
stories were put into writing thus making the written accounts popular as every day accounts of what took place 
in Notsie and how they reached their current homeland. The Notsie narrative is a popular narrative among the 
Ewe groups in Ghana and Togo.    
110
 The paucity of sources has been the bane of my efforts at getting to the history of the Nkonya as a people and 
the root of events and related actors in the prolonged existence of the land dispute. 
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In spite of this challenge, Ampene argues in one of his works “History of the Guan-
Speaking peoples of Ghana: The Undisputed Aborigines of Ghana” (2011), that the 
beginnings of the Guan should be traced to the Black and White Volta basin in central Gonja, 
though he has difficulty establishing when the Guan first started to inhabit this area. He goes 
further to illustrate from other historical literature that the Guan are the “aborigines” of 
Ghana.
111
 Linguistically and culturally, the Nkonya share a lot with the Gonja, Nchumuru, 
Kete krachi, Afutu, Cherepon, Anum, Nkami and Larteh who live in different parts of Ghana.  
Though they have the same roots and understand each other fairly well, there are still 
customs, norms and practices that differentiate one group from another.  
In the particular case of the Nkonya, there is a popular myth among the people which 
says that the Nkonya migrated from Nyansaland in East Africa in the 12
th
 century with the 
Gonja because of a struggle between two princes over who had the right to the throne. It is 
said that one of them, Atu Tente, (meaning the tall Atu), a warrior and a hunter wearied by the 
struggle, decided to leave with his followers who are today the Nkonya or the Atu Ade, i.e. 
Atu’s people. Thus, Atu Tente became the mythical founding father or ancestor of the 
Nkonya. This myth is strongly supported by Aduamah (1963) though he has difficulty 
explaining the basis of his support of the myth. Today, this myth is still very common among 
the people of Nkonya and most of the elders I interviewed in different communities recounted 
stories in which they traced their background to a place in East Africa.
112
 Contradicting this 
account, Lilley, a British colonial administrator who worked among the Nkonya for years, has 
argued that the Nkonya who form part of the important division of Efutu originally settled at 
Cape Coast (Lilley 1925). However, the Akan invasion in the area around the 17
th
 century 
drove them eastwards and brought them where they are now after many years of sojourn (also 
see Ampene 2011). In a related development Nyinanse disagrees with Aduamah’s position by 
stating that “nowhere in East Africa is any of the closely related Guan dialects or any of its 
larger family unit- the KWA, spoken” (1984:21). He supports Lilley’s thesis by asserting that 
given the linguistic and cultural similarities between the Nkonya and other Guan speaking 
peoples such as the Aguafo and Awutu from the Cape Coast area, the cradle of Nkonya is 
probably in the Central Region. Nyinanse argues further that the historical fact of increasing 
slave raiding by Europeans with the complicity of Nkonya local leaders, together with the 
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 Ampene quotes extensively from the works of Gadzekpo Seth Kordzo, (1999), E.J.P. Brown (1929) A.A. 
Boahen (1966), to give credence to his claim that the Guans lived in present day Ghana long before any other 
ethnic group arrived. He therefore considers the Guan as the real autochthonous people of Ghana.     
112
 A group of elders I interviewed in Nkonya-Tayi and Ahenkro mentioned Kenya as the place their ancestors 
lived and from where they moved to the Gold Coast, as a result of internal power struggles between two princes 
(interview conducted on 28/05/2014). 
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continuous fighting with the Portuguese, the Fante and the people of Accra were equally 
significant factors for their migration from the coastal belt. Having left the coast, the Nkonya 
sojourned in Larteh, a Guan location in today’s Eastern Region. Probably this was around the 
16
th
 century. From there, they moved on to the Akwamu where the attempt by some Nkonya 
men to seduce the wives of the Akim led to a war in which they were driven away (Nyinanse 
1984).  
Eventually, the Nkonya crossed the Volta River at present day Senchi in the Eastern 
Region and here the group divided into two. One group went northwards and is identified as 
the Nkonya-Wurupong and the other group moved eastward and is known as the Nkonya-
Ahenkro. It is here that the paramountcy is located today. The pursuit of arable land and water 
were significant determinants of where the group settled. The two groups were later reunited 
but differences over who first settled in the area continue till today and form the basis of an 
unending chieftaincy dispute between the people of Ahenkro and the Wurupong (Ampene, 
2011). The major contentious issue is about which of the two communities has the right to the 
paramountcy. Ampene (2011) explains that Ahenkro gained the status of paramountcy 
because of its proximity to Kpando, the German headquarters at the time, and the fact that 
Wurupong at that time refused to accept the German flag.
113
 Later, when the British took over 
the administration of the area, Wurupong accepted the flag, but the British could not in their 
power claim the status of paramountcy for the Wurupong. Till today, the chiefs and elders of 
Wurupong have refused to pay allegiance to the chief of Ahenkro and have unsuccessfully 
been seeking the status of paramountcy at the Volta Regional House of Chiefs.  
This struggle over local power has fractured the political economy of power relations 
between the local leadership of Ahenkro and Wurupong and some locals belonging to the 
royalty. The generality of the people, however, are unperturbed by the struggles over local 
power and have been engaging in many interpersonal and intercommunity activities such as 
funerals, marriages, common markets and other social interactive activities. As one of my 
interlocutors in Nkonya-Ntsumuru told me: ‘We are one people, so why should we allow a 
leadership struggle to destroy our ancestral connection.’  
This said, during fieldwork, my interviews with informants in the Nkonya 
communities revealed that when it comes to the land dispute, the Wurupong have either 
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 Local stories among the Wurupong say that though they were first to come to the area, they lost the 
paramountcy to the Ahenkro because in the colonial days when the chief was required to go to Kpandu, the 
German colonial administrative center, for meetings and other duties, the distance did not make these journeys 
appealing to him. So he delegated the chief of Ahenkro who was closer to the centre. Eventually, the chief of 
Ahenkro took advantage of his proximity to the colonial centre and entrenched himself as paramount chief. The 
royalty of Ahenkro dispute this story. 
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overtly or covertly been supporting the Nkonya villages that are entangled in the land dispute 
because of the belief that they come from one ancestral stock. This intercommunity support 
points to the fact that while land can be the site of intractable division, it can also be a 
unifying entity between groups and individuals. In this way, at the ideological and practical 
levels, land may be seen to constitute a ‘shifting’ entity whose appropriation or expropriation 
is subject to the dynamics of the moral economy of power and social relations among or 
within groups. 
The narratives of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya demonstrate the difficulty with dating 
historical accounts which have become ‘gossip’ and as such live on in the historical memory 
of a people, to “embody something which expresses the identity of the group in which they 
are told” (Vansina 1988:19). It also shows how the oral and written accounts have been 
feeding into each other and how over the years, the oral narratives lost historical traction as 
the myths and stories supporting these narratives faded away, leaving the people to rely on 
written accounts which they have made and remade into oral stories.  
 
4.2. SETTLEMENT EXAMINED  
 
In Ghana, names of persons, places and things are not only given for purposes of 
identification but also tell the historical circumstances surrounding their naming. Alavanyo 
and Nkonya are examples of names that do not only show a location, but more importantly 
also tell us about the circumstances surrounding the history, identity and social relations 
between the two communities.  
 
4.2.1. From ‘Notsie’ to ‘Alavanyo’: “We shall live here, it might turn out to be good”  
 
In pre-colonial societies, the abundance of arable land, water and security were 
significant determinants of human settlements. Thus, Gavua explains that in the distant past 
human settlements were determined by “defence and the availability of water in the form of 
rivers and streams, arable land and wild game were major considerations of the early settlers 
in terms of the particular locations where towns were sited” (Gavua 2000:6). These were the 
factors that influenced the first settlement of the Saviwo/Alavanyo at Akrofu under the 
leadership of Amega Xe when they migrated from Notsie to Ghana. From Akrofu a party of 
Saviwo moved to Saviefe where a quarrel over a woman between an Alavanyo and a man 
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from Todome, a neighbouring town, led to the death of the latter and compelled the Alavanyo 
to flee their kinsmen. After they moved to Sovie, the Alavanyo had to flee again because one 
of them who became indebted to a man, and killed his debtor at a funeral when the latter tried 
to reclaim his money (Dzathor, 1998:51).  
This unfortunate situation precipitated another migration of Saviwo to their kinsman 
Togbe Tatse Koku of Kpandu Tsakpe. The latter shared a boundary with the Nkonya and was 
in good standing with the chief of Nkonya at the time. Togbe Tatse Koku, fearing that the 
people of Sovie might pursue the indebted man and his family and end up fighting him, 
dispatched these fugitives with their wives and children to his friend Kondodze
114
 at Nkonya-
Akloba. There, they were warmly welcomed (Dzathor 1998:52, Ampene 2011:104). This was 
how the moral economy of social relations between the Alavanyo and the Nkonya began to 
continue till today, in spite of the land conflict. The fugitives were settled at Loklunbo,
115
 
which means the ‘dark mountain’, near the River Volta. Later, the Alavanyo asked for a new 
location because they did not like to stay close to the water, and because the vegetation held 
little appeal for farming and hunting.  
The Nkonya were said to have obliged to the request of the Alavanyo on the grounds 
of the harmonious relations between the two. As a result they offered the land the Alavanyo 
now live on. According to some informants from Alavanyo, the land offered to them was a 
‘dangerous and unwanted’ land which was abandoned because it was part of the major slave 
route that ran from Salaga in northern Ghana through Hohoe (then the district capital of 
Alavanyo and Nkonya) to Accra and Cape Coast. The Alavanyo further argue that they were 
the ones who came to set “free” the Nkonya who had suffered from the slave trade, took 
possession of the area and made new settlements. It is therefore the contention of the 
Alavanyo that the ‘new settlement’ (which is where they now live) was not given to them by 
the Nkonya as is popularly held, but that it was acquired through the ingenuity and bravery of 
the Alavanyo people, and especially the Alavanyo hunters.
116
  
In my estimation, the position of the Nkonya constitutes one way of reemphasising the 
point they have been making over the years, namely that the Alavanyo are late comers and 
‘strangers’ who were settled on Nkonya land. For the Alavanyo, it is also a way of resisting 
this particular Nkonya claim, and to reemphasise their ownership and legitimacy to the land 
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 The Nkonya explain that Kondodze means the ‘fair Akondo’ in Ewe and is the corrupted form of the Nkonya 
name Akondo, a person who was said to be of fair complexion.  
115
 The Alavanyo call the place ‘logloto’ which means the same in Ewe. 
116
 The Nkonya have disputed this claim. According to them the land on which the Alavanyo now reside was 
given to them by the Nkonya ancestors. 
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allegedly acquired through discovery. I argue that the two competing stories are the result of 
an ‘historical gap’ or what Jan Vansina (1988:23) calls a ‘floating gap’, which is 
instrumentalised by both groups to feed the culture of constructions and reconstructions that 
have characterised the historical dynamics of the land conflict over the years.  
As with many local societies in the past, power struggles over land, together with 
consanguine feuds in the various lineages, clans and families among the early or first 
comers/settlers in Alavanyo culminated in social cleavages, compelling most kin group 
members to move to other areas. These kinship break ups or deliberate separations eventually 
ended in the creation of the seven towns/villages in the Alavanyo traditional area today. It is 
obvious that the land thus occupied by the Alavanyo today is insufficient to accommodate the 
rapidly increasing demographic changes taking place in these seven communities. Moreover 
this land is also not fertile enough to sustain large scale agrarian activities. The disputed land, 
which is the most fertile, thus remains the indispensable lifeline embodying the 
dreams/ambitions of both groups to secure a ‘homeland’ for the current and future 
generations.  
Today, in conjunction with their kinsmen from Sovie, Saviefe, and Akrofu, the 
Alavanyo have formed an umbrella union known as SASADU, an acronym designating the 
four towns. The organisation’s fundamental aim is to advance the development of their 
respective areas and to foster strong kinship ties among themselves in as far as they share a 
common ancestry. In my observation, the threat of the land dispute to the social and cultural 
cohesion of the clans and families seems to have emboldened the people to remain more 
resolute and united in their kinship relations. 
 
4.2.2. From different ‘beginnings’ to ‘Nkonyaland’ 
 
According to the Nkonya, the village of Nkonya-Asakyiri is the most significant settlement 
because it was connected to the very source of life, the kpakplawusi, a stream perceived as 
“the life giver ‘that’ was in later years identified as a god” (Nyinanse 1984:17). Till today, 
Asakyiri remains a very important historical and ritual site for the Nkonya. But what is the 
history behind the name Nkonya and the people? There are three derivatives of how and why 
the people are called the Nkonya.  
One explanation has it that when the forefathers of the Nkonya settled on the land on 
which they now live, they said ani to ko nya which means “we fought and got”; obviously 
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referring to the current settlement.
117
 Another derivation proposed by Lilley (1925), however, 
suggests that Nkonya means ‘will never get’, which means no one can forcefully appropriate 
their land. On the other hand Aduamah (1963) says Nkonya means ‘the invincible’ i.e. the 
spiritually powerful people. I got to know from my informants that over the years, the Nkonya 
have come to identify themselves with all these derivatives but especially the one referring to 
‘will never get’ (perhaps referring to the fractured relationship between them and the 
Alavanyo) as an emotional and psychological device to give meaning and energy to the 
culture of resistance and the politics of insistence in the struggle over the disputed land with 
the Alavanyo. This settlement story offers some explanatory trajectories for appreciating the 
current ideologies and practices associated with the resilience of the Nkonya in the land 
conflict.  
Like the Alavanyo, the Nkonya have always personified the land as a ‘mother’ whose 
motherly care is experienced through the abundance of food, good health and a good 
relationship among the living and between the living and the ancestors. The land is also the 
field for knowing and creating a spiritual link between the people and the beings of the 
spiritual world. Hence, when the land is no longer able to support life in this way they migrate 
in search of fertile lands where water and a fertile vegetation offer the possibility of good 
human habitation, ritual/spiritual life and agrarian activities.
118
  
All over Ghana, the Nkonya and their kinsmen and women the Gonja, Nchumuru, 
Larteh, Akwapim, Krachi and Afutu with whom they share a common historical background, 
are renowned for their magic, juju, sorcery, and other spiritual powers. In Nkonya in 
particular, since precolonial times, there has been a strong belief in the chief fetish ‘Nanasia’, 
located at Nkonya-Wurupong.  
Nanasia is said to grant victory during war, bless childless couples with children and 
grant other blessings. In the past, and in the current land dispute, the people have appealed to 
‘Nanasia’ in different circumstances in the effort to overpower the Alavanyo in the battle over 
the disputed land, but so far without success. In fact, one informant described the on-going 
land dispute as a battle between spiritual powers/forces that can be appropriated by the 
Nkonya and those that can be appropriated by the Alavanyo for multiple reasons/intentions.
119
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 Interview with Openi Kofi Manu at Nkonya-Ntumda, 31/05/2014.   
118
 Openi Manu of Ntumda explains that because of this the Nkonya have had to fight many groups of people 
down the ages of its history. 
119
 In most African societies, the use of spiritual/mystical powers during war, football matches, elections or some 
other challenging period/duty is commonplace and so what happens in Nkonya and Alavanyo is the norm and 
not the exception. 
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Today, Nkonya is made up of fourteen communities and about six of them share 
boundaries with the Alavanyo. It is, however, the boundary between Nkonya–Tayi, Nkonya-
Kadjebi and Nkonya-Ntsumuru and Alavanyo-Kpeme, Alavanyo-Wudidi, and Alavanyo-
Agoxoe that is the subject of the land dispute. The Nkonya also share boundaries with the 
Guan communities of Santrokofi, Akpafu and Bowiri with whom they ‘drank fetish’, as well 
as with the Ewe groups of Kpandu, Aveme, and Gbi. This ritual is common in many African 
societies and is used not only in the context of receiving strangers, but also to seal marriages 
and accompany other traditional practices (cf. Kouassi Zartman, 2000). During the colonial 
period it was used as the religious aspect of the inauguration and installation of chiefs or the 
erection of native councils by colonial officials (cf. Nyinanse, 1984).  During fieldwork, older 
informants also strongly expressed the belief that social relations between Alavanyo and 
Nkonya were established through the rite of drinking fetish. The contents of the rite included 
the pouring of libation in which the gods and ancestors of the land are invoked, a promise by 
both sides to keep the terms of the covenant, and the readiness to share land, as well as social 
and economic life together. It is believed that any party that breaches the terms of this moral 
agreement defining social and property relations will suffer the wrath of the gods and 
ancestors because such breach constitutes an infraction and an offence and creates a form of 
‘social and spiritual imbalance’ in society. More so, it is believed that when the offence is not 
remedied, the land will become infertile, the people will lose the blessings of the ancestors 
and other calamities shall befall the community. In former days, fetish priests, elders and 
sometimes the chief linguists of both communities were called upon to carry out this 
important ritual. All of this indicates how the two communities in the past have been creating 
and recreating meaningful social worlds, building bridges of peace across to each other, and 
mitigating untoward happenings between them.  
Today, in the wake of the land dispute, much of what we know about the social and 
moral economy of relations between the two has weakened and has given vent to different 
interpretations of past relations, as each group tries to reinvent the past in order to give 
credence to its present claims to the land. This will continue to be a major driver of the land 
conflict for some time to come.   
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4.3. SOCIAL ORGANISATION 
 
Social organisation among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya is built around kinship which 
provides the main window into the social and property relations among a large network of 
consanguine relations. Asamoa explains that “the kinship organisation among the Ewes of 
Northern Volta Region is a social frame of reference in terms of claims on assets (e.g. land, 
wild cash crops, etc.) and offices, solidarities, counselling and defence of kinship members 
and spiritual protection” (Asamoa, 2000:49). The kinship structure finds expression in the 
segmentary lineage system in which the lineages, clans and families are united by 
consanguinity. In this system males of different fathers are brothers and may call any of the 
fathers their father, while the daughters of different mothers are sisters and may call any of the 
mothers their mother. This system is still very much in practice today. Both Nkonya and 
Alavanyo practice a patrilineal system of inheritance in which the basic social unit is the 
house, (wei in Nkonya and afe in Ewe), a patrilinear nuclear family where a husband, wife or 
wives, children and sometimes children of deceased relatives live together. However, in 
Nkonya, the matrilineal line is also acknowledged. For instance, a maternal uncle has a strong 
say in his nephew’s family matters. 
Among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, each village settlement consists of clans (Kuwo 
in Ewe or Otin in Nkonya)  
“…which are the largest residential units of people interrelated by ancestry and 
marriage. Each clan spans segments arranged in a hierarchical order. In 
descending order the segments are the major lineage (avedufe), the minimal 
lineage or extended family (fome) and the nuclear family (atsu kple asi/asiwu). 
The clan and all its segments trace their succession and claim their heritable 
property through the male parental line” (Asamoa (2000: 48).  
 
It is within the segments that the major lineage (avedufe/otuntufla), the extended 
family (fome) and the nuclear family (asiwu/abusuan) are found. They all trace their origin to 
a common male ancestor, and the names and the genealogical line of people may be traceable 
to the village/town from which they come. Kinship ties are thus very strong among the 
Alavanyo as well as the Nkonya. According to Nyinanse (1984) while the Nkonya tend to live 
in closely-knit communities or villages comprising of all members of a particular lineage, the 
Alavanyo on the other hand tend to live within clan settlements that are spread across a wide 
geographical reach. Thus, in this settlement pattern, land can be a problem as much as it is 
needed to accommodate kin members.  
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In both Alavanyo and Nkonya, members of the clan are agnates. The male members of 
the clan are the highest figures of authority. They take care of the property of the clan and see 
to the welfare of the group/agnates. Land belongs to the lineage and is administered by clan 
and family heads whose duty is to protect the land and make sure every member of the family 
who needs land for farming or building purposes has enough. Land can also be acquired by 
individuals and groups through purchase, gift and (in precolonial times) through warfare. 
There is a political hierarchy of roles and responsibilities in which clan heads are placed 
above family heads, women and so on. Family and community disputes are settled by chiefs, 
elders and family councils who administer justice. Family members may sell or dispose of 
land only after elaborate consultations and the approval of clan heads because land (anyigba) 
belongs not only to the living, but also to generations yet unborn. In recent years, some clan 
and family heads have however abused the power entrusted to them and have been selling 
land without due customary procedures. During fieldwork, there were a number of such cases 
within families in which those who felt cheated were threatening court action as traditional 
processes of resolving the issues had failed.   
Boundaries of family lands were known only to a few because of security reasons, i.e. 
to safeguard the land so family members may not put undue pressure on clan and family 
heads to expropriate the land indiscriminately (Nyinanse 1984). It has,  however, been 
observed that today some of the disputes over land among family members are traceable to 
the local practice of keeping land boundaries ‘secret’ such that when those with the requisite 
knowledge die, disputes immediately erupt with devastating consequences.
120
  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, the clan is not only a biological unit, but functions as a 
social, economic and political unit. Members support each other economically, socially, and 
morally when there is need to do so. For example, when a member of the clan dies, all 
members are expected to assist in cash and in kind in the burial and funeral arrangements; and 
sanctions are given to those who refuse to help. In fact, during weekends, Alavanyo, Nkonya 
and the surrounding towns/villages can become busy with funerals which today have become 
very expensive as families sometimes have to keep the dead in the morgue for months before 
burial, while the cost of feeding guests might be considerable. The clan thus serves as a 
structure of material and social security to help members cushion the impact of demands in 
modern Ghanaian society.  
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 Today, because of the many land struggles, family and clan heads are showing the boundaries of land 
belonging to the clan and family to the youth, so they can protect the land from any encroachers. 
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Ideally, older ones have the responsibility to counsel, rebuke, punish and admonish 
young ones so they may grow into responsible adults. Special care is offered to the disabled 
and the aged. The Nkonya and Alavanyo believe in life after death so clan elders/heads 
mediate between the living and the dead through ritual, libation, divination, clairvoyance, and 
necromancy so that at death members may be received by the land and the ancestors (Gavua 
2000). 
As in most African societies, the family institution comprising of the extended and the 
nuclear families are very important to social life among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya. Today, 
however, the impact of social change and modernization expressed through liberal ideologies 
and individualism have weakened the meaning and purpose of the family institution. Thus, in 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya, while the extended patrilineal family continues to exist, people 
tend to place more emphasis on the nuclear family or family of orientation. The challenges of 
the land dispute have further fractured the extended families in which intermarriages 
involving families of both Alavanyo and Nkonya are still actively engaged in. Intermarriages 
between the Alavanyo and Nkonya have been part of the social interactive discourse between 
the two for centuries, but the emergence of the land dispute and the politicization of ethnicity 
and belonging have weakened the intermarriages between the two groups. Today, the social 
environment is so divisive and polarised that young people from either side of the divide no 
longer feel comfortable seeking suitors in the communities because they are likely to be 
considered as spies or people seeking to ‘poison’ their neighbours.121  
Monogamy, polygamy, endogamy and exogamy are all forms of marriage accepted 
among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya. Polygamy is practiced for a myriad of reasons among 
which are superstitious ideas about menstruation, the need to have more children as a status 
enhancing symbol, the choice for the man to have another wife should the first be barren and 
so on (Asamoa 2000:54). Sometimes when there is stiff competition between two suitors over 
a bride, the suitors can resort to juju or magico-spiritual methods as a way of gaining 
competitive advantage over other suitors.
122
  
A young man going into marriage must acquire a personal residence where he will 
take his bride. More often,  
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 During fieldwork in August, 2012, one of the youth leaders in Alavanyo who was dating a lady from Nkonya 
told me that some of the youth are unhappy with him because they felt his Nkonya girlfriend may be taking vital 
information from Alavanyo to Nkonya. Later, when I returned to the field in June, 2014, this youth leader had 
passed away under circumstances his wife and friends considered suspicious. 
122
 Two young men shared with me that they believe they lost the women they wanted to marry to the use of juju 
by other suitors. In the communities, to use methods like this to get what one wants is an acceptable practice. 
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“the location of the house on the husband’s patrilineal territory is to strengthen 
and sustain the agnatic principle of territoriality, a cardinal presupposition for the 
reproduction of kinship membership in time and space” (Asamoa in Gavua 
2000:52).  
 
There are two normative residence patterns: patrilocal and virilocal. While both are 
practiced, virilocality is the preferred practice. It is said that this will offer the man the latitude 
he needs to exercise masculine control over his household. This is where his gun and hoe 
symbolically but also physically express their significance and purpose.  
Marriage is not an individual affair, but a family matter in which the kin group, as well 
as the clan and family heads are involved to support the couple with gifts, counsel as well as 
spiritual and moral assistance. The dowry or bride price is not static and uniformed across 
board; rather, it is subject to the social and material standing of a suitor. A woman married 
into a lineage, (avedufe/otuntufla) is not considered a blood member even if well integrated, 
so when she dies, her body is taken back to her own kin for burial. Thus, married women 
always remain ‘strangers’ in their husband’s home.  
The socialization of children is the primary responsibility of parents, and it used to 
take place along strict gender lines: females followed their mothers to draw water, cook, fetch 
fire wood, do household cleaning, and collect food stuffs from the farm. Males defined 
themselves through their fathers in the art of farming, hunting and weaving. However, since 
children are part of the larger society, it is culturally expected of all adults to assist in 
socializing them. It is said that “a cock belongs to an individual but when it crows, its impact 
is felt by the whole village.” This is to say that a child may belong to one family, but what 
he/she does affects the whole community. Today, this culturally expected role has come under 
serious strain because of individualizing trends and wider social changes.  
The organization of space in the household was informed by a functionalist rather than 
decorative orientation, but one did (and does) not exclude the other. Men do not visit the 
kitchen or draw water; these are considered to be chores for women. Similarly, women do not 
concern themselves with the physical maintenance of the house; it is the duty of men.  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, it is customarily expected of a father to provide his son(s) 
with a gun, a cutlass and a hoe when he is ready for marriage. These are to aid him in fending 
for and defending his family and community against any form of external aggression. So it is 
not a crime for a man to own a locally made gun or a pistol known as ‘Klosasa’ or ‘Tukpui.’ 
On the contrary, in a farming and hunting community these tools carry a lot of cultural and 
social significance. They are symbolic of the masculinity, power, bravery, and productive 
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capacities of a man. In Alavanyo as well as in Nkonya, to know how to shoot as a boy is to 
learn how to be a man, and as such it is a required skill.  
Today, a diminishing number of families still adheres to this custom, but the threat to 
human life emanating from the dispute has provided a fresh impetus for groups, especially 
among the youth, to acquire guns. The acquisition and use of guns has given the old and the 
young, but especially those involved in the “raiding” of timber, a newly found power. Thus, 
today, rather than being a cultural symbol, guns are redefined at the ideological and practical 
level to assume the character of a weapon of war. It is conversions and redefinitions of this 
sort that have turned the fecund land into a site of bitter competition and hostility, and that 
have deprived most of the people of the opportunity to access the land for more productive 
ends. 
4.4. LAND RIGHTS AND TENURE SYSTEMS: A DISCOURSE OF POWER AND 
POWERLESSNESS  
 
Since the beginning of the post-colonial period, there has been an ongoing debate across many 
parts of Africa about the issue of land rights and tenure systems in the effort to harmonise 
land use practices at the local and state levels. So far, the debate has not yielded the intended 
results. Instead, it has led to multiple and sometimes contradictory land reforms across the 
continent. In Africa, land rights are not developed in isolation; they are connected to 
‘indigenous’ and state tenure systems which are often framed around the idea of the 
‘customary’; a term shrouded in ambiguity. In the particular case of Ghana, the idea of the 
‘customary’ has been vital to the understanding of the politics of land rights and tenure 
systems. According to Amanor (1999) and Berry (2001), the idea of the ‘customary’ has been 
built around reinventions of African traditions by the colonialists and has thus been fraught 
with prejudice and ambiguities (see also Mamdani, 1996). For instance, Berry opines that the 
colonial effort to redefine the customary in favour of colonial pursuits rather produced 
ambiguities in which traditional rulers such as chiefs, elders and colonial officials colluded to 
deprive locals of heritable land.  
Amanor (1999) picks up this very issue by showing how in the Gold Coast, the 
colonial government’s introduction of the Crown Lands Bill which sought to invest “waste 
land, forest land and minerals” ( p.46) in the British Crown and other landed benefits to 
chiefs, complicated matters and led to different interpretations of customary land law. Under 
the tutelage of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, (ARPS) the bill was challenged by 
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the “Gold Coast intelligentsia who argued that there was no waste land within the colony, that 
all lands had owners, and that the crown had no legal authority to appropriate lands” (ibid 
p.47). The bill was summarily withdrawn but its discourse continued to shape land rights and 
tenure practices for years to come. The history of land rights from the 1890s onwards 
indicates that colonial officials, Ghanaian elites and legal authorities “offered shifting, 
sometimes contradictory interpretations of the content of customary law and the jurisdiction 
of traditional authorities” (Berry 2006:248).  
In my opinion, power relations between state and local leaders on the one hand, and 
traditional authorities and the peasantry on the other, are at the root of the shifting 
inconsistencies related to laws and regulations connected to land rights and tenure systems in 
Ghana. Those with power use their power to their advantage while rendering the majority of 
the people powerless in the pursuit of their rights to land. Presently, in both the 1979 and 1992 
constitutions, customary land rights and tenure systems are running side by side with state 
land legislations and sometimes the two undercut each other in very complicated ways.  
This analysis reveals the checkered history of land administration in the colonial 
period and points to the fact that the numerous land disputes in contemporary Ghana are due 
to a lack of consistent land rights, tenure systems, and land laws. 
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, allodial rights in the appropriation and expropriation of land 
is vested in clan and family heads, and thus is a male affair. By allodial title/right, I am 
referring “to a person who has hereditary rights to a piece of land, who can bequeath it to kin 
and who can let others have temporary use rights, through either a formal lease or an 
unwritten agreement” (Lund, 2008:49). In his study of land struggles in northern Ghana, Lund 
discovered that an allodial title is hardly absolute or constant over time but changes as it is 
historically contingent on a set of property rights. This resonates with the case among the 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya where allodial rights to land belong to men, but are at the same 
time subject to the forces of power, negotiation and land marketization.   
Women only have usufruct rights to land, and any land given to them, especially for 
farming, comes under the care of brothers, husbands, and paternal uncles. It is argued that 
since marriage is exogamous, and residence viri-local, and if women would be allowed to 
own land, they would take family land to outsiders. This tenure system does not guarantee 
land security to women nor empower them to negotiate favourable terms in land transaction. 
According to some authors (Manuh et al, 1997; Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010), this is a form 
of gender discrimination in land allocation, and is coupled with the strong ideology that 
women are not farmers. It makes it very hard for women to acquire land for various needs. 
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Unfortunately, these customary practices have been integrated into state laws, thus 
entrenching the gender inequalities in land tenure (cf. Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010).   
One’s belonging to the family is of extreme importance to women’s rights to land, but 
here again the power structures of society are fundamentally male-dominated, and thereby 
limit one’s rights to own and use land according to one’s own wishes. In this sense, the real 
determinant of land rights are not consanguine relations or any form of right, but power 
relations. In the larger picture, it is not only women who are disadvantaged in the acquisition 
of land, but also the bigger group of youth and peasants. Hence, in my view, local land 
systems are embedded in a politics of power in which those vested with authority arrogate to 
themselves undue power in the dispensation of family or community land.
123
 This produces a 
social logic which empowers elders and renders women and the peasantry powerless in the 
use of landed property.   
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, most of the founding fathers of the clans became owners of 
land that was acquired through their first settler status. Talking about the Ewe, Gavua (2000) 
explains that these lands were protected and guided by trowo deities or togbuiwo, ancestral 
spirits. Within this arrangement land owners offered land to new comers and their families for 
settlement and farming. It was (and today is still) believed that land is life, so a family without 
land is considered a family without a present and therefore without a future. Such a family 
risks perpetuating a cycle of misery and poverty among its descendants. Hence, every family 
avoids this situation by buying land, or acquiring it through some form of tenure transaction. 
However, the emergence of the land dispute and the exploitation of forest resources by a 
collusion of youth, traditional authorities, and timber contractors, has led to a situation in 
which many families de facto lost their allodial and usufruct rights over the land because they 
could no longer access it.  
In the communities of Nkonya and Alavanyo, three important landmarks significantly 
affected land rights and practices in the area. First, the emergence of the cocoa industry, 
secondly, the demographic challenges, and thirdly the commoditization of land and the 
complexities of the land dispute.  
Historically, prior to the emergence of the cocoa industry, the two peoples operated a 
simple customary land tenure in which Nkonya held large parcels of land by virtue of being 
first comers, and shared some of it with Alavanyo farmers within the framework of loosely-
                                                          
123
 In recent years, the increasing demographic challenges within clans and families is beginning to have a telling 
effect on the distribution of land, leading to many land quarrels within families and clans.  
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arranged tenure agreements based on intermarriages, friendships, common agrarian practices 
and the fact that they both share social and geographic spaces together.  
Land rights and tenure systems in Alavanyo and Nkonya, however, came to a head 
with the introduction of cocoa into the area in the 19
th
 century (cf. chapter two). With the 
passage of time, the inflow of migrant farmers and labour and the wish of both Nkonya and 
Alavanyo farmers to enlarge following the boom of the cocoa industry led to pressure on land. 
Given that boundaries at the time were loose, land was plentiful, and acquisition was based 
more on social relations than on strict legal prescriptions, farmers from both communities 
capitalised on the situation and moved into lands fertile for cocoa production but to which 
access was not properly negotiated.  
This situation led to different interpretations related to land use practices and 
occasioned minor disputes all over the place. Legitimate issues of boundary, ownership and 
the authority to determine allodial and usufruct rights then arose as migrant farmers with only 
usufruct rights to land made frantic efforts to translate this opportunity into allodial rights by 
trying to make outright purchase.  
This process led to land sales which created tensions and divisions within clans and 
families as some members felt side-lined in the use of land and the benefits of land 
purchase.
124
 These events also constitute a major factor in the intractability of the land conflict 
between the two communities. 
Secondly, in both communities, as the local and migrant populations began to increase, 
demography became a major challenge which impacted heavily on the land dispute. The 
Nkonya who feared they were going to lose the land they had always considered theirs, 
started instrumentalising their first comer and autochthon status by arguing that as first 
comers, they were first to establish a spiritual and physical relationship with the land, thereby 
justifying their claims of ownership of the land. They emphasised that this fact explains why 
in the distant past, the Alavanyo drank fetish with Nkonya and had their headman installed by 
the king of Ahenkro (cf. Ampene, 2011).
125
 
Later in 1931, when the British took control over the area after the departure of the 
Germans in 1918, Mr. Norton Jones a British forester, was given the responsibility to 
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The story is not different in the Peki area, in the Volta region which was also a cocoa growing area. Meyer 
mentions that in Peki “after 1918, cocoa cultivation steadily increased, but as suitable cocoa land became a 
scarce commodity, this increase led to more land conflicts within and between families and lineages” (1999:15). 
125
 As amalgamation was adopted in the 1920s by the British to bring all sub-chiefs under one head chief in 
furtherance of the policy of indirect rule, this tributary system was abrogated. The Nkonya and other ethnic 
groups in the area who resisted amalgamation suffered for it. The British saw this group as enemies of colonial 
policies and rule. 
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demarcate and convert the forest region on the Togo Plateau belonging to the six states into a 
forest reserve with specific portions owned to each state. This act was consummated before 
the Togo Plateau Reserve Settlement Commission at Hohoe, today a district capital. 
Thereafter, farmers from Nkonya and Alavanyo were restricted from making new farms in the 
forest reserve although they were allowed to keep the old ones. This restriction aggravated the 
challenge of land rights and tenure regimes in the area as farming lands became more 
restricted and limited farmers’ chances of expanding into new territories. The prohibition also 
affected food production and family incomes, and generally impacted negatively on economic 
and social life within the two communities.  
The third important factor which also impacted on land rights and tenure systems is 
the increasing commoditization of land, and the emergence of share cropping practices. 
Earlier, I have mentioned that usufruct rights to land were given under very flexible terms 
because of social ties, e.g. marriage. This system was seriously challenged because of the 
numerous land disputes, and eventually it led to a stricter form of land regime: abunu and 
abusa. In abunu, the practice is that when a landowner gives land to a sharecropper for 
cultivation, at harvest time the produce is shared equally between the two. In abusa the 
sharecropper takes two thirds of the produce and gives one third to the landowner (Amanor 
1999). This system changed the nature of land rights and the dynamics of property in the area 
as migrants who gained land under favourable terms and could pay more attracted more 
labour. 
Youth who served as labour force on the farms of their parents because they were 
culturally expected to do so, rather preferred to provide labour to migrant farmers who were 
willing to pay good money in exchange for labour. The attraction of money was so strong 
that, young men limited the expanse of personal farms in preference of farming for either 
migrants or locals whose rates for labour were high.
126
 While this structure of labour relations 
worked to the advantage of migrant farmers and some locals, it inevitably created tensions 
and family conflicts as parents felt betrayed by their children who were seen as owing them 
the duty of reciprocating the fatherly care they had been receiving over the years. The 
monetisation of labour also challenged the balance of power in property relations between 
sons and fathers, as sons tried to equal fathers or overtake them in terms of fiscal and property 
security (cf. Lentz 2003). 
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 This shift in labour relations is not so strange, as Amanor (1999) relates similar stories in the Eastern region 
of Ghana where cocoa production became lucrative. 
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While the frontier of cocoa production created an influx of migrants who gained land 
and labour on favourable terms and opened up new areas to markets, the process itself 
empowered some and disempowered others, generated social conflicts and increased 
inequality and economic insecurity (Amanor 2010). Arguably, today the cultural norm of 
reciprocity between parents and children which hitherto was strong in many African societies, 
not least in Nkonya and Alavanyo, has lost much of its influence. 
By the 1970s, cocoa cultivation had reduced and had given way to subsistence forms 
of agriculture/crop production. Many families and individuals now only farmed non-export 
crops such as yams, legumes, plantain, cassava etc for domestic purposes. As it were, this 
eventually reduced the fiscal power of parents and youth as they were all relying on the land 
for their livelihood and economic security.  
Today, for fear of being shot, many landholding families in Nkonya and Alavanyo 
whose lands ended up within the ‘disputed’ area, have abandoned these lands and have of 
necessity entered into landholding agreements such as abunu and abusu with land owners in 
undisputed areas. Those who could not enter into any form of land transaction had to resort to 
outright purchase (which is extremely difficult for many) in order to farm and ‘eat’ or build. 
The older generation however, detests the commodification of land, arguing that it increases 
poverty and impacts negatively on the moral economy of reciprocity and the social relations 
of production. Besides, land belongs to the ancestors, and the current generation must use and 
pass it on to future generations. As land is considered a source of life in the two communities, 
when strangers/visitors need land to ‘farm and eat’ it is customarily required that it is given to 
them. In fact, it is seen as a divine duty because it is a way of sharing life with strangers and 
making them feel at home. Some elders emphasise that communities and individuals could 
attract the wrath of the gods or the ancestors if they fail in this regard. But this can attract the 
gods’ blessings if they show generosity and goodwill towards strangers. On the basis of this 
custom or ethos, the Nkonya have been arguing that this was precisely why they accepted to 
enter into tenancy agreements with 7 Alavanyo farmers who needed land to farm and eat after 
they lost the 1975 court case.
127
  
In my opinion, the challenges and ambiguities associated with land transactions in 
Nkonya and Alavanyo are manifestations of a discourse of power and powerlessness which is 
expressed in the way in which groups and individuals negotiate land rights and tenure systems 
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 The letter by the Alavanyo requesting to enter into tenancy agreement with Nkonya was signed by Joseph 
Foli & Eugene Prikutse on behalf of the others and is in private possession of the Elders of Nkonya-Tayi. I have 
also made a copy of it. 
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which can become very controversial matters. While living among the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya, I observed that the power clashes at the root of most land struggles seem inevitable 
for a number of reasons.  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo an individual may “claim use rights to a field as an elder, 
while a second may claim the same rights to the same plot by virtue of being the son of the 
previous cultivator. Conflict, then, arises because each person has a valid claim to the land” 
(Reyna and Downs 1988:17). This practice has often created disputes because it gives the 
impression that the land is being transferred illegitimately. It also indicates that ownership of 
property and land are not that simple, but constitute a “complex bundle of rights that are 
socially and politically embedded” (Lentz 2006:1). In fact, land use and rights to a piece of 
land maybe concentrated at one time and later be diffused as many people may acquire rights 
to it. This could not be more true than in Alavanyo and Nkonya where the patrilineal system 
of inheritance has often pitted sons of different brothers and brothers from the same family 
against each other in land disputes that may run for years.  
This condition bares out the argument of Berry (in Juul and Lund, 2002) that land 
struggles in Africa more generally are not just about their economic values, but “rather they 
constitute arenas of simultaneous struggles over wealth, power and knowledge. Inherent in 
every conflict over who should get access to a particular tract of land, on what terms, are 
simultaneous and interrelated struggles over who should decide how land is to be allocated 
and used, on what basis” (p. 108). The observation of Berry raises to the fore the challenge 
that the power to determine rights to land and property in a given situation are not easy to 
determine.  
During fieldwork, some of my interviewees related stories about intra-family, inter-
family or intra-clan land disputes resulting from family or clan heads who sold land or entered 
into tenure arrangements for personal financial benefits with individuals/groups not in 
consonance with prescribed customary norms.
128
 Today, in the light of this lack of 
transparency on the part of elders and other traditional authorities, it has become normal 
practice for family members who feel cheated in some form of land transaction to bypass 
traditional dispute settlement processes and resort to the law courts for settlement. People tend 
to trust the courts more than any system of arbitration in spite of the many challenges they 
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 Often, the effort is made to keep these disputes secret because a clan or family that is unable to resolve its 
land matters amicably is perceived in the eyes of the community as wishing the extinction of its line or its 
members. It is considered an act of shame. 
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face in bringing cases to the courts. The deeper reasons for this practice will be taken up in the 
sixth chapter. 
 
4.5. LIVELIHOODS: A MORAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SURVIVAL 
4.5.1. Colonial Period 
 
In the distant past, (and still today), land constituted the primary source of livelihood for the 
people of Alavanyo and Nkonya. However, the protraction of the current land conflict and the 
inability of the people to access the land, has compelled them to seek new (often diversified) 
forms of livelihood. By livelihood, I mean the ways and means a people uses to exploit 
natural resources such as land, and human resources (knowledge, machinery) at their disposal 
to meet their economic, social and cultural needs in a sustainable way.
129
 Chambers and 
Conway explain that 
“a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stresses and 
shocks, maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets, and provides sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net 
benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long 
term” (1991:6).   
 
In the colonial period (and still today), agrarian activities constituted the principal source of 
livelihood among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya. Non-export crops such as cassava, plantain, 
maize, and export crops like cocoa, coffee and cola nuts offered good money to many a 
farmer. One of my informants who used to have a big cocoa farm which he lost in the land 
conflict told me;  
“My three houses were built during the cocoa boom of the 1970s. I was able to 
send my children to school, build three houses and marry my two wives. Life was 
good and we had a lot to eat and to share with one another. This is not the case 
today because of the intensification of the land conflict.”130 
 
In Ghana, cocoa is a perennial crop and is generally perceived as an intergenerational source 
of livelihood and a property or wealth for families and clans. One’s place in the family and 
the structure of inheritance are, however, significant factors for staking a claim of ownership 
or a share. For instance, among Akan groups such as the Ashanti where inheritance is 
matrilineal, women can own and take care of cocoa farms on behalf of the family. It is 
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 By sustainable, I mean the culture/practice in which the natural and human resources of a people are exploited 
to meet not only the livelihood needs of the current generation but also those of the future generation. 
130
 Interview with Amega Nutakor of Alavanyo-Wudidi, July, 2012.  
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common practice among the Ashanti for fathers to pass on their cocoa farms to their daughters 
or sisters.
131
  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, the practice is different; a cocoa farm is comparable to a 
landed property and a non-negotiable family property managed by males, and this is the 
tradition, as some elders emphasised. A cocoa farm is passed on from father to son or from 
father to brother or uncle. Women may share in the benefits of a cocoa farm but would not 
own one or be responsible for taking care of one on behalf of the family.
132
 Thus, while the 
moral economy of property relations offer women the opportunity to share in the 
fruits/benefits of a cocoa farm or land, the political economy of power relations on the other 
hand does not allow women to own a cocoa farm or landed property. Today, because of the 
land dispute, very few people still owe cocoa farms and most of these farms have been 
destroyed or are under constant threat of being destroyed by the activities of groups and 
individuals.  
Among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, besides cocoa cultivation, subsistence activities 
of hunting, fishing, weaving, wood carving, blacksmithing, boat making and trade were 
equally sources of livelihood. The Nkonya were and are noted for fishing and boat making, 
but these do not constitute a viable source of livelihood today. Blacksmithing is a very big 
profession among the Alavanyo whose relationship with the Akpafu gave a further boost to 
the profession as the latter were gifted in the smelting of iron and in metallurgy. All over 
Ghana and in the neighbouring countries of Togo, Benin and the Ivory Coast the Alavanyo 
are famous for their giftedness and ingenuity in the fabrication of guns and other metallurgical 
implements. Blacksmithing is thus a viable source of income and livelihood, but only for a 
few. The use of guns in everyday life in Alavanyo and Nkonya has given a further 
psychological and rational foundation to the gun business as people from both communities 
buy guns from the blacksmiths, who are now producing unlicensed guns at secret locations for 
fear of being arrested if found out. This is a major reason why people of both communities 
can easily mobilise guns any time the land conflict escalates.  
In Alavanyo and Nkonya, land and labour relations are gendered; women work on 
smaller and accessible parcels of land that do not require heavy labour, while men cultivate 
lands that are situated within the forest belt and are labour and capital intensive. While 
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 But the demands of work and the robustness of maintaining a cocoa farm, coupled with the fact that Ghanaian 
society is generally patriarchal, women tend to cede this right to brothers, uncles or nephews who may take 
immediate responsibility of the farm for the entire family.  
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 The reasons being that among the people inheritance is patrilineal and marriage is exogamous, so if women 
were allowed to own family cocoa farms, they would be taking them to outsiders. 
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women’s activities on the land offer some income, their participation in farming is 
customarily understood to be auxiliary to men’s. The latter are by custom expected to provide 
for the nutritional needs of the family. Sometimes, labour costs are mitigated through the 
cultural practice of adzodada.
133
 While this practice was widespread in the past, today it is 
less common. It underscores, however, the importance of interdependence and explains why 
human-social relations are significant to the production and distribution of goods and services 
in local communities such as Alavanyo and Nkonya. My informants explain that in the past 
there was a strong culture of sharing (numama) among kin groups, families and within the 
village. Groups and individuals were willing to offer food or share land with others who did 
not have access to these. The prolonged nature of the land conflict seems to have weakened 
this value of reciprocity and sharing which is so characteristic of the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya.    
Unsurprising, among peoples of the two communities, the roots, barks and leaves of 
trees, the rivers, the soil, etc are not only important for their medicinal and spirito-magical 
value, but also for their economic value. Togbe Atsu, who became a herbalist through the 
‘gift’ of some ‘spiritual power’ from his paternal and maternal grandparents, told me he has 
been healing people with asthma, chronic abdominal pains, as well as barren women through 
the use of herbs and leaves.
134
 There are other plants such as the Kpomi which contains a 
milk-white juice and flowers and when boiled with palm-wine has been used for the 
successful treatment of dysentery (Spieth, 2011). Today, it is observable that these ecological 
‘products’ have been destroyed through the destruction of the forest where most of these 
plants or leaves are located. 
4.5.2. The Post-Colonial Period: The Economy of (un)certainty 
 
By the end of the 1970s, when cocoa production had gone down, a disturbing phase of 
economic uncertainty was inaugurated. At this time, economic predictability and the 
possibilities of livelihood, which were dependent on the cultivation of cocoa, coffee and cola 
nuts, could no longer be relied on. This uncertainty brought in its trail a reduction in income 
levels and the necessity for new forms of livelihood and economic sustainability to emerge. 
The economic challenges of the time were exacerbated in the early 1980s when the Ghanaian 
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 Farming practices remain largely rural as they depend on hoes and cutlasses for tilling the land. They take 
turns to farm for each other and in this way families and individuals who cannot afford the cost of labour are able 
to carry out their agrarian activities without great worry. 
134
 People, and especially those of the older generation who treat themselves with herbs and plants when sick, 
rarely visit the hospital. It is believed that one lives longer that way.  
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government was compelled to introduce structural adjustment programmes (SAP) directed by 
the World Bank and IMF because it was poorly managing the economy and entrenching a 
culture of mismanagement in the society. These policies made matters worse for most 
Ghanaians, especially those belonging to local or rural communities such as Alavanyo and 
Nkonya.  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo, the abundance of timber in the early 1980s and the big 
money it offered pushed many young people into the timber industry. Following the creation 
of the Forest Reserve in 1931(cf. chapter three), families with commercial trees were barred 
from logging them, but the prohibition did not stop illegal logging of timber in the area.  
In some communities in Alavanyo and Nkonya, the 1980s also marked a period when 
families started an aggressive regime of subsistence farming as they capitalised on the fertility 
of the land along the slopes of the mountains and in the forests to grow food crops such as 
maize, cassava and yams for domestic and commercial purposes in order to meet the 
nutritional needs of the family and other domestic necessities such as health, education, 
marriage, and funerals.  
The lack of regular income and the vicissitudes of the land conflict threw many 
families into a state of quagmire. For instance, many homes were left with only mothers and 
children as the dispute claimed the fathers and the abled youth who could fend for the 
families. Many women became breadwinners (afedzikpolawo in Ewe) for the families. In fact, 
in Alavanyo and Nkonya today, many homesteads are managed by women; they have become 
men (nutsuwo or mberima). Traditionally, this is an inversion of roles and responsibilities 
reserved for men because among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, while women may 
complement the efforts of men, they don’t shoulder the burden of care in the family; it is the 
men. This is why it is said among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya that the men own the land 
and the women the crops/fruits. This inversion of roles and power points to the fact that war 
or conflict can sometimes blur and permanently shift the borders between locally defined 
roles of masculinity and femininity, the powerful and the powerless, and the nature of what 
constitutes ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’.  
Today, local and trans-local remittances have become a source of economic or 
financial support to families and individuals with children who are living and working outside 
Ghana and in the big cities of Tema, Accra or Kumasi.  
Since the 1980s, the production of marijuana has also become a major source of 
livelihood for the youth in the two communities. In Ghana, it is a criminal offence and one 
could go to jail for years when arrested for cultivating and selling marijuana; but the 
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economic and survival challenges occasioned by the land conflict have compelled the youth to 
go into marijuana farming because it offers ready money as the drug is in high demand in the 
area and beyond. For most of the youth, any activity that can bring money and help them 
survive the burdens and challenges of the land dispute is acceptable, even if this is sometimes 
not legally permissible.  
In recent years, the operation of Okada
135
 has come to constitute yet another livelihood 
opportunity for the youth. This transport system caught up with the people in the area because 
of bad roads, unemployment and the harsh economic conditions. Okada is the creation of the 
youth, a micro economic survival strategy and it is assisting the idle youth to mitigate the high 
unemployment and poverty rates in the communities. Okada also allows people in the towns 
and villages of Alavanyo and Nkonya to commute across the two communities with ease and 
facility.   
 
Figure 21. Okada boys who ‘pick and drop’ passengers at their convenience 
 
Today, Okadanomics
136
 is widespread in Ghana, even though it is a criminal offence to 
operate one because of the high security risks involved. City planners, politicians and the 
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 An Okada is a commercial motorcycle that is used as a vehicle in Nigeria and well beyond. The name comes 
from the now defunct Okada Air, a Nigerian local airline.  
136
  A form of business in which motorbikes are used as a public transport system to meet the economic needs of 
the riders. 
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police are divided over whether the legal prescriptions barring the operation of Okada should 
be removed to allow them to operate with a measure of surveillance or not. This confusion is 
a major reason why the Okada boys are operating with impunity. For instance, in spite of the 
legal prohibitions barring the trade, some Okada boys hardly use crash helmets. They ride 
very fast, do not respect traffic regulations and can take more than one passenger at a time, 
thus endangering both the life of the passenger (s) and the Okada boy. In the organisation of 
city spaces and places, Okada boys are considered ‘disruptors of order’ as their penchant for 
picking and dropping passengers anywhere and anytime continues to disrupt the organisation 
of public space and the aesthetics of places. Okada boys tend to blur and shift the structure 
and order of planned space by configuring an alternative system of order that allows them to 
avoid tax and arrest, and to tactically move from place to place in search of clients. Okada 
boys can turn any space into a ‘stopping and picking’ space. While this is perceived by local 
and city planners and the police as a form of disorder, for the clients, Okada is preferred to a 
taxi because it is less expensive, convenient and can take commuters right to their door steps.  
 
 
Figure 22. Youth and Women at stone breaking job. 
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Another innovative livelihood activity which has become part of the everyday strategy 
of survival in Alavanyo and Nkonya is sand winning and the breaking of boulders/rocks into 
smaller units for building purposes. The rock breaking is a demanding activity but it attracts 
both youth and women. It is a livelihood venture that blurs gender lines. There are those who 
carry the rocks from the top of the mountains to the base and those who break these rocks into 
smaller portions which are then sold to building contractors and individuals.   
Sand winning on the other hand, is an all-male affair. It is a very physical activity and 
quite laborious and this explains why it is the preserve of the men, and especially the youth. 
As these economic activities bring in ready money, some youth have abandoned school and 
are either winning sand or break rocks/stones in order to meet personal and family needs. This 
has changed the dynamics of power and the economic relations in the homesteads, as women 
and youth have invariably become the breadwinners and somehow the figures of authority in 
some homes. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that one can understand the way the Alavanyo and the Nkonya 
perceive themselves and the land conflict when the migration, settlement narratives and 
identity, and the livelihood challenges confronting them are well appreciated. Among the 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya, the determining factor for settlement is land and the availability of 
water, and these two elements continue to be among the major drivers of the land dispute 
today. One can thus understand why the land dispute is protracting and why it is nested with 
many personal and collective interests of different actors.   
Additionally, I have demonstrated that the initial healthy relations between the two 
groups became problematic when the Alavanyo decided to seek autonomy by socially and 
politically delinking themselves from the Nkonya. It is observable that the emergence of the 
land dispute is partly attributable to some of the reasons leading to the separation between the 
two. In this sense the duplex character of land as grounds for unity and disunity among 
people, and its vulnerability to the dynamics of local politics and the moral economy of social 
relations of property is strongly brought to the fore and indicates the challenges involved in 
solving protracted land disputes.  
More so, I have explained that the names Alavanyo and Nkonya are not just labels of 
places, but a bundle of things expressing the history, identity and culture of the people. A 
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name is thus a world of multiple realities, which may produce multiple registers of meaning 
and reveal the deeper realities behind who a people are, and what they stand for or cherish.  
Among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, kinship relations are very significant to one’s 
claim to land, status, and local authority. Within the kinship structure, clan and family heads 
have great power and the responsibility to take care of land and to make sure every member of 
the kin group who needs land to farm and eat has enough. This constitutes a source of power 
and authority for clan and family heads, some of whom sometimes abuse this power for 
personal gain and thereby create minor disputes. 
In the long history of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, the culture of gun usage has 
been a disturbing phenomenon in the escalation of the conflict. In these communities guns 
have a cultural importance as young men ready for marriage are given guns as symbolic of 
their coming of age. Today, the longevity of the land dispute has compelled a situation in 
which guns have been redefined as weapons of war and conflict. This dynamic will continue 
to pose a big challenge to any effort directed a solving the land conflict. 
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that colonial and post-colonial politics regarding 
land reforms have had a telling effect on land rights and tenure systems in most parts of 
Ghana, not least in Alavanyo and Nkonya. As the land dispute is ongoing and many families 
have lost access to farmable land, locals have resorted to abunu and abusa in order to mitigate 
the loss of family farmable land. But gender inequalities in which women and youth have 
little or no say in land matters continue to hinder their possibility to harness the land for 
productive ends. I argue that the political economy of power underpins customary laws under 
which individuals and groups within the family and clan access rights to land, and function in 
favour of clan and family heads but to the disfavour of the majority within the kin group.  
Moreover, I have elaborated that livelihood possibilities open to the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya have significantly diminished. Farming (cocoa, coffee and cola nuts) and other 
related agrarian activities that formed the core of livelihood among the Nkonya and the 
Alavanyo for centuries are no more. Today, the challenges imposed on them by the 
destructive consequences of the land conflict has rendered the land inaccessible and has 
pushed many into new forms of livelihood such as timber ‘raiding’, Okada, petting trade, sand 
winning etc. While these forms of livelihood do not produce big money, they are influencing 
the discourse on power and authority in the homes as women and youth rather than men have 
more or less become the afedzikpolawo, the bread winners of the families. Thus, the landed 
assets, capabilities and the structures of society such as the family and marriage institutions 
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that allow the people to mitigate the shocks and stresses of the conflict situation and to 
maximise the benefits of the land are weakened by the protraction of the land dispute. 
I argue that these socio-economic and political challenges would have to be tackled if 
the continuing impact of the land dispute would be mitigated to allow the area to have peace.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AUTOCHTHONY, BORDERS AND BELONGING: THE POLITICS OF 
DIFFERENCE 
 
….we must never forget that a boundary occurs only as a reaction of one system 
to another, and is thus necessarily oppositional, having two sides – Hastings 
Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson (1999:22). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Africa, autochthony claims, constructions of social borders, and the interconnection 
between the two, tends to complicate claims of belonging to land by different actors. All of 
this has been well researched in the fields of conflict studies, not least in other fields such as 
religion, sports or politics (cf. Kuba & Lentz, 2006). When, however, autochthony and 
borders are instrumentalised in a land conflict such as the one involving the Nkonya and the 
Alavanyo, they create conditions for the politicisation of difference, exacerbating the 
contestations over claims to the disputed land. More often than not, “in such circumstances 
belonging to the soil acquired great emotional force - even to the extent of sometimes 
usurping the idea of the nation or community” (Geschiere 2009:216). Thus, autochthony 
claims and the construction of borders are almost always precursors to conflict and 
complications of belonging. They feed into each other and give groups who are competing 
over land, property, or power, the needed conduit to anchor the salience of their claims.  
In Africa, ever since the post-colonial period, autochthony claims, often backed by 
first comer status, have become particularly visible in resource conflicts, as well as local and 
state politics (Geschiere, 2009). This has often led to social tensions between groups leading 
to challenges of belonging.  
In Ghana, autochthony claims are very powerful in the competition over land. 
However, Geschiere (2009), Pelican (2009) and Lentz (2003, 2013) have illustrated that 
autochthony claims are not fixed or uncontested; rather they are often contested realities,  
subject to varying degrees of interpretation. Actors tend to ground claims to autochthony by 
using different social, cultural and political narratives and that is why autochthony is such a 
fluid, complex and indeterminate phenomenon (see also Lund, 2011). For instance, Lentz’s 
work (2003, 2013), situated among the Dagara and Sisala of northern Ghana, but resonating 
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with autochthony practices across most parts of Ghana, demonstrates how contestation over 
autochthony claims between the two communities led to a land conflict which inevitably 
created differences and complicated notions of belonging between the two groups. Discussing 
similar research in the Ivory Coast, Geschiere (2009: 98-117) demonstrates how the use of 
autochthony to differentiate between one’s place of ‘origin’ and one’s ‘right’ to compete for 
political office in Ivorian politics led to protracted political and ethnic conflict between those 
in the south who are considered ‘true’ Ivorians, as opposed to those in the north (mostly 
migrants from Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali) who are considered ‘untrue’ Ivorians.  
The literature on autochthony also points to the fact that autochthony claims tend to 
precipitate problematic social borders or barriers. Donnan and Wilson (1999) have argued that 
borders are a complex phenomenon and, while they seem to be dealing with social borders, 
they often include cultural and territorial borders. Borders are a multifaceted social reality and 
as such can find concrete expression in many fields such as politics, sports, economics, 
religion and many other areas of human endeavour. Migdal (2004) has also observed that 
borders often seem to be de-territorialised because they are “contingent on varying historical 
circumstances, rather than being immutably rock-like. Borders shift, leak; and they hold 
varying sorts of meaning for different people” (Migdal, 2004:5). In my opinion, it is the 
‘shifting and leaking’ for which borders are known, and the different meanings they conjure 
up, that make them a contested terrain and a site of multiple actions and reactions. It is also 
because borders or barriers can leak and close that they can be employed by different actors, 
especially in contestations over land or political power, to determine what is permissible and 
impermissible, doable and undoable or lawful and unlawful.   
Against this background, this chapter tries to critically examine how autochthony and 
borders are constructed, sustained and instrumentalised in the context of the Alavanyo-
Nkonya land conflict. The chapter argues that the challenges of social and cultural 
interchange and belonging between the two groups is fundamentally the result of the 
politicisation of autochthony and difference. The chapter will be divided into three parts. In 
the first section, I will examine how and why the discourse on autochthony began and 
eventually essentialised. The claims of autochthony supported by the creation of social 
barriers/borders has led to a politicisation of the differences between the two communities 
exemplified in the usage or application of markers. How these markers are employed to 
advance claims to autochthony in order to own the disputed land will be treated in the second 
part. The third part will be devoted to examining how the two disputing groups can de-
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emphasise their differences and develop new grounds of mutual social and cultural exchange 
which can then promote peaceful coexistence between them. The conclusion will then follow. 
5. 1. “WE ARE DIFFERENT; THEY ARE NOT LIKE US”: THE BURDEN OF 
AUTOCHTHONY 
  
In Ghana, the use of autochthony as a device to claim land or some other property 
within the same community or between two communities has been enormously problematic. 
The problem becomes compounded when it is an intercommunity struggle over land such as 
the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute where both groups are appealing to different ‘rituals’ of 
autochthony in relation to, for example, hunting grounds or burial sites (which are sometimes 
difficult to discover) in order to ground their claims to the land (cf. Greene, 2002). In trying to 
understand how and why the two groups have been essentialising and instrumentalising 
autochthony and their social borders, thus sharpening the differences between them, I asked 
Openin Kwadjo Afrifa, an influential elder of Nkonya-Tayi, to share his views with me on the 
above issues, and he told me: 
“Well, we the Nkonya and the Alavanyo are farmers and grow the same crops, but 
we don’t sacrifice to the same ‘gods’ during and after the farming season. We are 
Guan and the Alavanyo are Ewe. We settled in this area first, in fact long before 
the Alavanyo came, so we are the autochthon and we are the ones who perform 
rituals and sacrifices to our ancestors and the gods to bless the land, part of which 
is now in dispute. Our culture is different from theirs, but in times past we 
intermarried and had common funerals and festivals together. Now, because of the 
conflict we cannot do anything with them. Though we live side by side, our 
relations have become so bad and we are no longer able to live together because 
Alavanyo is trying to claim our land.”137  
 
It is observable from the narration of Openin Afrifa that the people of Nkonya seem to base 
their claims to autochthony on religious, political, historical and sociocultural grounds. While 
these categories are not new in the discourse about autochthony, they can lead to 
complications and challenges, especially if both Nkonya and Alavanyo keep referring to the 
past to register their claims to the disputed land as being ‘children of the soil’ (cf. Boni, 2006; 
Shipton, 2009). It is in this direction that Lentz (2006), for example, argues that basing 
autochthony on first comer claims and ritual relationship to land is a contestable venture 
because it often rests on arguments about historical ‘truths’ which lend themselves to power 
plays in which the ‘truth’ of the powerful more generally becomes ‘the truth’ of the matter. In 
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 Interview conducted at Nkonya-Tayi, March, 2012 
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the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute, the discourse on autochthony is one that is heavily laden 
with a strong emotional charge and a great appeal to historical categories. The appeal to the 
past to foreground autochthony claims has however not solved the land dispute this far, but 
has rather led to the creation of borders and social cleavages in the relations between the two 
groups as illustrated by my interviewee. 
Interestingly, over time, as the social borders/barriers became ever more sharp with 
problems of belonging, the two groups also took advantage of the very social borders they 
produced to foster differences and to engage not only in timber raiding or looting of farm 
produce, but also to engage and maintain marital ties and consanguine relations. In this sense 
borders are not absolute barriers; they become significant social, cultural, political, economic 
and legal facts, but also opportunities in the way that they are crossed. And it is precisely this 
mechanism, this process of producing, maintaining and crossing the border that generates 
powerful resources, economically as well as politically and culturally, for groups and 
individuals. Maintaining and then crossing barriers in a variety of ways creates sites of action 
and specific agencies, and also becomes, in the case of the Nkonya-Alavanyo dispute, a 
means of communicating with each other, as well as a means of differentiation between them. 
On the grounds of these observations, I argue that in Alavanyo and Nkonya 
autochthony claims and social barriers have become sites of creating and sustaining specific 
agendas that unify and promote individual and collective welfare, but also specific actions 
that disunite the two groups and complicate peaceful co-belonging. In the larger picture, what 
is at issue between the two groups has very little to do with ‘cultural stuff’ (Barth, 1998), 
political differences or even agrarian differences, but rather it forms an illustration of how 
both communities are redefining autochthony and picking on certain markers, feeding those 
into social arenas/engagements that create barriers and make inter-crossing between them 
problematic. I use the term “markers” here to denote cultural and socio-economic categories 
such as ethnic identity, language or the stereotypes and prejudices that are used by both 
communities to instrumentalise autochthony and social borders, and in order to politicise their 
differences. I contend that while the politicisation of difference is spread through such 
markers, the markers themselves are not necessarily conflictual. Their everyday use in the 
context of the land struggle has, however, given them a certain ring of negativity which then 
make their mutual relations discordant.  
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5.2. THE POLITICISATION OF DIFFERENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY 
LIFE 
 
The appreciation of human differences (social, biological, ethnic or linguistic) between and 
among groups and individuals is common in many (if not all) societies. But, differences are 
also ambivalent in the way they are expressed because as they promote healthy group 
interaction or harmony, they can at the same time serve as grounds for disharmony or 
unhealthy group interaction if managed improperly (cf. Hinton, 2002). In my relations with 
the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, it was observable that while the two groups could tap into their 
diverse social and cultural potentials and differences in a myriad of ways to deal with other 
social challenges such as intermarriages, they have not been able to use these diverse 
potentials to deal with the challenges of autochthony and to resolve the land dispute. This is 
so because as Jenine-Keith (1975) argues, social and cultural diversity in the relations 
between groups can promote interdependence and productive cultural interchange, but at the 
same time, diversity can also engender conflict when a group feels that cultural interchange 
with another group threatens its independence and pushes it to make unacceptable 
compromises.  
In the social encounters between the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, a major marker that 
has been the basis of contestation and has been nourishing the politics of difference between 
the two groups is the politics of first comer status that is often pushed by the Nkonya 
especially. Since the genesis of the land conflict, the Nkonya have been arguing that as first 
comers, they are the autochthons and therefore the owners of the disputed land. Thus, they 
perceive the Alavanyo as intruding ‘strangers’ who are unrightfully ‘sitting on their land.’ The 
Nkonya have equally used the court verdicts to support their first comer claims. Over the 
years, these arguments have provided the Nkonya with some practical grounds or some merit 
to persistently raise an issue with the history behind the name Alavanyo itself. The story being 
pushed forward by the Nkonya is that, when the Alavanyo finally settled on the place they 
now occupy (which Nkonya allege was part of their land), Togbe To, who at this time was 
leader of the Alavanyo, sat on the ground and exclaimed “Miano fii kpo; adabanyo” i.e., “Let 
us venture settling here; it might turn out to be successful” (Dzathor, 1998:53). Over the years 
Adabanyo has since been corrupted to become ‘Alavanyo’ and this is how the name Alavanyo 
came about and how and why the people finally settled in their current location. In the past, 
and still very often today, the Nkonya have been interpreting the statement “miano fii kpo, 
adabanyo” to mean a clear admission by the Alavanyo of two things: first their late comer 
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status and secondly, by inference, their non-ownership of the disputed land. While the 
Alavanyo do not dispute the fact that they first settled among the Nkonya before relocating, 
they argue that the land which they now occupy (which includes parts of the disputed land) 
was not given them by the Nkonya, but was discovered by able Alavanyo hunters.
138
 If the 
argument of Alavanyo is followed through, it seeks to discredit the autochthony claims of 
Nkonya based on the ownership and use of the disputed land while positing a new narrative of 
autochthony which seeks to argue that the disputed land is partly Alavanyo land and partly 
Nkonya land.  
In the bigger picture, the arguments of both groups may imply that “what counts, then, 
are the social networks and the political power that can be brought into play to support one’s 
own story” (Lentz 2006:54). The positions of both groups bears out the argument of Kleist 
(2013), Lentz (2003) and Boni (in Kuba & Lentz (2006) among others that autochthony 
claims backed by first comer status are rarely absolute, but contingent on discourses of 
ancestrality, power and history. This is one major issue creating the contestations and social 
barriers between the two groups. Clearly, in the above narrative both groups are drawing on 
the past, however unfittingly, to ground their claims. One of my interlocutors from Nkonya 
argued that 
 
“This land conflict is going on because the Alavanyo do not want to accept the 
fact that we are the first comers and the owners of the land. We gave portions of 
the land to their ancestors who came to live among us. Their own writers 
(referring to Dzathor’s work, 1998) have recorded these events, so why do they 
now want to claim ownership of a land we have been living on before they 
came?”139   
 
Today, in Alavanyo and Nkonya, the use of the autochthony arguments coupled with 
first comer/late comer categories to produce ‘frameworks of difference’ has sharpened and 
widened the social and cultural differences between the two groups and has led to 
complications of belonging (cf. Lund, 2011 & Lentz, 2013). The use of first comer ‘rights’ to 
advance arguments in support of claims to land or other resources is not peculiar to Ghana, 
but common to most African societies, as amply illustrated in the research of Pelican (2009), 
where she talks about a land struggle between the Mbororo and the Grassfielders of 
Cameroun. She argues that in this region, the argument of “priority in time, that is, of being 
                                                          
138
 See Kludze (1973) for an elaborate presentation of the different modes of land acquisition in the past among 
the people of the northern Volta region of Ghana. 
139
 Interview with Kwabena Fori, June, 2012 at Nkonya-Ntumda. 
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first comers to a certain area, plays a crucial role” (p. 57) in strengthening group or individual 
claims to land. 
In my view, the discussion on autochthony and first comer rationalities becomes 
strongly politicised especially in political or land conflicts when different actors try to use 
autochthony as a scheme to ownership or right to land or power by constructing borders and 
politicising difference in order to eliminate opponents. This is the kind of narrative Geschiere 
(2009) finds at play in his analysis of Ivorian state politics, where first comer arguments and 
notions of who is a ‘true’ Ivoirian and autochthon are employed by political actors to ‘purify’ 
the community of ‘aliens’ and to redefine autochthony at closer range, basically because 
certain ‘spoils’ – landed property and political posts - have to be shared. In a related research 
Geschiere & Nyamjoh, (2000:424) have also articulated that: 
“Notions of autochthony have a similar effect of creating an us-them opposition, 
but they are less specific. They are equally capable of arousing strong emotions 
regarding the defense of home and of ancestral lands, but since their substance is 
not named they are both more elusive and more easily subject to political 
manipulation. These notions can be applied at any level, from village to region to 
country.”  
 
Examining the connection between autochthony and belonging in a global context, Mezzadra 
& Neilson (2012) have equally argued that we do not have to “see borders as devices that 
obstruct or block global flows. Rather we see them as parameters that enable the channeling 
of flows and provide coordinates within which flows can be joined or segmented, connected 
or disconnected” (p. 59). Arguably, it is precisely the flows and the overlapping between the 
global and local that create and recreate complications associated with borders/barriers and 
challenges of belonging in different scenarios/milieus. When human relations lose their 
predictability and are constantly in flux, they generate ambiguous and unpredictable outcomes 
of a magnitude difficult to control and to pin down with certainty. Belonging in this context, 
as with the people of Nkonya and Alavanyo, would be extremely difficult to anchor, for in 
this sense “mixture has failed to produce social cohesion and cultural interchange” (Amin, 
2002:2). The problem of over-essentialising first comer and autochthony status by the Nkonya 
in order to exclude the Alavanyo in the competition over the disputed land, is becoming 
increasingly problematic because “in practice any attempt to define the autochthonous 
community in more concrete terms will give rise to fierce disagreements and nagging 
suspicions of faking” (Geschiere, 2009:27, emphasis mine).  
In relating with the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, I have often had discussions with local 
authorities and commoners, even within the same community, who pointed out instances of 
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nagging suspicions of faking and embellishment of stories about who owns the disputed land 
and who is engaged in encouraging entrenched or shifting positions. I see this activity as 
indicative of the immense challenges that confront the Nkonya in their effort to define 
autochthony and first comer narratives as closely and exclusively as possible in order to bar 
the Alavanyo from continuing to contest their right to the disputed land. This is equally a 
significant factor that is leading to the instrumentalisation of first comer and autochthony 
status and is stifling trans-border activities between the two communities.  
Another trait which is more symbolic of Nkonya identity, following from first comer 
and autochthony arguments, is the avoidance rule of circumcision. In Nkonya, to be 
uncircumcised is the acceptable local custom based on the belief that circumcision makes a 
man less ‘whole’ and limits his possibilities of living a ‘full’ human life and playing certain 
traditional roles such as that of a chief or the head of a clan. It is therefore connected to 
symbolic rituals of power and purity especially when it is related to men from chiefly 
families. On the contrary, in Alavanyo, it is uncustomary for a man not to be circumcised and 
“many an Ewe woman, especially of the older generation, would not have sex with an 
uncircumcised man” (Asamoa, 2000:54). On the basis of this local custom, the Nkonya have 
over the years perceived the Alavanyo as ‘unwholesome’ (mawanhike), and must be avoided. 
In the ritual theory of Mary Douglas, the Alavanyo may be said to be a form of ‘pollution’ or, 
in the words of Erving Goffman (1963), a ‘spoiled identity’. In an interview with some local 
youth in the Nkonya communities, it appears that today most of these youth do not see the 
rule of circumcision as constituting a major identity trait for anchoring “Nkonyaness”, nor do 
they use it as a mechanism for building social barriers between Nkonya and Alavanyo.  
This observation brings to the surface the intergenerational differences in the meaning 
and understanding of the land dispute, even in the same community . In spite of this, for the 
older generation, the rule of circumcision is a significant symbolic difference between 
Nkonya and Alavanyo and indicates why, in the first place, the Nkonya should not have 
accepted the Alavanyo into their midst when they first approached them as fugitives from 
Kpandu (cf. chapter one). Some elders of Nkonya have emphasized that this is one major 
reason why the chief god of Nkonyaland, Nanasia was relocated to the high mountains of 
Nkonya-Wurupong, away from the reach of the Ewe and other circumcised people, because it 
is a taboo for a circumcised person to come near Nanasia. Although years of Christian 
evangelisation have diminished the pervasiveness and adherents of Nanasia today, those who 
still strongly believe in Nanasia are arguing that the inability of Nkonya to possess the land in 
dispute and the presence of other misfortunes involving them and the Alavanyo could be 
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attributed to the close social and geographic proximity of the latter. In fact, on the basis of this 
custom, some elders say the Nkonya should not ‘eat’ with the Alavanyo.140  
In Nkonya as well as in Alavanyo, to eat or not to eat with someone is a deep symbolic 
expression that is pregnant with a lot of meaning. In my interaction with some elders of both 
communities, I came to understand that eating or commensality is not just the consumption of 
food and drinks, but an art of self-definition, and an identity and cultural praxis that creates a 
form of sociality that binds and unites groups and individuals. Commensality is rooted in the 
nexus between a present and a future orientation in which the art of consumption, like 
marriage, transcends the present sociality it engenders and transmits something intimate into 
the future about human interaction and belongingness between and among groups. Friedman 
(2002) sheds light on the significance of commensality by arguing that “eating is an act of 
self-identification, as is all consumption. Proteins and calories aside, consumption, the 
libidinous half of social reproduction, is a significant part of the differential definition of 
social groups and individuals” (p. 235).  
In the anthropology of commensality, sociality is an integral part of its meaning and 
essence. In Ghanaian cultures, not least in other African cultures, when the art of 
commensality is no longer possible in the relations between individuals or among groups of 
people, it signifies a social rupture, a disruption of the vital tissue of inter-group or interethnic 
sociality and an inversion of the possibilities of reconciliation when things go wrong in the 
social encounters between the individuals or group members. In fact, the end of commensality 
is the end of social relations and the closure of any form of interactive movement. Thus, I 
argue that what comes to the fore with the rule of avoidance is how ‘cultural stuff’ has been 
redefined, essentialised and instrumentalised by the Nkonya with the intention of excluding 
the Alavanyo from continuing to stake a claim to the disputed land.  
Moreover, I have also observed in my relations with the Alavanyo and the Nkonya that 
ethnic
141
 differences between the two groups are also politicised to ground claims to 
autochthony. Ethnic identity issues assumed prominence in academic debates/discussions 
with Barth’s classic “Ethnic groups and boundaries” (Barth, 1969). In this work, Barth argued 
that ethnic identity is a form of social organisation in which membership is based on self-
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 The use of the metaphor ‘eat’ here differs from the way it was used in chapter three of this work. While in 
chapter three ‘eat’ was used to denote a survival strategy among the generality of the people in Alavanyo and 
Nkonya, here it is used to indicate a significant cultural phenomenon which symbolises friendly relations among 
people, or reconciliation after the settlement of a dispute. More generally, the concept or idea of eating has a lot 
of symbolic meaning in many African societies.  
141
 In Ghanaian parlance ethnicity is known as tribalism, i.e. people who have the penchant to do things in favour 
of people who come from the same ethnic background as themselves. 
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ascription and ascription by others, and that it is not ‘cultural stuff’ that differentiates groups 
but the social boundaries that encompasses the group (see also Donnan & Wilson, 1999). 
Scholars such as Roosens have criticised Barth’s boundary concept by arguing that ethnic 
identity is about “the genealogical dimension, which unavoidably refers to the origin, and 
always involves some form of kinship or family metaphor” (Roosens in Vermeulen and 
Govers 1994: 83).  
More recently, Lentz & Nugent (2000:2-3) have also argued that ethnic identity is 
basically an ‘invention’, a complex social phenomenon in which “individuals and groups have 
the ability to stress or de-emphasise any particular aspect of their culture or identity, 
depending on the context” (see also Schlee, 2000 for similar views). The position of Nugent 
and Lentz posits that ethnic identity is a very fluid and mutable phenomenon that may 
undergo rapid change in the social and cultural organisation of societies resulting from their 
inter-linkage with neighbours, targeted interests and the global community.
142
 Fundamental to 
the ideas and theories of the scholars above is the recognition that ethnic identity is a ‘social 
construct’ whose boundaries and purpose can shift and change depending on what is at stake. 
There is, therefore, a great flexibility associated with the construction and application of 
ethnic identity of groups and individuals. 
Nevertheless, I think that the ethnic identity of a group cannot simply be constructed at 
will. That would be too presumptuous. What I do argue is that, in spite of the shifts and 
changes associated with the social or ethnic identity of groups, there are elements of a group’s 
identity that are more or less resilient and are constantly being redefined and reapplied in 
different social contexts, especially when a resource such as land is at stake (see Tonah, 
2007). This is what makes ethnic identity a versatile concept or phenomenon.   
During my research, I observed that while there is a strong ‘we’ feeling of identity and 
sense of ‘Nkonyaness’ and ‘Alavanyoness’ among the generality of the population, those with 
the strongest proclivity to stressing the ethnic factor in issues of autochthony were traditional 
authorities and groups from clans who own land in the disputed area. The reason for this 
emphasis is not difficult to find because of the instrumental use to which ethnicity can be put, 
and also because among the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, land is the most significant marker of 
identity. One’s identity and rootedness as an Alavanyo or a Nkonya, is one’s ability to point 
to land on which one’ ancestors have lived and related down the centuries. Genealogical roots 
in place and locality, i.e., land, are very vital in identity politics and struggles over 
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 See Barfield (1997) for an elaborate debate on the constructivist, primordialist and instrumentalist schools of 
thought about ethnic identity of groups. 
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autochthony among the two groups. Thus, for those who own land within the disputed area, to 
lose the land is to lose the basis of identity and rootedness and the reason for one’s claim to 
being an autochthon.  
In Ghana, the colonial period provides the framework for the emergence and the 
politicisation of ethnic identity. Ametewe (in Tonah, 2007: 27-28) argues that at the genesis 
of colonisation  
“Territories were carved out without any respect for the traditional socio-cultural 
boundaries; and the consequence was the establishment of colonies which 
encompass multiple traditional cultural entities and therefore heterogeneous 
cultural population groups. These different cultural groups within the colonies 
remained conscious of their different ancestral and historical origins; and over 
time, especially in the post-colonial era, their political and economic interests 
became intertwined with their ethnic identity. These interests and the identities 
became reinforced in the face of scarce resources and the quest for economic 
survival vis a vis the heterogeneity of ethnic identities within the new nations”.   
 
Very central to the analysis of Ametewe is the consciousness of various ethnic groups of their 
ancestral historical origins, and how these reinforce their identities in the face of scarce 
resources such as land. The challenges that have emerged from the colonial arrangement of 
traditional socio-cultural boundaries have been aptly demonstrated by Lentz (2013: 177): 
 
“The colonial ethnic map partly ignored and partly made strategic use of the 
ambiguities of over lapping identities and fuzzy boundaries. Toponyms were 
redefined as ethnonyms and vice versa; the mobility of the population was 
disregarded, or conceptually watered-down as “intermingling”; and multi-ethnic 
settlements were redefined as monolithic”.   
 
This being the case, it comes as no surprise that in Nkonya and Alavanyo groups and 
individuals are instrumentalising ancestrality, ethnic identity, historical narratives, stereotypes 
and prejudices among other schemes as avenues to undo the claims of each other to the 
disputed land. Today, the trading of prejudices and stereotypes among the old and the young 
in Nkonya and Alavanyo has become commonplace. Once a Nkonya youth boasted to me that 
‘The Alavanyo men were lazy, so they go about looting farm produce from our 
farms. This is one reason why their women don’t want to marry them, but us. We 
are hardworking people.’143  
 
An elder from Alavanyo also told me:  
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‘These people (referring to the Nkonya) are known to be wicked and violent 
people among their own Guan kith and kin. They are also dishonest people who 
know that the land they are claiming as their own does not belong to them, but 
land that was discovered by our ancestors centuries ago.’144  
 
The penchant to embellish stories, to use stereotypes and prejudices to ground a range of 
‘attacks’ against each other, and to cast otherwise insignificant differences in an  anti-Nkonya 
or anti-Alavanyo frame has become a deep-seated characteristic of the two communities. The 
observation of Ametewe with regards to the politics of difference in this regard is elucidating:  
 
“The understanding of such relations of competition and conflict are the concepts 
of prejudice and stereotypes which express negative attitudes towards people or 
groups, other than the one to which one belongs. Such negative attitudes and 
perceptions, which some may consider as simply ethnocentric, are in fact 
psychological weapons in conflict relations; and which therefore give credence to 
the discriminatory behaviours towards the members of a target group.” (Ametewe 
2007:25).  
 
In general, people’s identification with their ethnic roots is not a negative tendency because 
all humans have the need to belong to a definite group and indeed, we owe a lot of our values 
and norms to our backgrounds. Ethnic identity can however become problematic (as is 
already happening among the Alavanyo and the Nkonya) and lead to tensions and social 
conflict between in-group and out-group members when a significant resource such as land is 
at stake.
145
 It is my contention that it is on the axis of in-group and out-group relationships 
that intergroup conflict is created, leading to identity politics as exemplified in the case 
involving the Alavanyo and the Nkonya (cf. Ashmore et al, 2001; Ametewe, 2007). In line 
with this reasoning, Davy (2011) opines that using autochthony to politicise ethnic identity 
(and vice versa) has become a powerful tool for contestations over land because when a group 
loses land, it has not only lost an economic resource, but also a place of identity and memory. 
The group’s rootedness is displaced and this displacement tends to occasion confusion over 
crucial issues of identity and history. Allodial ownership to land and a sense of belonging are 
thus significant aspects of inclusion, territory and identity (see also Lovell, 1998). Davy’s 
observation throws light on some of the reasons why autochthony and the mapping of social 
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 Tonah’s work (2002) among Kasena farmers and Fulbe agro-pastoralists also illustrates how a struggle over 
land between the two groups led to the use of prejudices to mar the identity of each group, thus exacerbating the 
conflict. 
 177 
barriers are politicised and essentialised in the land dispute between the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya.  
Today, as the land dispute is used to politicise the ethnic differences, the mutual socio-
economic and political encounters between the two groups, the reverse is also true; the ethnic 
differences and the mutual socio-economic relations between the two groups are also used to 
sustain resilience in the land dispute. In this way, the instrumentalisation of ethnic identity, 
the politicisation of autochthony, the making of barriers and the complications of belonging 
will continue to challenge relations between the two groups for a long time to come. For 
instance, a chief in Nkonya or Alavanyo with enormous chiefly power, or an elite with 
considerable social capital, would be prone to instrumentalising ethnic identity for a myriad of 
purposes. This observation throws light on the point made by Benjamin Kumbour, the then 
majority leader of parliament, that the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute is difficult to resolve 
because some ‘ethnic benefactors’ are providing guns to the people to kill each other (cf. 
chapter one).  
In this conflict, ethnic identity has become a double-edged sword. Some groups and 
individuals tap into it for good personal or collective interests, while some others are also 
tapping into it to fracture the efforts that have been made so far to stop the conflict. This 
dynamic underscores the instrumental use to which ethnic identity can be put and why this 
would continue to be a big part of the challenges making the land conflict insoluble.  
In Nkonya and Alavanyo another major social device for pushing autochthony claims 
and for politicising difference is language. Studies have shown that there is a strong link 
between language and identity (cf. Urciuoli, 1995). In the two communities, some of the 
factors responsible for the politicisation of language can be traced back to the genesis of 
Christian missionary activities in the Volta region under the German colonial administration. 
As in most parts of Africa, education in this part of Ghana started with the churches. The 
importance of language to education and evangelisation was emphasised from the outset. 
Amenumey (2011: 174) explains that 
 “Sometime after the missionary societies began their work, they realised that it 
was necessary to learn the local languages. It was considered necessary to study 
these languages in order to spread Christianity through books to be written in 
these languages or translated into them. Accordingly, the missionaries began the 
scientific study of these languages”.  
 
In the Volta region, the grammar and the orthography of the Ewe language was written 
by the German colonial administration to facilitate relations with the local population and for 
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the purposes of education and evangelisation. Eventually, in Ghana and Togo, Ewe became 
the ‘lingua franca’ and minority ethnic groups such as the Nkonya, Likpe, and Santrokofi 
among others, were obliged to learn Ewe as it was the only medium of trade and commerce, 
of teaching in schools and of marital and other socio-economic exchanges. Till today, while 
most Nkonya speak Ewe, many Alavanyo do not speak Nkonya at all because there is no 
compelling reason for them to do so, as Ewe is spoken everywhere in the Volta region.  
Drawing on her work among Ewe groups in Peki and other parts of the Volta region, 
Meyer (2002) has demonstrated that when the North German missionaries or the 
Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft (NMG), took over missionary activity in the Volta region, 
NMG inspector D.F.M. Zahn stressed the importance of writing and the use of the local 
language in all transactions with the local Ewe population. This went against the 
Germanisation of the Ewe that some German administrators wished for (Meyer, 2002:173). 
Meyer illustrates further that among the German colonial officials it was believed that the 
Ewe people were not only in need of salvation, but that the language itself needed to be saved, 
for the Ewe had been far away from God and this had rendered their language poor. 
Although the prevalence of Ewe is a product of the German colonial administration, 
today, as in the recent past, the Nkonya have been redefining the prevalence of Ewe as a form 
of domination or a “neo-colonial” activity by the Ewe in general and the Alavanyo in 
particular. The Nkonya argue that the dominance of Ewe gives the Alavanyo a socio-
economic and political edge/power over them when it comes to social and political 
transactions, especially at the local and regional levels. If anything at all, the Nkonya say it is 
the autochthonous language that has to be used and not the language of ‘strangers.’ The 
reaction of the Nkonya points to the fact that in the context of conflict, disputants can reach 
for anything material or symbolic, and instrumentalise that to reach predetermined goals or 
interests as the theories of Lentz and others illustrate. In the bigger picture, however plausible 
the argument of the Nkonya might be, it fails to appreciate the historical complexities 
underpinning the pervasive usage of Ewe in the Volta region, as I have tried to explain above.  
In Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, language is a powerful tool not only for negotiating 
and navigating interpersonal relationships, but also for building and sustaining ‘fields of 
opportunity’ in the competitive arenas of economics, politics, property and religion. 
Unsurprisingly, it is in these fields that borders are created and sustained through the politics 
of difference and power. The connection between language and identity and the tensions they 
can create is aptly articulated by Maganga et al, (2007), in their work in an agrarian 
community in the Morogoro district in Tanzania:  
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“A people’s identity is closely related to language usage, both in relation to how 
they perceive themselves, as well as how they are perceived by other people. A 
number of studies have noted how language usage and identity can reflect tension 
between different social groups….” (p. 208). 
 
In this land conflict, language has become a vital tool for instrumentalising and 
politicising difference in the private and public spheres of the social encounters between the 
two groups. I give one example to illustrate this point. One of my interlocutors told me that, in 
the distant past, the two communities had joking relations that fostered sociality between 
them, even though this is no longer the case today. In this joking relation, the Nkonya called 
the Alavanyo oklifefo, i.e., people tied and sold
146
. In the same joking spirit the Alavanyo 
called the Nkonya Nkonya lalang, i.e., the Nkonya are dumb. These playful expressions 
carried no ill feelings on either side. Presently however, because of the impact of the land 
conflict on the social relations between the two communities, this is no longer the case. 
Whereas the older generation has a deeper understanding of the jokes, younger people are 
rather interpreting them as invectives. In fact, one of my interlocutors intimated that at one of 
the mediation committee meetings at Ho, it was explicitly said that this joke was hurting the 
sensitivities and sensibilities of some people and should stop. Given that in the past joking 
relations promoted flexible barriers of sociality between the two communities, their inability 
to continue to do so is a major fault line. In the two communities, so the people say, joking 
relations are a manifestation of acceptance by the autochthon of the non-autochthon group and 
vice versa. Locally this is expressed as ‘they have opened their hearts to each other’ or wo wu 
wo fe dzime na wo noewo in Ewe. The ‘death’ of joking relations between the two groups is 
therefore a signal of the death of the paths and norms on which disagreements/conflicts can be 
resolved with greater negotiation, and the axis around which agreements and social interactive 
relationships can be nourished with greater flexibility.  
About two decades ago, the Ghanaian government introduced a national educational 
policy in which local languages and not only the major ones such as Ewe, Twi and Dagbanli 
were to be taught in all schools at the lower primary level in all districts. This programme was 
to make Ghanaians aware of the importance of local languages in everyday interaction and to 
prevent local languages from being crowded out by the English language. Somehow, the 
Nkonya took advantage of this national plan and began to instrumentalise the process to 
reemphasise the need for the people of Nkonya to return to the Nkonya language. This move 
(as I was later to understand) was not because they felt there was compelling need to do so 
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(for most Nkonya speak Ewe), but primarily to differentiate themselves from the Ewe and to 
assert their uniqueness and place in the geopolitical dynamics of the conflict and other 
activities in the area. It was also believed that using the Nkonya dialect in schools rather than 
Ewe would offer the younger generation a sense of rootedness and ultimately offer a path for 
strengthening in-group relations and weakening negative out-group encounters.   
During fieldwork, however, I discovered that within the Christian 
denominations/persuasions in the area, different languages are used for services and for 
evangelisation. In one Catholic Church in Nkonya-Tayi, the Twi language (which is widely 
spoken in the Ashanti region), but also Nkonya and Ewe were used simultaneously during the 
same church service. One church elder told me that “in doing this, our services enrich the 
members because all members of the community can be reached through the agency of the 
three dialects/languages.” This observation reveals that the effort by the Nkonya to reassert 
and to differentiate themselves from the Alavanyo through the agency of language is in reality 
unimportant or unnecessary as the above example attests. Over all, the politics of language is 
another illustration of how the two groups are creating and sustaining language differences in 
order to ground claims of autochthony which invariably have been making relations between 
the two problematic.  
In most parts of Africa, (if not all), intermarriages constitute a very significant avenue 
for settling different disputes such as land and political conflicts that would otherwise have 
been difficult to resolve. Kwam (2008: 234) argues that in the distant past, in Africa: 
“Marriage was considered not only the unification of two individuals and the 
integration of two families, but also a promise of peace and cooperation destined 
to seal durable relations between their communities. It represented the true birth of 
new forms of peaceful relations in the midst of which individuals committed 
themselves never to fight each other, at least directly, and to avoid shedding the 
blood of members of the new group which had just been formed”. 
 
The observation of Kwam provides an eloquent perspective on why the people of Alavanyo 
and the Nkonya have intermarried (and may continue to do so) in spite of the ongoing land 
dispute. There is no doubt that intermarriages offer a socio-cultural platform for communities 
at war with each other to resolve their differences, to cement relationships into long-lasting 
union, and to minimise the possibility of a future conflict ever destroying their relations. In 
many Ghanaian communities, intermarriages have (and continue) to serve as a conduit for 
settling different forms of conflicts. But, why then have the Alavanyo and the Nkonya failed 
to use intermarriage to deal with their differences over the land dispute? Obviously the 
continuing existence of the land dispute itself is a big hindrance, but I also argue that as 
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intermarriages constitute grounds for settling different disputes, they also constitute grounds 
for creating new disputes especially when land is at stake. The experience of one of my key 
informants and a chief in Alavanyo elucidates this point:  
“I was married to a woman in Nkonya, but I lost my wife or nsronye in Ewe with 
whom I had two children to the land conflict because some of my people were 
suspecting that I have been passing vital information through my wife to the 
Nkonya people because I am married to their daughter.”147  
 
The complications resulting from intermarriage are bigger, however, than the sentiments of 
the chief, because today the intermarriages have become a hub around which social barriers 
and differences are mapped and integrated into different social settings. In an interview with 
some Nkonya youth, they shared with me that they had been cautioned by some elders to be 
careful in dating Alavanyo women because “the Alavanyo are not like ‘us’, ‘they’ hate us and 
‘they’ don’t want ‘us’ to have our land.” Given that suspicion, doubt and retaliatory action 
have become common vehicles of sustaining resilience in this conflict, one would not be 
wrong in saying that elders in Alavanyo would equally ask their young men and women to be 
wary in dating Nkonya women and men. The struggle with intermarriages betrays a certain 
duality, namely, that while on the one hand the Alavanyo and the Nkonya appreciate the 
intermarriages between them, they are also seeing them as dangerous social transactions that 
can weaken their resolve to claim the disputed land. This perception of the Nkonya of the 
Alavanyo and vice versa, has fostered a daily social praxis in which both communities 
continue to cast each other in a negative light among themselves and before outsiders.  
At a deeper level, these castigations appear to be devices by the two communities to 
strengthen in-group relations against out-group members in the context of intergroup conflict 
over the disputed land, power and identity challenges (cf. Ashmore et al, 2001). Boni’s (in 
Kuba & Lentz, 2006) research among the Sefwi in the western region of Ghana demonstrates 
a similar challenge where locals who claim autochthonous status try to use intermarriages 
which have taken place centuries ago to differentiate between them and the non-autochthon 
on the grounds of land struggles. Obviously, this occasioned numerous social problems 
because as Geschiere (2009) has observed, any attempt to define and apply any category of 
autochthony at close range would lead to fierce disagreements and suspicions of faking. 
Broadly speaking, this observation explains why in spite of the social and geographic 
closeness between the Nkonya and the Alavanyo, they have not been able to use intermarriage 
to resolve the land dispute, but have rather been using it to create social barriers thereby 
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making a liveable relation between them palpably problematic. On the other hand, I argue that 
however strong the conflict may be, it would be difficult to completely destroy intermarriages 
between the two communities. In fact, during research, I met youth from Nkonya and 
Alavanyo who are dating women or men from either side in total disregard for the cautions of 
elders that they be wary. Nevertheless, one cannot also ignore the challenges involved in the 
intermarriages as the story of the chief on the previous page attests. Similar challenges were 
equally expressed among some women married on both sides of the divide as already 
demonstrated in chapter four. 
However, as the battle over the disputed land intensifies, both communities are going 
to continue to see everything bad/wrong with the intermarriages. Eventually, the politicisation 
of difference through intermarriages is not only going to impact on prevailing marriages and 
make it difficult for children begotten from either side to relate well with relations on the 
opposing side, it is also going to block the possibilities of constructing new ones. 
Additionally, as this practice is deeply entrenched in the communities, it would deny the two 
groups the possibility of using intermarriages to handle even minor disputes, let alone the 
bigger land dispute which is ongoing.  
 
5.3. DE-EMPHASISING DIFFERENCES AND SOCIAL BARRIERS  
 
The central argument here is to demonstrate that the challenges of autochthony can be 
properly handled when the two feuding communities of Nkonya and Alavanyo begin to de-
emphasise their differences and the social barriers that are making belonging between the two 
difficult. I will draw on two examples to drive home my point.  
In the first place, there is no doubt that over the years, the challenges of autochthony 
have been complicated by the physical boundary that generated the conflict. Today, however, 
I argue that it is not the physical boundary that is shaping and reshaping the actualities of 
autochthony claims, but rather the social barriers that are constructed and applied in different 
social settings by the two communities. The social barriers have become a resilient obstacle in 
the effort by both groups to deal with issues of autochthony and their differences in a non-
politicised manner. The resilience factor rests on the fact that more generally, borders have a 
ring of ambivalence around them and as such are very difficult to cross. They offer grounds 
for healthy cultural interchange and at the same time constitute a basis for unproductive 
human interaction. It is this ambivalence that seems to stifle, disturb and block any attempt at 
crossing the barriers imposed by autochthony claims on both sides of the divide. Nevertheless, 
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during my fieldwork in the latter part of 2012 and in mid- 2014 when I returned to Nkonya 
and Alavanyo, I discovered that in spite of the uncertainties of the social environment and the 
culture of fear and suspicion among the generality of the population, there is a strong desire 
(especially among some of the youth and women) for a return to the healthy, friendly 
relationships that once gave them access to each other and to the land. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the fervour for the ‘good old days’ has motivated two intergroup 
associations, namely Nkonya and Alavanyo Queen Mothers Association and the Alavanyo-
Nkonya Peace Committee of North America (ANPC), to draw on the good will among them 
to try to de-emphasise their differences in order to negotiate new ways of “practicing” 
autochthony and belonging.  
First, I see the Nkonya and Alavanyo Queen Mothers Association, which never existed 
prior to the events of 1983, as illustrative of the effort by both groups to de-emphasise their 
differences, the social barriers that divide them, and to negotiate common grounds of mutual 
purpose and interaction. Although, in the political hierarchy of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya 
Queen-mothers and women more generally do not hold much power to influence geopolitical 
decisions about the land conflict, their ability to help de-escalate hostilities and tension 
following the 1983 events and those of recent times indicate that given a change in 
perspective and roles, the queen mothers association can still influence efforts that are made 
to address the challenges of autochthony and the land dispute in general. The observation of 
Yakohene (2012) on the role of women in the peace building process lends credence to this 
assertion: 
“Through their own initiatives, they also created activities which they carried out 
in the communities to share knowledge about the impact of the conflict on them; 
encourage other women to be part of the peace process; and to give peace a 
chance. Additionally, using a gender-sensitive approach to the peacebuilding 
process…… the attitude of the women folk in general helped in the push for 
peace…” (Yakohene, 2012: 74-75).  
 
Secondly, following the escalation of the conflict in early 2013, the Alavanyo-Nkonya 
Peace Committee of North America (ANPC) addressed a four point communique
148
 to the 
government, the traditional authorities, the youth groups and the religious bodies that were 
working for peace in the two communities. The ANPC stated in the communique that the two 
communities should:  
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America to serve as a unified mouthpiece on issues pertaining to their respective communities, and to foster 
friendship and good neighbourliness at home and abroad.  
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“exercise maximum restraint in the current fluid situation, 2, desist from 
provocation and all forms of violence, 3, expose and report to security agents any 
citizens with intent to disturb the peace and 4, return to the negotiation table to 
work towards total peace” (cf. 
www.ghanaweb.com/ghanahomepage/diaspora/artikel.php).  
 
While the elements of the ANPC communique are not very new because some groups 
and individuals have echoed them before, the fact that the two opposing groups in the 
diaspora de-emphasised their differences to form a group that sought to negotiate grounds for 
crossing the borders and boundaries generated by autochthony claims was something novel 
and significant. I think there is something positive in the action of the diaspora for it signals a 
frontier behaviour that can open a new beginning of intercommunity interaction that would 
make living together on the same parcel of land possible. The objectives of the queen mothers 
and the diaspora point to the fact that both groups are deeply concerned about the current state 
of social relations and the continuing impact of emphasising autochthony and barriers on the 
future of events in the two communities. For the diaspora in particular, if things continue to be 
in disarray they would not have a home to return to when they want to go home.  
In the larger analysis, the two associations have emphasised symbolically as well as 
practically the possibility of crossing social barriers whose flux and flow have been stifled by 
claims of autochthony, differences and problems of belonging. Thus, while it seems patently 
obvious that autochthony claims and challenges of mutual belonging are constantly leading to 
a politicisation of difference, from another spectrum the differences between the two groups 
can also become grounds for negotiating a unified action exemplified in the formation of the 
two associations. In my opinion, when social relationships between two communities or 
individuals grow cold, all the elements that sustain the relationship also grow cold. Today, 
this is what is happening in Nkonya and Alavanyo and that is the reason why the two groups 
can no longer ‘eat’ together. The two illustrations also indicate that while claims of 
autochthony freeze, control and exclude others in the pursuit of the disputed land, and also 
threaten identities and livelihoods, there is still a glimmer of hope that these challenges or 
barriers can be crossed when the two communities de-emphasise their differences and seek 
the commonalities that make meaningful social and intercultural exchange between them 
possible.  
Hence, the argument I have been advancing so far is not to downplay the salience of 
the arguments the two communities have been pushing forward with respect to autochthony 
and first comer claims, but to underscore how and why a non-conflictual relationship is of 
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vital importance to any engagement that would try to de-emphasise their differences, improve 
relations between them and deal with the challenges of autochthony.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that in the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute, challenges of 
autochthony, borders and the politicisation of difference are salient issues that are protracting 
the conflict. In Ghana, and in many other cultures, socio-cultural differences or diversities are 
respected because they serve as resources for engendering peaceful and harmonious relations 
between individuals and among groups. However, differences can also engender disharmony 
and lead to conflict when groups and individuals such as the Alavanyo and the Nkonya begin 
to instrumentalise them to give weight to claims of autochthony and first comer status in order 
to claim the disputed land.  
I have also shown that the ‘rituals’ or activities that are sustaining claims to 
autochthony, complicating belonging, and enforcing a politics of difference, are expressed 
through markers or entities. In my observation of the social and political relations between the 
two communities, the instrumentalisation and politicisation of the avoidance rule of 
circumcision, ethnic identity issues, language differences between the two groups, and issues 
of intermarriage, have emerged as markers for advancing claims of autochthony and thereby 
the disputed land. While on the surface the markers may constitute normal differences of 
everyday life, the penchant of the Nkonya and the Alavanyo to instrumentalise these markers 
to sharpen their differences is largely responsible for the construction of the social barriers 
which are making it difficult for the two groups to coexist. In Ghana, this is not so surprising 
because the proclivity of groups and individuals to instrumentalise ethnic identity or language, 
especially in resource conflicts such as land, is a huge problem constituting a major challenge 
to dealing with such conflicts (see Tonah, 2000; Lentz, 2003). This issue would continue to 
impact on efforts by the Alavanyo and the Nkonya to de-emphasise their differences as they 
try to transcend the politics of autochthony and first comer narratives.  
Furthermore, I have endeavoured to show that the resilience associated with 
autochthony and struggles of belonging are partly rooted in the worsening condition of social 
relations between the two communities. A breakdown in constructive social relations between 
individuals or groups tends to create unhealthy social barriers such as ‘we’ and ‘them’ or 
‘they’ and ‘us’ which are then exploited by the group members or individuals for goals that 
tend to widen rather than close the social divisions. This dynamic, as Lentz (2013) observes, 
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is so strong because “the power of autochthony discourses rests precisely on the latitude they 
offer in redefining boundaries according to changing contexts and interests” (p. 180). In my 
opinion, it is the agency of powerful actors such as chiefs and elders in Nkonya and Alavanyo 
who continue using their power to redefine autochthony that is complicating any effort at 
transcending the social differences between the two communities. This narrative would not 
only continue to protract the land dispute, it would also make the efforts of groups such as the 
Queen Mothers Association and the Alavanyo-Nkonya Peace Committee of North America to 
de-emphasise their differences and to improve social relations between the two communities 
impossible. On the other hand, if social groupings among the various segments of the two 
societies such as the youth, clan, elders, marital relations, etc. become more unbounded and 
undifferentiated, the more the willingness of the two groups to de-emphasise their differences 
and engage in healthy cross-cultural interaction can emerge (cf. Cohen, 1969).  
At the end of the day, the challenges of autochthony and belonging between the 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya demonstrate that in Ghana, autochthony claims and how they can 
sometimes be ‘invented’ and remain resilient especially in land conflicts, will continue to 
remain a significant factor engendering not only land struggles, but also struggles over 
identity, power and belonging among groups for a long time to come. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LOCAL PROCESSES, COURT VERDICTS AND STATE INTERVENTIONS: THE 
POLITICS OF COLONIAL AND POST COLONIAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE 
NKONYA-ALAVANYO LAND DISPUTE 
INTRODUCTION  
In Africa, the arbitrariness and ambiguities inherent in the creation of colonial 
boundaries form some of the drivers of land disputes within and between countries. As most 
local and urban communities continue to expand within and across boundaries in search of 
agrarian possibilities, or political and territorial control, the continent suffers more from 
boundary and land conflicts. Boundaries are conflictual, but they also constitute arenas of 
power, identity, agency, representation and authority over persons, space and property. And it 
is the delicate challenge of properly navigating these socio-economic and political fields that 
has often generated the protracted land boundary conflicts that characterize most African 
societies from precolonial times till today.   
In the particular case of Ghana, Christian Lund, Sara Berry and Richard Crook among 
others, have argued that land conflicts seem not to end, but that they only ‘hibernate’ instead, 
only to be reactivated when disputants/contestants can capitalize on changes in their economic 
power, or on alterations in local and state politics, history and in the ‘opportunities of the 
moment’, to make renewed claims (cf. Lund, 2008). The 100 year old Nkonya-Alavanyo land 
dispute is one of the land conflicts in Ghana in which the two disputing communities have 
been drawing on all these factors to advance arguments in support of their claims to the 
disputed land.  
The burden of this chapter is to critically examine the factors that are responsible for 
the current insolubility of the conflict and also offer some suggestions as to how the land 
conflict may eventually be resolved. The chapter will be divided into six parts.  
In the first part, I will present and draw on the theoretical perspectives of some 
scholars who have done extensive work on land related conflicts and show why their analysis 
inspires the lines of this chapter. The local efforts that have been attempted through traditional 
authorities and other actors will form the substance of the second part. An analysis of the 
court verdicts will be made in the third part. In the fourth part, an examination of why the 
various efforts by the state to resolve the dispute from the colonial period till today, have been 
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unsuccessful will be treated. In the fifth part, I will present the arguments and counter-
arguments of the contesting parties and how these have been feeding the politics of resistance 
and insistence which today aptly characterizes the conflict. In the sixth part, I will proffer 
some suggestions or ideas that can assist mediators, the state and policy makers to go beyond 
the politics of resistance and insistence and to assist the communities of Alavanyo and 
Nkonya to resolve the land dispute. I will present my final arguments in the conclusion.  
6.1. RESOLVING LAND DISPUTES: SOME PERSPECTIVES 
 
In most parts of Africa, it is true that land disputes constitute one of the major 
challenges impacting on the moral and political economy of land rights and tenure 
reforms/systems. These land disputes are often predicated on a number of factors among 
which are the bad application of the very rights in tenure systems that are supposed to 
eliminate the possibilities of the occurrence of conflicts.  
In precolonial Ghana, as in other African countries, land palavers were resolved 
through local ritual processes in which the primary objective of the arbitrators (mostly chiefs 
and elders) was not to seek for the offender and the offended, and to punish the former, but to 
adopt a conciliatory approach that would resolve the dispute between the contesting parties 
and eliminate the possibilities of revenge. Some of my informants intimated that this process 
was not without challenges as some elders twisted information in favour of a particular party 
against another. Today, the impact of social change, the increasing mistrust of chiefs and 
elders by the local community, and the complexities of dealing with land disputes, has eroded 
the salience of this approach. Thus, in the colonial period when the state courts emerged, 
locals who were dissatisfied with the local dispute resolution methods started taking their land 
disputes to the state courts. Here, one may argue that while local and state courts are generally 
perceived to be ‘centres of justice’ they often prove to be unable to resolve land cases with a 
note of finality or conclusiveness. With respect to state courts, several theories have been 
advanced to explain why in most cases they are unable to bring land palavers to a conclusive 
end. I draw on a few of these theories to explain what is going on with the Alavanyo-Nkonya 
land dispute.   
Dwelling on his research in northeast Ghana, where chiefs and earth priests compete 
over claims and rights to appropriate and expropriate land, Lund (2008), shows how land 
conflicts remain inconclusive even after the courts have ruled over them. He argues that in 
this part of Ghana (and perhaps in other regions as well), claims to land and property are 
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contingent on the political context (on the state and the local level) from which they emerge. 
Lund analyses how different actors exploit the context to refuse or shift verdicts in their 
favour. As a general rule, chiefs in northern Ghana do not manage land; it is customarily the 
preserve of land chiefs or earth priests, the tendamaa. Chiefs, however, began to manage land 
on behalf of the colonial administration when the colonial powers decided to take over all 
lands in northern Ghana. Thus, when the 1979 constitution spelled out that lands in the north 
should be reverted back to the ‘rightful owners’(who were not easy to identify), a huge land 
struggle between chiefs and earth priests emerged, sometimes also involving the state. This 
land struggle led to numerous and persistent court cases in which the interest of contestants 
(groups and individuals) in land and property ownership and their economic circumstances 
became decisive factors for how one could win or lose a land case. Lund demonstrates that 
“although arguments are often carried forth with reference to precedent and the past, the right 
moment for pressing a particular claim depends on the contemporary political constellations 
that can recognize claims as valid” (2008:182). The validity of claims was, however, not easy 
to determine, thus most of the cases ended inconclusively, meaning that a refusal/denial of 
right to land is ‘suspended’ to be reactivated in the future when new ‘opportunities’ to do so 
emerge. Thus, ‘opportunism’, vigilance, and appropriateness are very decisive tools in land 
struggles, and this not only in the northeast as Lund suggests, but also in other parts of Ghana.  
Berry’s works (2001, 2002) among the Ashanti corroborates Lund’s position in a 
number of ways. She argues that the resolution of land disputes is rarely complete. On the 
contrary, they are subject to negotiation, realignments and contestations, hence their enduring 
character. Berry reasons that land conflicts are often difficult to resolve because land struggles  
“…constitute arenas of simultaneous struggles over wealth, power and 
knowledge. Inherent in every conflict over who should get access to a particular 
tract of land, on what terms, are simultaneous and interrelated struggles over who 
should decide how land is to be allocated and used, on what basis” (Berry 
2001:108).  
 
Here, Berry demonstrates how chiefs who have custodial authority over stool lands 
become judges in land struggles in which they themselves are involved alongside their 
subjects, a situation which invariably turns the chiefs into winners and the subjects into losers. 
The arguments of Berry are fundamentally built on the same issues of power and authority 
that Ubink (2008) also addresses in her work on southern Ghana. Examining power relations 
between chiefs and the local population in relation to land, she observes that the near absolute 
power of chiefs, exemplified through the multi-interpretation of customary law about land 
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issues, gives them too much control in arbitrating land cases. This is why land verdicts in the 
local/traditional courts are difficult to implement as decisions are arrived at on the grounds of 
what she calls the “political factor”, i.e., the power forces at play at the local level. According 
to this author, in a scenario like this, the state courts become the strongest alternative form of 
‘resistance’ to verdicts in the local courts for the powerless, whose means of power has been 
eroded by the increasing power of chiefs and the state’s non-interference policy in land 
matters. Ubink also indicates that the challenge of cultural pluralism in relation to customary 
land practices and legal pluralism in relation to state laws on land cases in the courts have 
been the bane of legal systems in Ghana when it comes to court cases, not least those 
involving land.  
Furthermore, Crook’s (2004) research on court systems and land cases in three regions 
of Ghana, namely Kumasi High Court, Wa High Court and Goaso Community Tribunal 
reveal that family land disputes based on inheritance issues among children of deceased 
families or between widows and children were topmost among the cases, and locals generally 
prefer the courts to chiefs, elders or the police in spite of all the challenges involved in taking 
cases to court. According to Crook, this happens because the courts are perceived to enforce 
verdicts, act neutrally and be transparent. Facts on the ground however show that this is not 
always the case, as the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute demonstrates. The state courts are not 
‘havens of justice’ for they too are arenas of power games in which different  influential 
actors can ‘manipulate’ verdicts/outcomes to suit individual or group interests. In the end, 
Crook suggests that a multidimensional approach, consisting of the court system and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) systems, is more appropriate in dealing with land 
disputes and other cases.  
In other parts of Africa, the inconclusiveness of land related court verdicts resulting 
from unequal power relations continue to pose a problem to land tenure management or 
systems. In this connection, Kelly et al (2013) argue that in the Maasai region of Kenya, 
Maasai pastoralists who take land disputes to the state court do not get a hearing because 
powerful local elites, politicians and wealthy individuals who have great interest in land, pay 
their way to sustain their land claims, however dubious they might be.  
I find the theoretical positions of the above scholars very insightful as they illustrate 
why the resolution of land disputes is a complex matter which does not lend itself to neat 
schemes of negotiation, arbitration or resolution in the traditional courts, state courts or other 
processes of adjudication. In my estimation, power relations and issues of authority over 
property and persons are very decisive factors which continue to impact on land struggles. It 
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would take a combination of different but complementary theoretical and pragmatic 
approaches to resolve land conflicts. It is some of these approaches that I now want to 
examine.  
6.2. SETTLING THE LAND DISPUTE: PAST AND CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACHES 
6.2.1. Local Dispute Resolution: Seeking to Reconcile, not Seeking to Win 
 
All human societies have methods or rituals for settling disputes of different form and 
intensity. Land disputes or conflicts are however the most contentious of all cases, basically 
because of the indispensability of land to human livelihoods. This being the case, it is little 
surprise that land conflicts can run in some communities for centuries without resolution. The 
fundamental issue is the ‘right process or method’ that can be used to deal conclusively with 
protracted land conflicts of which the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute is an eloquent example. 
During fieldwork, my interlocutors related that the first recorded local effort to try and 
resolve the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute took place on Empire day in May 1923, but this 
attempt ended in mutual attacks in which people from both sides were physically assaulted.
149
 
This failed effort fractured the relations between the two communities as it revealed a 
weakness in the local methods adopted by the two communities to settle the land conflict. 
Within the communities of Nkonya and Alavanyo, there are clear processes for resolving land 
disputes/quarrels between and among groups and individuals within the family, clan or larger 
kin group. Intra-community conflicts/disputes are therefore handled with relative ease and 
facility. There is however no clear process of settling interethnic land disputes. In this regard, 
one of my informants, Efo Amegatse from Alavanyo, explained that  
“…we the Alavanyo and the Nkonya are two different people and even though we 
use the land for farming and other practices the same way, our customs vary with 
regards to the settlement of land disputes. Sometimes we take oaths by calling on 
our gods and ancestors to tell us who the rightful owner to a disputed land is, and 
we don’t have the same gods and ancestors. So there are customary differences 
that may not allow us to have a common ground to settle or resolve the land 
problem between us and the Nkonya.”150 
                                                          
149
 This day was celebrated in honour of the British Queen and the Empire, and as such was a non-working day 
when people of the Gold Coast in all communities were obliged to rest from work and to take part in the 
ceremonies. The Nkonya on the other hand decided that since this was a non-working day, it was the opportune 
time to go and retrace the conflicting boundary between them and the Alavanyo and to settle matters. This 
attempt did not work. Also, older informants intimated that already prior to the 1913 Gruner map, some 
unsuccessful local efforts to resolve the boundary conflicts between the two groups were made. 
150
 Interview with Efo Amegatse at Alavanyo-Kpeme, 7th July, 2014. Elders in Nkonya-Tayi expressed similar 
views in relation to land dispute settlements. 
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The explanation of Amegatse indicates that while there are cultural similarities 
between the Alavanyo and the Nkonya (which is why they have intermarried over the years), 
their differences become problematic when it comes to land palavers. In fact, during research 
I observed that it is within the framework of land matters in particular and disputes in general 
that the mettle of the social and political relations between the two communities is tested and 
challenged in the events of everyday life.
151
 The major reason for this situation is that over the 
years, the two groups have failed to build on the solidity and intensity of the cultural 
similarities and social relations between them to resolve the land dispute; rather, they have 
been sharpening and entrenching their cultural differences, thus eroding any possibility of 
settling the land conflict completely.  
In most parts of Africa, not least Ghana, the proclivity of groups and individuals to 
sharpen ethnic and cultural differences in the wake of disputes/conflicts is a common 
phenomenon. The story of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya is thus a manifestation of such a 
phenomenon which happens in other Ghanaian communities where ethnic and cultural 
differences in settling conflicts, especially those related to land, have been the grounds for 
tensions, killings and social unrest between individuals or communities. 
6.2. 2. Local Authorities and efforts to resolve the land dispute 
 
With the obvious breakdown of local methods and processes to settle the land dispute, 
the chiefs and elders of Alavanyo and Nkonya had come to their wits’ end until early 2003.  
At that time one of the violent escalations of the conflict compelled the Volta Regional House 
of Chiefs to appoint a three-member committee under the headship of the paramount chief of 
Buem Traditional Area to institute yet another local process of settling the land dispute 
between the two communities. The committee’s work did not settle the land dispute, but its 
effort led to the calming of tensions and the reduction of hostilities in the area (cf. GT, 
22/3/03). This however did not last long as the two communities started attacking and 
confronting each other.  Only very feeble efforts could be made at this stage because the two 
communities had taken hardened positions on the land dispute, making it difficult for any 
mediation process to take place.   
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 In spite of this, some of my interlocutors have argued that local skills and procedures for settling intra-
community land conflicts could be applied successfully to intercommunity ones involving disputants from both 
sides of the divide who are intermarried or have other close relationships. 
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More recently in early 2013, when the conflict escalated again amid a lot of violence 
and hostilities, the Regional House of Chiefs again intervened in the matter. This time 
however, the House of Chiefs did not form any committee to mediate in the conflict and to 
tackle the thorny issues stalling peace in the area, but rather issued a series of threats and 
sanctions to the paramount chiefs and peoples of Nkonya and Alavanyo if they did not do 
something about the conflict (cf. chapter three). In my view, the threats and sanctions from 
the House of Chiefs were a desperate measure by a desperate leadership disenchanted by the 
fact that over the years, their efforts to try to mediate and settle the land dispute had not met 
with success, but with resistance and a hardening of positions from the peoples of the two 
communities. Moreover, the customary land practice in Alavanyo and Nkonya, and indeed the 
whole of the Volta region of Ghana, where the appropriation and expropriation of land 
belongs to the heads of the families and the clans, and not local or paramount chiefs, 
diminishes the power of the Regional House of Chiefs to take a decisive action in the ongoing 
land dispute. They would be seen to be meddling in a local matter which is beyond their 
political and legal jurisdiction.  
Besides this, today local people have a huge doubt  about the authority, transparency 
and fairness of local chiefs and local dispute settlement ‘experts’ to use local conflict 
resolution procedures to adjudicate land conflicts in an unbiased fashion (cf. Ighosa in 
Zartman, 2000). This is why locals would, in spite of the many challenges involved in 
bringing a case to court, still prefer the state courts to the courts of chiefs and elders. Thus the 
ability of chiefs, especially those in Alavanyo and Nkonya, to leverage the authority and 
power they enjoy to solve land disputes in the communities is diminished or hampered by 
custom and tradition. The research of Berry (2001) and Ubink (2008) in the Ashanti region, 
however, illustrates that in this part of Ghana chiefs who take custodial care of land belonging 
to the community sometimes use their power to appropriate land for personal interests to the 
disadvantage of the peasantry, youth and women. In spite of this situation, in Ghana one 
cannot ignore the enormous influence of chiefs in land issues; they are still the medium 
between their peoples and the state when it comes to matters of land reforms and tenure 
systems.     
About a decade ago, when the state observed that land disputes were multiplying and 
overwhelming the courts, the government, with the support of local authorities instituted a 
new land reform project, i.e., the Land Administration Project (LAP) with the aim of reducing 
land disputes at the local and national levels. Under the guidance and supervision of the LAP, 
38 Customary Land Secretariats (CLS) were established to operate on a pilot basis in all ten 
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regions of Ghana. The land secretariats were to use alternative dispute resolution methods to 
adjudicate land disputes, provide land information (ownership, rights, use, etc.) to the public 
and so on.
152
 The secretariats are managed by chiefs, legal experts, planners, valuers/estate 
managers, and land surveyors where necessary. Analysts such as Ubink and Quan (2008) have 
observed that over the years, the resolution of land disputes through the CLS has been 
successful in certain areas such as the Ashanti region, but in other areas locals are contesting 
land related rulings of the CLS which are supposed to be conclusive in the state courts. A 
major reason for this contestation is that  
“In peri-urban Ghana, the chiefs and elders of certain communities have coalesced 
into an interest group that is reinterpreting customary land law to support today’s 
opaque, inequitable and somewhat convoluted system of customary land 
administration. In this system, chiefs’ administrative roles in land rights 
transactions enable them to appropriate community members’ interests for purely 
economic motives. The CLS objectives of enhancing transparency of land 
transactions and ensuring accountable and equitable land administration thus run 
counter to those of this interest group.” (Ubink & Quan, 2008:207). 
 
Besides, today it is realised that the system is both slow and lends itself to unequal power 
relations as observed above between poor land owners and rich landless people who try to use 
the power of money and political capital to appropriate land illegitimately. 
6.3. THE COURT VERDICTS 
TABLE OF COURT VERDICTS 
YEAR OF CASE WINNER OF CASE 
1953 
FIRST COURT CASE 
 
1957 RULING IN FAVOUR OF NKONYA 
1959 ALAVANYO APPEAL RULING 
1961 NKONYA INSTITUTES COURT ACTION 
1970 RULING IN FAVOUR OF NKONYA 
1970 ALAVANYO APPEAL RULING 
1975 RULING IN FAVOUR OF NKONYA 
1980 ALAVANYO APPEAL RULING 
1980 APPEAL QUASHED, VERDICT IN 
FAVOUR OF NKONYA, END OF LEGAL BATTLE 
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 Michael Nti Appiah’s (2011) work “Land dispute resolution in Ghana – Role of customary land secretariats: 
Case of Gbawe customary land secretariat” has provided an elaborate presentation of the functions of CLS and 
how they have been faring in the established regions in Ghana. See also Ubink & Quan (2008) on the same issue.  
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In chapter two, I elaborated how the appeal of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya to the 
British colonial officials to intervene in the land dispute failed to yield any good results. The 
failure of this effort and the collapse of local conflict resolution mechanisms pushed the 
Nkonya to take the matter to the Akpini native court ‘B’ located in Kpandu. Later, the case 
was transferred to the Lands Division of the High Court at Accra because at this time, there 
was a national plan to eventually abolish native courts by 1958 (cf. Amanor and Ubink, 
2008).
153
  
A verdict was eventually given in favour of the Nkonya. During the court proceedings, 
while the Nkonya pressed their case with the 1913 Gruner map, the Alavanyo pressed their 
case with a 1905 plan/map
154
 which was tendered in court but was rejected by the presiding 
judge Justice van Lare because:  
“The evidence on behalf of the defendants and the co-defendants that the true 
boundary was laid in 1905 is highly unsatisfactory and most unconvincing. This 
evidence is that of a witness Dornya who appears to give evidence from slippery 
memory of events of his personal knowledge when he was a child of 9 years.”  
 
Already at this first case, it seems that it was the Gruner map and not the 1905 plan 
that was going to remain resilient in establishing the boundary between the two communities. 
Today, while the Gruner map continues to be used as the major deciding tool for the Nkonya 
in their claim regarding the land dispute, its capacity to actually do so is still far from certain.  
In 1959, the Alavanyo who were aggrieved by the decision of the court appealed the 
verdict of 1957 at the Court of Appeal in Accra, but the move was unsuccessful.
155
 Again, on 
the grounds of the Gruner map, the presiding judge dismissed the case saying that if:  
“…the 1905 plan, is examined, it is clearly shown that it is not a Gruner map. His 
initials are on the roads and not on the six states and therefore obviously could not 
have been the plan which in the 1931 enquiry the parties had agreed as 
demarcating the boundaries of these states.”  
 
He also said; 
“Having found as a fact and as we have pointed out, there is ample evidence to 
support the finding that it was the 1913 plan which the defendants (Alavanyos) 
                                                          
153
 The events that led to the verdict of this case and the subsequent refusal of the Alavanyo to accept the verdict 
are elaborated in the second chapter of this work. 
154
 The 1905 plan known as “Karte von Togo” was meant to demarcate roads, villages and so on for a large 
geographical area stretching from Togo. Thus, it was not intended to demarcate ethnic boundaries between the 
two communities as was established with the Gruner map. This plan is in possession of the elders of both the 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya. 
155
 Cf. Civil Appeal no. 12/59, 1959, Appeal Court, Accra.  
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agreed to in the 1931 enquiry as forming the boundaries in question. We agree 
with the learned trial judge that the defendants are estopped “per rem judicatem” 
by the judgment in that enquiry from raising again the question of their 
boundaries.”  
 
Two things are worth commenting on in the statement of the presiding judge. First, the 
reference to 1931 must be understood against the background of the Forest Ordinance of 1927 
(cf. Oduro et al, 2011) in which parts of the forest areas of Ghana were to be conscripted into 
forest reserves. In Alavanyo and Nkonya, this exercise took place in 1931, when the forest 
area known as the Togo Forest Plateau was conscripted into a forest reserve by the British 
forester, Norton Jones. This done, both communities were barred from making new farms in 
the reserves but could keep the old ones. It is strongly argued by the Nkonya, whose position 
is supported by the presiding judge as mentioned above, that it was the Gruner map that 
served as the template/model for the conscription exercise which took place at the Togo 
Plateau Reserve Settlement Commission at Hohoe in which elders of the six states were 
alleged by the Nkonya to be present (cf. chapter four).
156
   
Second, the rejection of the 1905 plan and the injunction placed on the Alavanyo to 
refrain from ever raising the issue of the boundary again was disturbing news to them. 
Undoubtedly, this injunction gave the Nkonya a legal victory, but it did not offer the social 
victory they needed to take possession of the disputed land. Additionally, it seems the Nkonya 
could not also take possession of the land because the use of maps or topographical plans 
conflicted sharply with the worldview of the two groups about the structuring of space and 
boundaries as I have already elaborated in chapter two.
157
 Arguably, (at least in colonial 
times) the Gruner map was alien or foreign to the local perception or logic about how the two 
groups structure ‘spaces’ into ‘places’ or order the environment to respond to their cultural 
and socio-economic needs. This analysis in my view constitutes a significant factor for 
Alavanyo’s continuous rejection of the court rulings which have been generating attacks and 
counterattacks, and stalling farming activities upon which most families depend for 
livelihood.  
As the attacks by groups and individuals continued and with others trespassing into 
lands not properly negotiated, the Nkonya instituted a legal action in 1961 against individual 
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 During the proceedings the lawyer to the Alavanyo, Mr. Akufo Addo argued “that the appellants, when they 
agreed with the plaintiffs in the 1931 Enquiry with the boundaries as demarcated by Dr. Gruner, did not have in 
mind the 1913 demarcation but the 1905 one.” (cf. Civil Appeal No. 12/59, in the Court of Appeal, Accra, 
Ghana). 
157
 Land demarcations in these communities were flexible and could be subject to broad fields of negotiation and 
understanding. 
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Alavanyo farmers, this time at the High Court at Ho, the Volta regional capital, seeking to 
restrain them from trespassing onto their land.
158
 During the proceedings, the court had to 
restrain both the Alavanyo and the Nkonya from entering the disputed area until the case was 
finalized. This injunction was unpalatable to both groups and so it did not bring about peace 
but precipitated hostilities between the two communities instead. The Nkonya, who felt the 
previous court rulings went in their favour, insisted that the court should rather not have 
restrained them but only the Alavanyo from trespassing into ‘their’ land. In 1966, as the case 
was still in court, the presiding judge asked that a surveyor be employed to retrace the Gruner 
map and re-erect pillars as a way of further ascertaining the certainty of the Gruner boundary 
demarcations.
159
 
In December 1970, on the basis of the Gruner map, the case was finally adjudged in 
favour of Nkonya, and the Alavanyo were given one month to atone tenancy if they so 
wished, to continue working on the land. In his concluding words the judge said: “The 
impression one is left with is a strenuous bid by the defendants the Alavanyos to discredit 
once more the Gruner plan of 1913. I regret this third throw of the dice cannot yield the 
desired bonanza.”160  
 This is the third time the Alavanyo had lost the case, but convinced that the 
judgment was not fair, they appealed this ruling at the Court of Appeal in Accra. On the basis 
of the Gruner map and after a careful review of past verdicts which went against the 
Alavanyo, the case was dismissed in December 1975.
161
 While overall the verdict did not 
bring about a resolution of the land dispute, it gave the opportunity to seven Alavanyo farmers 
to enter into tenancy agreement with Nkonya who still have copies of the agreement.  
  In 1980, the Alavanyo decided to re-litigate the issue this time at the Stool Lands 
Boundaries Commission which deals with stool lands and not boundary disputes between two 
ethnic communities. It also has limited legal authority to enforce verdicts because it is only an 
administrative commission.
162
 At the end of the proceedings the commission gave a verdict 
against the Alavanyo, but ordered that the boundary be re-demarcated, something the Nkonya 
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 Cf. Suits no. 28-35/61, 1970, High Court of Justice, Ho, Volta Region.   
159
 One Henry Hagan (a familiar name among locals in the area) is a licensed surveyor who carried out the re-
demarcation exercise.  
160
 Cf. Suits no. 28-35/61, 1970, High Court of Justice, Ho.  
161
 Cf. Civil Appeal No. 112/74, 1975 in the Superior Court of Judicature, The Court of Appeal, Accra.  
162
 In Ghana, the movement from one adjudicating body to another is commonplace and manifests the desperate 
effort by groups and individuals to seek redress to land cases either in the state or local courts by every means 
possible. Thus, the case of the Alavanyo and the Nkonya is not uncommon, and represents a familiar discourse 
which in my view lends credence to the observations of Christian Lund, Richard Crook and Sara Berry that in 
Ghana land disputes tend to end inconclusively.  
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objected to, arguing that this was already done in 1966. To push the objection to its logical 
conclusion, the Nkonya took the matter to the High Court in Accra. Finally, in December 
1980, the order of the Stool Lands Boundary Commission was quashed. Thus, this ruling 
ended the legal battle between the Nkonya and the Alavanyo over the disputed land. Clearly, 
like the local efforts, the legal process also failed to settle matters between the two groups in a 
decisive way. According to Yakohene (2012), “the lack of enforcement of the rulings and the 
inability or failure of the agencies responsible for the enforcement created a derisory image of 
the judicial system” (Yakohene 2012: 64).  
 
6.4. STATE INTERVENTION AND MEDIATION COMMITTEES  
6.4.1. Colonial State 
The drawing of the 1913 Gruner map was the high point of the involvement of the 
German colonial administration in the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute. Although the map did 
not settle the land dispute, it offered some peace, however fragile it was, and indicated the 
colonial government’s involvement and preparedness to help settle the land dispute.  
By the 1920s, when the British had taken over the administration of the area from the 
Germans and the land dispute was still ongoing, the traditional authorities of Alavanyo and 
Nkonya appealed to the British colonial government to intervene and help solve the land 
dispute, but not much was achieved.
163
 It appears that the colonial state lacked the 
‘appropriate’ resolution mechanisms for solving the land dispute which according to their 
thinking was a local matter that chiefs could handle alone. I argue that the British colonial 
administration could have done more to help solve the land conflict between the Nkonya and 
the Alavanyo, if they had not been indifferent to local issues and excessively selective in what 
benefited the colonial project in their dealings with the local population.  
During fieldwork, some locals, especially those of the older generation, related stories 
about the style of German and British colonization and it was obvious that in general they 
were more appreciative of German colonial activities than of the British ones. One Kojo 
Fiave, 83, from Alavanyo-Agorme, told me: “The Germans taught us hard work, discipline 
and trades such as carpentry, masonry, and the Ewe language. The British on the other hand 
did very little for us and it was difficult to reach them.” In spite of this, there were informants 
who expressed a general dissatisfaction with both the German and the British colonial 
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 See chapter two for an elaborate presentation of the correspondence between the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, 
and the colonial administration, especially during British colonial rule. 
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systems, and blamed them for some of the land and chieftaincy disputes in the area today. In 
Ghana, the impact of German and British colonial activities on land and chieftaincy matters is 
felt across many parts of the country and does not only pertain to the communities of 
Alavanyo and Nkonya (see Apoh and Lundt 2013).  
6.4.2. The Post-colonial State and the Mediation Committees 
 
In the immediate post-colonial period, because the court cases were still ongoing and 
the state had other immediate bigger issues of national importance to attend to, it did not have 
either the luxury of time or the resources to intervene in a local land dispute, except to allow 
the court process to go on. Eventually, because the legal battle ended without any resolution, 
it gave vent to an opening which was exploited for different intentions by elite groups, 
politicians, individuals, and successive governments whose paramount interest was to amass 
votes in order to stay in power.  
The major issue that I see in the dynamic relations between the state and local 
communities in terms of land use practices is the state’s non-interference policy in chieftaincy 
and land issues, which in most cases are interconnected. More often than not, the non-
interference policy of the state has been affecting the power of successive governments to 
leverage their authority to end land and chieftaincy conflicts wherever they emerge (cf. Ubink 
& Quan 2008:203). It appears that, in the specific case of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, 
the state has shown interest in resolving it. But, the lack of political clout on the part of the 
government to confront the court rulings and the penchant of the two groups to keep 
reconstructing and redefining the contours of the dispute seem to have stifled the state’s 
intervention.  
From the 1990s, however, the state has provided funds and facilitated the setting up of 
mediation committees to help solve the land dispute. At other times security personnel have 
also been dispatched to the area to maintain peace and order. Presently, following the events 
that erupted in early 2013 (see chapter one), the area is still under curfew and there is security 
(the national army and the police) presence to maintain peace. 
6.4.3. The Acquah Committee 
 
The Acquah committee was appointed by the Provisional National Defense Council 
(PNDC) in November 1992 to investigate the land dispute and advise government on how to 
solve the conflict and bring lasting peace to the two communities. It seems however that the 
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committee could not carry out its work because hostilities began before they could actually 
address the issues. 
6. 4. 4. The Mireku Committee 
 
The Mireku committee was jointly appointed in March 1995 by the District Chief 
Executives (DCEs) of Hohoe (Alavanyo) and Jasikan (Nkonya) to inquire into and to resolve 
the land dispute. Later, the committee’s work ran into difficulties that also involved the DCEs 
and the local authorities in the area. In a letter written by the chairman of the committee and 
addressed to the DCEs and the peoples of Nkonya and Alavanyo, the committee lamented that 
 
“Both the District Administrations were not in the position to help us with 
transportation to facilitate our movements as all our requests fell on deaf-ears. 
Besides, we have as at the time of writing this letter not been paid any sitting 
allowances. Apart from a Minutes Book and files provided us to record the 
proceedings, we have to make our own provisions through individual 
contributions for the purchase of stationery. We had to pay messengers we sent 
out to distribute letters to the District Administration and all parties listed in our 
letter.”164  
 
Having to work under such difficult circumstances, the committee  
 
“Felt that the wide publicity in the media, radio and television news when the 
Committee was inaugurated on the 23
rd
 March, 1995 at Kpandu was to cash in 
cheap popularity by the authorities or they were to put us in the embarrassing 
situation in which we now find ourselves….”165 
 
In its interim report, the committee stressed among other things that the translation of the 
Gruner map on the ground is a sine qua non to reconciliation and the maintenance of peace in 
the two communities.
166
 The committee also said that “the implementation of the court’s 
decision will not help to promote peace between the two traditional areas.” At the same time it 
noted that it did not have power to set aside court decisions. Although the Mireku committee 
finally wrote a report, it was never implemented because both parties did not accept the 
findings and government could not force them on the people.  
                                                          
164
 This letter was written on the 15
th
 August, 1996 and signed by all five members of the committee and is in 
possession of the elders of Nkonya-Tayi, but I have a copy in my possession. 
165
 See also the letter of the committee dated 15
th
 August, 1996 earlier cited. 
166
 See interim report of Mireku committee dated 12
th
 January, 1996 to District Chief Executives of Hohoe and 
Kpandu. This letter is in possession of the people of Nkonya-Tayi, but I have a copy in my possession.  
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In my candid view, the complaints of the committee reveal a certain pretension which 
is this: while the District Chief Executives and the peoples of Alavanyo and Nkonya profess 
to want lasting peace in the area, they were not ready to commit funds, time and energy to see 
to the realization of this objective. One then wonders if the lack of commitment and the 
inconsistency in the actions of state and local authorities is not another compelling factor 
stalling the resolution of the land dispute.  
 
 
Figure 23. Some soldiers and police men deployed to Nkonya and Alavanyo to maintain peace, 1983 
and 2003. 
6.4. 5. Clergy-led Mediation Committee (2004 to date) 
 
This committee was formed with the collaboration of the people of Alavanyo and 
Nkonya when the Catholic Diocese of Ho, with support from central government through the 
Volta Regional Security Council, initiated efforts to help solve the land conflict. When the 
committee was inaugurated, many locals had great hopes that it was going to resolve the land 
conflict conclusively, but as indicated in previous chapters this was not to be.  
The fundamental objective/goal of the committee was to restore “peace and good 
neighbourliness to the Nkonya-Alavanyo area for the promotion of peaceful co-existence and 
for the reemergence of socio-economic development” (Yakohene, 2011:69). As the local 
conflict resolution techniques, the courts’ verdicts, and the work of other committees proved 
insufficient in resolving the dispute, this committee decided to do something ‘new’ by 
adopting a multi-sectorial approach in which chiefs, clergy men, queen mothers, lawyers, 
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youth groups and significant others, described as ‘strategic allies’ and spoilers,167 would all 
form the key promoters or engine of the mediation process. The committee adopted this 
approach because it wanted to bring on board a broad spectrum of the local and trans-local 
population/actors whose views and ideas could positively impact on the character of the 
conflict. Rt. Rev. Dr. Livingstone Buamah, a retired Moderator of the Presbyterian Church 
and chairman of the committee, told me in an interview that this approach  
“…was a way to encourage the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya to own the peace 
process, for as a committee we can’t bring them peace but to create the conditions 
that would promote peace. It was also to bring on board people whose voices they 
would respect and accept, and to help them tell the whole world that they have 
lived for centuries in peace, and are not going to continue to allow the land 
dispute to destroy the peace and harmonious relations they have been enjoying 
over the centuries.”168  
 
Through the committee’s effort, the chiefs and peoples of Alavanyo and Nkonya were 
emboldened and enabled to take far-reaching decisions with a view to anchoring peaceful 
coexistence. During fieldwork in 2012, it was obvious that human relations, mutual socio-
economic and agrarian activities had improved tremendously. However, the inability of the 
committee to confront the court rulings, the escalations and de-escalations of the conflict 
since late 2012 till today profoundly derailed the peace process.  
As the mediation process progressed, local authorities, the elite and the youth of the 
two communities started to accuse some members of the committee for taking sides in the 
conflict, abusing their leverage and blatantly ignoring the court verdicts. These accusations 
affected the name and integrity of the religious leaders (two Catholic bishops and the 
chairman mentioned above) whose leverage most locals and the state felt could be brought to 
settle the land dispute, but instead some were accused of siding with one party against the 
other. According to Zartman (2008), the accusation of mediators involved in mediating 
conflicts is not novel. He argues that in most cases, while mediation is meant to reduce the 
danger of escalation, define and narrow the boundaries of a conflict, identify trade-offs, and 
establish the agenda for eventual negotiations, thus increasing the chances of success for 
negotiations to take place, it often does not achieve the end envisaged because contestants 
tend to accuse the mediators of bias and of playing the ‘double.’ The failure of the religious 
leaders to lead the people of Alavanyo and Nkonya to peace also demonstrates that the belief 
                                                          
167
 See Darkwa et al, (2011) for an elaborate description of the activities, findings and recommendations of the 
Mediation committee to central government concerning how peace could be restored to the communities of 
Alavanyo and Nkonya, but which have so far not been implemented.  
168
 Interview conducted at Ho, May, 2012. 
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that religious leaders can bring their spiritual and moral weight to bear on conflicts, and to 
help resolve them, is not always a logical outcome, even though in places such as South 
Africa, religious leaders such as Rev. Desmond Tutu have succeeded in using their religious 
might to reconcile the people after the collapse of apartheid rule.  
My observations, however, indicate that the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute cannot be 
solved without a third party, and many locals and nonlocals with whom I interacted, agree 
with this assertion. This observation also resonates with the thoughts of David W. 
Augsburger, who in examining conflicts and how they are mediated across different cultures, 
suggested that “in any dispute, rarely can the two opposing parties design a constructive way 
out or a creative way through. A third party becomes essential, an outsider who does not 
contrive to think in an either/or manner or to apply conflict to resolve conflict” (Augsburger 
1992: 5- 6). A major problem in this particular conflict is how to find that “acceptable third 
party or outsider” who will transcend all boundaries and be acceptable to the two 
communities. This is a compelling factor that must be confronted if a third party effort would 
be relied upon to solve the conflict.   
6.5. THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE AND INSISTENCE: A TUG OF IDEAS OVER 
A TURF    
 
From the analysis above, it is obvious that the different unsuccessful efforts that have been 
made to resolve the conflict eventually led to a ‘politics of resistance and insistence’ which 
has been generating some interesting arguments that I want to examine, so as to elucidate 
further why the conflict has remained immune to all attempts to settle it.  
A major reaction to the legal verdicts which is pushed forward by the Alavanyo has 
become a political issue in which they argue that the first court verdict went in favour of the 
Nkonya because of their political affiliation to the CPP, the ruling party at the time (cf. 
chapter two for details). The Nkonya have objected to this argument by explaining that they 
won the land case not because they were amenable to CPP politics, but because the evidence 
they produced in court provided eloquent testimony that they were owners of the disputed 
land. They therefore won the case on merit and not on any political relationship.  
This however did not stop the game of resistance and insistence between the two local 
communities. So in 1997, in reaction to the findings of the Mireku committee, the Alavanyo 
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wrote an article in one of the national dailies,
169
 citing three colonial and post-colonial court 
cases to further buttress their continuous refusal/rejection of the court rulings.
170
  
First, the Alavanyo argued that Gruner himself “said corrections would have to be 
made to the map from time to time” (Cf. 5 WACA, 1939, p.14).  
In the second case they mentioned that  
“Their lordships note that the map is on a very small scale. That it is and must in 
the circumstances be doubtful whether it was intended to be used for the purpose 
for which the respondent seeks to use it viz, to set out accurately tribal boundaries: 
and that, moreover, it has been shown to contain inaccuracies…. In short, the map 
is of such a character that it would not be safe to draw an inference from it 
regarding the tribal boundaries now in dispute” (cf. 2 WACA, 1934, p. 26-27).  
 
Third, the Alavanyo also argued in reference to one court case in which Justice 
Francois, one of the judges who ruled in favour of the Nkonya in the 1970 court case, is 
lamenting “that the Gruner plan is vulnerable to the serious criticism of unreliability. It should 
not have been the basis of a decision” (cf. Civil Appeal No. 10/83, 1985, p. 12). On the 
grounds of this statement by the judge, the Alavanyo gave legal credence to their refusal to 
accept the court verdicts. Thus, in their thinking the judges erred in the 1970 case by ruling in 
favour of the Nkonya.  
A closer observation of the three different cases cited by the Alavanyo indicates that 
some doubts were raised about the authenticity and accuracy of the ‘Gruner map’ that formed 
the basis of the verdicts. It is also observable that the cases are about three different places of 
the Volta region. For instance, the first case cited above deals with a land dispute between the 
Tafi Atome and Djokpee, which are in the Volta region but not within the boundaries of the 
land dispute between the Alavanyo and the Nkonya. This observation raises serious issues 
about the reliability and plausibility of the cases cited by the Alavanyo. In my interaction with 
elders of Nkonya and Alavanyo, it appears that Hans Gruner drew many maps for different 
places in the Volta region which at the time were under the jurisdiction of the Germans.
171
 
The specific map that was drawn by Gruner and used to demarcate the boundary involving the 
six contiguous states reads in German as “karte sechsherren stokes” (bisher kunjagebirge 
genant) i.e., the land boundary of six states from the Nkonya Mountains (cf. Gruner map in 
chapter one).  
                                                          
169
 Ghanaian Times, February 15
th
 1997. 
170
 The three cases are: Nana Akpandja vrs Fiaga Egblomesse 5 WACA, 1939, 10-15, Kponuglo & Others vrs A. 
Kododja 2, WACA, 1934, 24-26, and Adu Kavenge & Others vrs Nana Akoto III Civil Appeal No. 10/83, 
25/02/1985.   
171
 The 1905 plan which was tendered in court, but was refused by the judges, was said to have been drawn by 
Gruner.   
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Over the years, the Nkonya have been reemphasizing that the ‘Gruner map’ mentioned 
by the Alavanyo in the above cases has nothing to do with the Gruner map that was used to 
demarcate the boundaries of the six contiguous states mentioned above. Thus, in the thinking 
of the Nkonya, the three cases referred to by the Alavanyo are once more an attempt to use the 
media to discredit the authenticity and veracity of the Gruner map and the court rulings. In 
this regard, a leading local authority in Nkonya reiterated that  
“If the Alavanyo are certain of the validity and legitimacy of the three cases they 
have referred to, they should take the matter to court since this is a legal issue and 
invite them. They should stop using the media to litigate or advance arguments to 
support their claims to the disputed land.”172  
 
The use of media conduits (internet, radio, television and various social media) by the 
Alavanyo as well as the Nkonya is an old tactic both have been employing to offer different 
registers of meaning about the conflict before the public, which in most cases have been 
engendering the politics of resistance and insistence in which both communities have been 
encapsulated. In my view, since the media (print and electronic) constitute a source of power, 
and news or information from the media is unquestionably taken as ‘truth and fact’, both 
communities will continue using the media to shape the matrixes that inform the politics of 
insistence and resistance.   
Additionally, during fieldwork, the argument by the Alavanyo that the Anya trees 
incontrovertibly point to the ‘true’ boundary between them and the Nkonya since precolonial 
times, continues to be reemphasised in different ways (cf. chapter two). But, till today, the 
arguments and counter-arguments based on the Anya trees have not succeeded in resolving the 
land dispute, but have only been enforcing and re-enforcing a politics of insistence and 
resistance which has become a defining feature of everyday description of the conflict.  
Another major activity which has been entrenching the culture of resistance and 
insistence in the land conflict is the agency of lawyers and local and trans-local actors, as 
mentioned in chapter three. Over the many years of the conflict, the  inability to maintain a 
consistent and sustainable path for resolving the land dispute has allowed actors such as 
lawyers, politicians and ‘spoilers’173 to unnecessarily interfere in the dispute. Often, these 
actors present themselves as ‘sons of the land’ who are seeking to bring peace to the people. 
Their actions however, run contrary to the peace they claim to bring because some among 
them have the penchant for building and spreading negative stories and contradictory 
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 Interview with Agya Kofi Nsiah, Nkonya-Tayi, July, 2014. 
173
 Yakohene in Darkwa et al, (2012) describe people who sell arms, loot farm produce and have generally been 
engaging in destructive activities as “spoilers.”  
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perceptions about the conflict for personal reasons. The agency of this group of actors has had 
(and will continue to have) a telling impact on the actualities of the dispute as they continue to 
encourage negative reactions among the youth and elders, thereby crowding out any attempt 
to solve the land conflict. It thus comes as little surprise when Yakohene (2011), commenting 
on the work of the clergy-led mediation committee, intimated that  
 
“One outcome of the mediation process reveals that perceived politicization of 
earlier peace processes led to the prolongation of the conflict. This is evident in 
the favouring of a political party, by parties to the conflict, to the detriment of 
other political parties. Politicians and government appointees have been accused 
of kowtowing to the needs of one party to the conflict to the relegation of the 
other. They are also known to have used the conflict as a campaign tool to secure 
votes during local and parliamentary elections by sympathizing with one party to 
the conflict” (p.80-81). 
 
Generally, in Ghana, the link between chieftaincy and land conflicts, and the covert or 
overt involvement of politicians in these conflicts, is commonplace and reveals why such 
conflicts tend to drag on for years (see Tonah, 2012). In the particular case of the Alavanyo 
and the Nkonya, in many instances today as well as in the past, both communities have taken 
advantage of the political relationship they enjoy with different political persuasions in the 
country, and especially the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and the benefits these 
relationships bring to keep renewing and repackaging narratives in order to lay claim to the 
disputed land. In my opinion, it is the latitude of political opportunism which both the 
Alavanyo and the Nkonya can tap into and the tactics of seizing the ‘merits of the moment’ to 
push forward claims that is partly responsible for some of the failed efforts to resolve the 
dispute.  
Moreover, it appears that as the mediation committees can only make 
recommendations to central government for implementation and cannot actually prosecute, 
the contesting parties have been exploiting this deficiency to keep telling competing stories 
that are more about reemphasizing earlier positions such as the court verdicts or Anya trees 
than paving the way for a new approach that can lead to a resolution of the land conflict. In 
my view, it is also this culture of producing and spreading narratives that go unchallenged that 
has been feeding or nourishing the politics of resistance and insistence.  
Locals I interviewed during fieldwork lamented the fact that today, in Nkonya and 
Alavanyo, there are groups and individual propagandists who are good at ‘cooking’ stories to 
soil the name and integrity of their opponents and to put them and their communities in a bad 
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light before locals and the Ghanaian public. This may not be surprising, for in conflict 
“enemies seem to confront one another more as objects or physical obstacles than as moral 
subjects” (Harrison 1993:1). These are some of the daunting socio-political challenges in 
which the dispute is embedded, and why today doubts are rife in the area and beyond, 
indicating that perhaps the land conflict may still take a long time to be resolved.   
 
6.6. BEYOND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE AND INSISTENCE: THE 
COMPROMISES AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
The above presentation suggests that the pendular movement of ideas, contestations 
and sentiments by the two competing parties points to the fact that there are no clear paths to 
resolving the dispute, and that there are thorny issues to be tackled if ever the conflict would 
be resolved. While I do not intend to outline a litany of recommendations to powers or 
authorities concerned with the challenge of solving the land dispute, I nonetheless want, on 
the grounds of my lengthy anthropological relationship with the people of Alavanyo and 
Nkonya, to offer some ideas or suggestions on how the two communities can go beyond the 
politics of resistance and insistence and to make the necessary compromises that have to be 
made and meet the challenges that have to be faced in view of solving the dispute.    
As already intimated in previous chapters and the above, the court verdicts are by far 
the major issue retarding efforts to resolve the land conflict and there is no easy way out of 
this dilemma. During fieldwork, it came up in my encounter with chiefs from the 
neighbouring towns of Akpafu, Santrokofi and some from Nkonyaland and Alavanyoland, 
mediation committee members, individuals and significant institutions such as (WANEP), the 
Ho Catholic Diocesan Peace Centre, both of which have played a facilitating role in the work 
of the dysfunctional mediation committee, that no mediation committee, individuals or group 
will succeed in resolving the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute if it fails to tackle the court 
verdicts. As Albert Ababio, an opinion leader of Nkonya living in Accra, said during an 
interview I had with him: 
 “…the court verdicts cannot be pushed aside as if they were the product of 
lawyers who did not know what they were doing or the judges err in passing 
judgment the way they did. To neglect the court verdicts and to create a new 
platform in terms of a mediation committee to solve the land conflict is not 
possible.”174  
 
                                                          
174
 Interview conducted in July, 2014 at Accra 
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I add my voice to the voices of this larger group to stress that the court verdicts should 
be addressed by every means possible through a credible and sustainable engagement between 
the state and local leaders and legal counsels of both communities and significant others. Over 
the years, groups and individuals involved in mediating the dispute know that confronting the 
court verdicts would be a significant step to resolving the land dispute, but they have either 
said they did not have the power to undo court verdicts or they simply navigated away from 
them.  
In confronting the court verdicts, two scenarios are likely to emerge. One, the Nkonya 
could be convinced to put the court verdicts aside and to accept an out of the court settlement 
if this process would give credence and respect to their claim as land owners. In this case the 
Alavanyo would then have to negotiate for more land from the Nkonya. Two, the issue could 
go back to court (which the Nkonya have been advocating), and if it does go to court, I would 
suggest a two-dimensional approach. In this approach, it would serve both the state and the 
two communities well if the court process went along with a mediation committee whose 
principal role would be to approach groups such as the youth, elite, politicians and individuals 
to deliberate, convince and encourage them to back down on their entrenched positions so to 
open a new channel through which the eventual court verdict, when reached, can be accepted 
in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and in the knowledge that if total peace would come to 
the area, painful compromises would have to be made. Given my observations on the terrain, 
the need to include the elite, especially the politicians, in any effort to resolve the land dispute 
(because of the enormous leverage they command in the area) is very significant to its 
success. This was equally stressed by Honuorable Benjamin Kumbour, the then majority 
leader in parliament (cf. chapter one).  
The two-dimensional approach has the merit of building confidence and trust among 
the people that there is at least a formal process whose outcome they could accept with little 
resistance if the work of the mediation committee has gone well with the majority of the 
people. The current dysfunctional mediation committee tried to adopt the two-dimensional 
approach in its work, but its failure to tackle the courts’ verdicts became one of the decisive 
factors explaining its failure to resolve the land dispute.  
In June 2014, when I returned to the communities of Nkonya and Alavanyo, it came to 
the fore in my encounter with chiefs and elders of the two communities that central 
government decided that as part of efforts to settle the land conflict between the two 
communities, a military training camp would be established in the disputed area. The military 
would also keep surveillance to ward off any troublesome group that would attempt to foment 
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trouble so as to allow farmers to gain access to their farms, which most of them are now 
unable to access because of attacks and sporadic shootings. In an interview with the 
paramount chief of Alavanyo, Togbega Tsedze Atakora VII, he told me that 
 
“…three different delegations from the military hierarchy have visited the area 
and informed us about government’s intention to establish a military training post 
on the disputed land as part of efforts to resolve the land dispute. The people of 
Alavanyo have no problem with this effort because we cannot continue to fight 
and kill innocent lives because of a parcel of land.”175 
 
In a similar interview with chiefs and elders of Nkonya, they also expressed their 
preparedness to respect the government’s plan provided the Gruner map is used as the 
blueprint for this exercise. The pronouncement of the leadership of both communities to 
cooperate with the government’s plan (however plausible or implausible it might be) is good 
news, but the insistence of the Nkonya that the Gruner map be used is not good news because 
it is simply a tacit way of reemphasizing the court verdicts which have not settled the land 
dispute this far. In fact, in one of its presentations in 2008 before the current dysfunctional 
mediation committee, the Nkonya even quoted a biblical text from Proverbs 22:28 which says 
“never move an old boundary mark that your ancestors established”176 to support their 
enduring insistence on the Gruner boundary as the sole means to solving the dispute.  
If the history of past government interventions in this land dispute are anything to go 
by, the current effort to use military presence will not solve the land dispute, but will rather 
silence dissenting voices and raise old problems/challenges which have not been tackled in 
the past. For instance, would the establishment of the military post be a short or long term 
measure? If it is a short term measure, would the conflict not ‘resurrect’ with grave 
consequences when the military is gone? And if it is a long term measure, would this not put 
undue pressure on the national purse and monies that would have been used to develop the 
two communities? Again, if compensation would have to be paid to families who own the 
disputed land, which boundary would be used in this exercise? Is it the Gruner boundary or 
the Anya boundary (both of which have remained problematic to the resolution of the land 
dispute)? These are very tough and significant questions which must be addressed if peace 
can return to the area. In fact, the biggest challenge for central government is how to convince 
the peoples of both communities to accept this plan as a sustainable and viable option that can 
provide a more enduring resolution of the conflict than previous ones.  
                                                          
175
 Phone interview from Accra, August, 2014 
176
 Other versions of the bible read “do not cross beyond the ancient limits that your fathers have set.” 
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I am of the opinion that if the above issues are not properly handled, any effort 
championed by government, groups or individuals to try and solve the land conflict would 
rather lead to more provocations, resistance and hostilities. This then means that a resolution 
to the politics of resistance and insistence, which is stalling efforts to resolve the Alavanyo- 
Nkonya land dispute, can be transcended when the daunting challenges are confronted and 
when  significant compromises can be made by peoples of the two communities.   
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that a major drawback to solving the Nkonya-
Alavanyo land dispute is the lack of an intercommunity conflict resolution process. The two 
communities could, however, develop a sustainable intercommunity dispute resolution 
mechanism to solve the dispute through third party intervention.  
Moreover, I have demonstrated that the customary practice where disputants in a land 
case would take the matter to chiefs and elders for redress/resolution is fast waning. Today, 
many Ghanaians are more driven to take land disputes to the state courts than to the courts of 
chiefs and elders because they mistrust the latter to offer balanced justice or judgment. But, 
the adjudication of cases in the state legal courts is not also without challenges because in 
many cases it has been demonstrated that court verdicts are not final, but are contingent on 
discourses of negotiation, contestation and the attempt to draw on the past and drag it into the 
present to make one’s case. It is the legacies of the past, especially court rulings such as the 
one involving the Alavanyo and the Nkonya, that make the settlement of land disputes a ‘life 
and death’ matter in most parts of Ghana.  
I have equally observed that a major challenge in the dispensation of justice in land 
cases and other cases in the state courts of Ghana is a certain degree of tension between legal 
pluralism and cultural pluralism. This tension stems from the fact that sometimes judges 
inevitably ‘invent’ judicial customary law which invariably differs substantially from local 
customary norms and practices, and this can affect the legitimacy of court verdicts for 
community members (cf. Ubink and Quan 2008). There are simply too many cultural 
differences and too many legal prescriptions in Ghana that do not allow for a harmonization 
of the different elements of the law as operable in the state. In my opinion, the problem of 
harmonizing customary law and state law, such that legal battles are reduced to the barest 
minimum, is a major factor at the root of the back and forth movement of courts cases 
especially those related to land palavers such as the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute.   
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In my estimation, it is also the contestations, the challenge of unequal power relations, 
the abuse of political leverage by powerful individuals and groups in the Alavanyo-Nkonya 
land dispute, and the alignment of the disputing parties with different political persuasions 
that have been feeding the politics of resistance and insistence that defines the conflict today 
and makes the dispute insoluble.  
These trajectories, in my view, constitute deep-seated obstacles to solving the land 
conflict which today is not just about the ‘truth’ of where the demarcating boundary between 
the two communities lies, but more about transforming the communities of Alavanyo and 
Nkonya from conflict endemic communities to life-giving peaceful communities, i.e., 
communities willing to live in mutual respect, dignity and to appreciate or celebrate their 
differences. It is this challenge of transforming the two communities that makes any effort at 
resolving the dispute a complex and demanding project.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
This study has tried to unravel the complexities and challenges embedded in the evolution and 
dynamics of the Nkonya-Alavanyo land dispute, and it has attempted to bring to the fore the 
human, social, economic and political as well as cultural narratives responsible for its 
persistence.  
While the Nkonya-Alavanyo land conflict might have started as a dispute over a 
German colonial boundary drawn in 1913, this study has demonstrated that today, the major 
drivers of the dispute are clearly not about this boundary alone, but about deep-seated issues 
concerning ethnicity, land security, local and state politics, court verdicts, economic interests 
in commercial trees, as well as autochthony and first comer narratives. The study emphasises 
that it is however, the power and agency of powerful actors such as traditional authorities, the 
elite, youth and timber contractors to politicise and instrumentalise the above drivers/triggers 
in different social and political arenas that is largely responsible for the continuous existence 
of the dispute and why it has remained insoluble till date.  
In Ghana, the phenomenon of the use of guns by youth groups, the overt or covert 
meddling in land matters by the elite and traditional authorities, and their proclivity to collude 
and exploit forest resources for personal or collective interests is not peculiar to what is 
happening in Alavanyo and Nkonya, but is a disturbing practice common in other parts of 
Ghana as well, as the work of Amanor (1999) and Berry (2001) have amply illustrated. In the 
long run, it is the intentionality i.e. the “highly conscious plots and plans and schemes; 
somewhat more nebulous aims, goals, and ideals; and finally desires, wants, and needs” 
(Ortner, 2006:134) of the elite, the traditional authorities and the youth in Nkonya and 
Alavanyo that will continue to define and shape the actualities of the land dispute for a long 
time to come.  
Additionally, this study has strongly emphasised that a significant narrative for 
understanding why land is indispensable to the existence and identity of the Alavanyo and the 
Nkonya is their cosmic worldview, but simultaneously, the illegal exploitation of the forest 
resources on the land also constitutes a significant factor for appreciating why the conflict is 
protracting. Nkonya and Alavanyo cosmology expresses a spiritual-human template that 
defines, on the one hand, their relations with celestial beings (Supreme Being, deities, and the 
ancestors) and with one another, and on other hand, their relations with the land and with their 
neighbours. It is through the dynamic synchrony between these two sets of relations that 
fullness of life is attained and re-attained, and how the land is sustained for the current and 
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future generations. Thus, for the two communities, land is everything because it is the basis of 
individual and collective identity and the source of their history, memory and 
intergenerational livelihood (cf. Kludze, 1973).  
Moreover, the significance of good social relations between the two communities in 
the overall effort to resolve the dispute is a pertinent matter that has also been addressed in 
this work. If the Alavanyo and the Nkonya have existed side by side in peace for centuries 
until the land disputes emerged to weaken the relations between them, it would again take 
good social interactive relations to anchor lasting peace in the two communities. I have argued 
that this can be achieved when the two groups begin to de-emphasise their differences and de-
instrumentalise autochthony and first comer claims and the construction of social barriers. In 
this way, they can tap on the socio-economic, political and cultural commonalities between 
them for a sustainable resolution of the land conflict.  
Furthermore, this study has also demonstrated that while there is a push by some 
locals, state institutions and global actors such as the UNDP and important community 
members in the diaspora to end the conflict, the actualization of this effort is still a long way 
off because of the activities of the major actors mentioned above. However, ways to combat 
the activities of these actors and enrobe them as ‘strategic’ partners in the resolution of the 
dispute have equally been stressed. Thus, while there is no easy trajectory for resolving this 
particular land dispute because of its multi-layered character, it does not mean that it cannot 
be resolved. On this score, I argue that the prospects of resolving the Nkonya-Alavanyo land 
dispute lies not in the effort of mediation committees, groups or individuals, but in an 
approach that should involve the state, conflict resolution experts and social scientists who 
should factor in worldviews of the two communities about land, as well as anxieties and 
activities of youth, traditional authorities, and elite groups. Unquestionably, this process will 
require enormous time, energy, money, great skill and unwavering commitment of local and 
other stakeholders, as well as from the central government whose mandate it is to help end 
conflicts so as to promote justice, peace, and co-belonging among the multiethnic citizens 
across the country. 
In the larger picture, if the land dispute is not completely resolved, the customary 
expression or the fundamental belief among the Nkonya and the Alavanyo that “we don’t live 
on the land’ but ‘relate with the land’, will not receive its full meaning, but would remain as 
elusive as ever. 
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Dans de nombreuses parties de l'Afrique, pas  moins le Ghana; les conflits sociaux, politiques, 
religieux et des chefferies sont visibles partout (Tsikata et Seini, 2004, Ghanaian Times, 
10/06/97 et 29/1/98), mais, il semble que les litiges fonciers sont de loin les plus répandus, les 
plus violents et persistantes, surtout quand ils sont liés à la chefferie et ã des problèmes  
ethniques (cf. Berry, 2001; Crook, 2005; et Tonah, 2012). Ce fait est explicable du point que 
dans la plupart des sociétés ghanéennes, la terre est non seulement une ressource économique, 
mais, surtout, elle est aussi perçue comme la base de la cosmologie, de la puissance, de 
l'histoire, de l'identité, du contrôle territorial et du fondement même de la vie. Ce sont les 
identités collective et individuelles,  les représentations symboliques qui, quand ils sont 
contestées par les communautés, les familles ou les individus, ont tendance à créer beaucoup 
d'hostilité et de violence. 
Au Ghana, la querelle de terre qui a duré  cent ans (qui est toujours en cours) entre le 
Nkonya et le litige foncier  Alavanyo, constitue l'un des conflits fonciers les plus élastiques 
qui a jusqu'ici défié toutes les tentatives de résolution. Bien que ce litige foncier particulier est 
généralement perçu comme une querelle frontalière, dans le monde réel, ce sont le 
«maraudage» de bois, les verdicts des tribunaux, la politique ethnique, les réinventions de 
l'histoire, et les activités des groupes «d'élite» parmi d'autres facteurs qui constituent les 
principaux moteurs de la querelle. 
Cette étude fait valoir qu'il est cependant, la puissance et l'agence des autorités 
traditionnelles, des groupes d'élite, et des groupes de jeunes d'instrumentaliser et de politiser 
ces pilotes qui sont largement responsable de l'insolubilité du litige foncier. 
Cette étude examine de façon critique pourquoi les interventions par les fonctionnaires 
coloniaux, les autorités traditionnelles et les comités de médiation depuis les années 1970 à ce 
jour ont échoué. En outre, l'étude cherche à savoir pourquoi au fil des ans, l'alignement et le 
réalignement de Alavanyo et de Nkonya aux acteurs étatiques différentes, les partis politiques 
et leurs voisins ethniques dans l'effort d'avoir des questions réglées entre elles sont restées 
infructueuses. 
La thèse est divisé en six chapitres. Le premier chapitre offre une dimension brève, 
mais compréhensive de la dynamique du conflit, le cadre conceptuel, la méthodologie utilisée 
pour la collecte de données et de la documentation pertinente sur les réformes agraires et des 
systèmes de tenure à travers l'Afrique, et le Ghana en particulier. 
Le deuxième chapitre décrit brièvement le contexte politique et socio-économique des deux 
communautés, et dénoue l'histoire et les défis intergénérationnels dans lequel le conflit est 
enveloppé à travers la lentille de la période coloniale et postcoloniale, ainsi que le présent. En 
outre, le chapitre analyse la vision du monde cosmique de Nkonya et de Alavanyo, et 
comment ils entretiennent des relations avec la terre,  comment ils font face aux êtres célestes 
et aux voisins et aux défis quotidiens du conflit foncier. 
  
 
Les principaux acteurs (autorités traditionnelles, les jeunes, l’élite et les femmes) dans 
le conflit sont traités dans le troisième chapitre. Au Ghana, les autorités traditionnelles sont 
encore très respecté, et ils exercent un pouvoir considérable dans le maintien du contrôle 
social, de la loi et de l'ordre dans leurs communautés (cf. Odotei et Awedoba, 2006). Mais, 
aujourd'hui, dans Alavanyo et Nkonya, les autorités traditionnelles ont perdu l'influence 
politique pour prendre des mesures décisives sur le litige foncier. Pourquoi en est ainsi, est 
bien articulé dans cette partie. Dans ce chapitre, je soutiens que le pouvoir et l'organisme de 
différentes catégories de jeunes, (Sohe) dans le conflit sont ambivalents. Grâce aux opinions 
locales sur les jeunes, et les perspectives théoriques récentes sur les jeunes par Honwana et De 
Boeck, (2005); Honwana, (2012); Stephens, (2005); Van Dijk et al (2011), Abbink & Kessel, 
(eds) (2005), entre autres, je démontre comment cette ambivalence se joue. En général, la 
capacité de la jeunesse pour aider à mettre fin à la querelle territoriale est affaiblie par 
l'implication de certains dans le commerce du bois illégal et la tendance de certains membres 
de la direction à exploiter leur position pour des gains personnels, entre autres facteurs. Aussi, 
dans cette section, l'agence de l'élite et de la façon dont ils influencent les événements 
quotidiens de la querelle territoriale est traitée. En outre, cette partie jette un regard critique 
sur la position et le rôle des femmes et la façon dont ils s’élèvent au-dessus des fardeaux du 
litige foncier pour occasionner le changement et modifier des événements sociaux et 
économiques dans les communautés. 
Dans le quatrième chapitre, les migrations et l'identité des récits, et comment le 
Alavanyo et Nkonya venus à vivre côte à côte sont examinés. Dans l'appartenance de Nkonya 
et Alavanyo un à la lignée, le clan et la famille sont vitales pour l'accès à l'utilisation et la 
propriété des terres. Cette coutume est cependant pas une question avant droite, que les droits 
fonciers et les systèmes fonciers sont également sous-tendue par genre et les relations de 
pouvoir entre hommes et femmes dans une société dominée par les hommes. Comment les 
deux communautés surmontent ces défis associés à l'appropriation  des terres et les questions 
de subsistance engendrées par la prolongation du conflit des terres sont examinées de près. 
Le cinquième chapitre examine de manière critique comment revendications 
autochtones, premiers récits de coin, et les frontières sociales sont construits, soutenue et 
instrumentalisée dans le contexte du conflit des terres Alavanyo-Nkonya. Le chapitre fait 
valoir que l'insolubilité des litiges fonciers repose aussi sur les défis de l'échange social et 
culturel et d'appartenance entre les deux groupes qui sont fondamentalement le résultat de la 
politisation autochtone et les différences illustrées dans l'utilisation de marqueurs. Comment 
ces marqueurs sont utilisés pour faire avancer les revendications autochtones afin de posséder 
le terrain litigieux et comment les deux groupes engagés dans la querelle de terre,  peuvent 
atténuer leurs différences et trouver des terrains d’entente  pour  un échange social, culturel et 
mutuelle qui peuvent ensuite promouvoir la coexistence pacifique entre eux.  
Dans le sixième chapitre, j’’analyse attentivement les diverses tentatives 
infructueuses – les verdicts judiciaires, les efforts coloniaux, les mécanismes de résolution des 
conflits locaux, et  les commissions de médiation parrainées par l'État - qui ont été utilisées 
depuis la période coloniale jusqu'à aujourd'hui pour résoudre cette querelle. Cette étude 
démontre  que la résolution du litige foncier Nkonya-Alavanyo ne repose pas dans le travail 
de médiation d'une seule institution ou des individus, mais dans une approche globale qui 
devrait impliquer des médiateurs formés, des experts en résolution de conflits, l'état, les 
habitants et autres acteurs significatifs qui devraient tenir compte, dans la vision du monde 
des deux communautés à propos  de la terre, ainsi que les angoisses et les activités de la 
jeunesse, les femmes, les autorités traditionnelles, et des groupes d'élite. 
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In vele delen van Afrika, niet in het minst in Ghana, zijn sociale, politieke, religieuze en 
leiderschapsconflicten talrijk aanwezig (Tsikata en Seini, 2004, Ghanaian Times, 6/10/97 en 
29/1/98). Het lijkt er echter op dat landconflicten veruit de meest diepgaande, gewelddadige 
en hardnekkige twisten zijn, vooral wanneer ze gelinkt zijn aan leiderschap en etnische 
kwesties (cf. Berry, 2001; Crook, 2005; en Tonah, 2012). Dit kan verklaard worden door het 
feit dat grond in de meeste Ghanese samenlevingen niet alleen een economische rijkdom is, 
maar dat het ook gezien wordt als de basis van kosmologie, macht, geschiedenis, identiteit, 
territoriale controle en de fundamenten van het leven zelf. Dit zijn invloedrijke collectieve en 
individuele representaties van identiteit en symboliek, die, wanneer ze bevraagd worden door 
gemeenschappen, families of individuen, veel vijandigheid en geweld schijnen te 
veroorzaken. 
In Ghana is het honderd jaar oude landconflict (dat nog steeds gaande is) tussen de 
Nkonya en de Alavanyo, één van de meest hardnekkige landconflicten dat tot op vandaag alle 
pogingen tot oplossing heeft weerstaan. Hoewel dit specifieke landdispuut doorgaans gezien 
wordt als een grensconflict, zijn in werkelijkheid onder andere het ‘plunderen’ van hout, 
rechtsuitspraken, etnische politiek, het heruitvinden van de geschiedenis, en de activiteiten 
van ‘elites’ de grootste drijfveren van de discussie. 
Hoewel, deze studie stelt dat het de macht en ‘agency’ van traditionele autoriteiten, 
elitegroepen, en jongerenbewegingen zijn, met het instrumentaliseren en politiseren van deze 
drijfveren tot gevolg, die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de onoplosbaarheid van het landconflict. 
Deze studie onderzoekt op een kritische manier waarom tussenkomsten door koloniale 
beambten, traditionele autoriteiten en bemiddelingscomités sinds de jaren 1970 tot op 
vandaag mislukt zijn. Deze studie probeert ook te belichten waarom de Alavanyo en de 
Nkonya zich door de jaren heen gebonden hebben aan verschillende overheidsactoren, 
politieke partijen en hun etnische buren, in de poging om tot een overeenkomst te komen, en 
waarom dit mislukt is. 
Het proefschrift is opgedeeld in zes hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk biedt een 
korte maar verhelderende dimensie van de dynamieken van het conflict, het conceptuele 
kader, de gebruikte methodologie voor de dataverzameling en de relevante literatuur over 
landhervorming en grondbezittingssystemen in Afrika, en specifiek in Ghana. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk schetst kort de politieke en socio-economische achtergrond van 
de twee samenlevingen, en ontrafelt de geschiedenis en intergenerationele uitdagingen waarop 
het conflict steunt, in het licht van de koloniale en postkoloniale periode, tot op vandaag. Het 
hoofdstuk analyseert ook het kosmische wereldbeeld van de Nkonya en de Alavanyo en hoe 
zij in relatie staan tot het land, hoe zij omgaan met hemelse entiteiten en buren, en hoe zij 
omgaan met de dagelijkse uitdagingen van het landconflict. 
  
 
De hoofdactoren (traditionele autoriteiten, jeugd, de elite en vrouwen) in het conflict 
worden behandeld in het derde hoofdstuk. In Ghana worden traditionele autoriteiten nog 
steeds erg gerespecteerd, en zij dwingen aanzienlijke autoriteit af in het behouden van sociale 
controle, recht en orde in hun gemeenschappen (cf. Odotei en Awedoba, 2006). Maar 
vandaag, bij de Alavanyo and Nkonya, hebben traditionele autoriteiten hun politieke macht 
om beslissende actie te ondernemen in het landconflict verloren. Waarom dit zo is, wordt 
uitgediept in dit hoofdstuk. In dit hoofdstuk argumenteer ik dat de macht en bemiddeling van 
verschillende categorieën van jongeren, (sohe) in dit conflict ambivalent zijn. Via lokale 
perspectieven van jongeren, en recente theoretische perspectieven op jeugd door onder andere 
Honwana en De Boeck, (2005); Honwana, (2012); Stephens, (2005); Van Dijk et al (2011), 
Abbink & Kessel, (eds) (2005), zal ik demonstreren hoe deze ambivalentie tot uiting komt. In 
het algemeen wordt de capaciteit van de jeugd om het landconflict te helpen beëindigen 
verzwakt, onder andere door de betrokkenheid van sommigen in de illegale houthandel en de 
neiging van sommige leidersfiguren om hun positie uit te buiten voor persoonlijke belangen. 
In dit onderdeel wordt ook de ‘agency’ van de elite behandeld, en hoe zij de dagelijkse 
gebeurtenissen in het landconflict beïnvloeden. Tot slot onderzoekt dit hoofdstuk de rol en 
positie van vrouwen en hoe zij boven de lasten van het landconflict uitrijzen om verandering 
teweeg te brengen en sociale en economische gebeurtenissen in de samenlevingen 
transformeren. 
In het vierde hoofdstuk worden de migratie- en identiteitsverhalen belicht, alsook hoe 
de Alavanyo en de Nkonya naast elkaar kwamen te leven. In Nkonya en Alavanyo zijn het 
behoren tot geslacht, clan en familie essentieel om toegang tot landgebruik en –eigendom te 
krijgen. Niettegenstaande is dit gebruik geen rechtlijnige zaak, aangezien grondrechten en 
eigendomssystemen ook ondersteunt zijn door gender- en machtsrelaties tussen mannen en 
vrouwen in een samenleving gedomineerd door mannen. Hoe deze twee samenlevingen 
uitdagingen overkomen, die aan toe-eigening van grond en kwesties van levensonderhoud 
gerelateerd zijn en veroorzaakt worden door de voortzetting van het conflict, wordt ook in 
detail belicht. 
Het vijfde hoofdstuk onderzoekt kritisch hoe aanspraken op autochtoniteit, 
‘eerstkomer’-vertellingen en sociale grenzen geconstrueerd, in stand gehouden en 
geïnstrumentaliseerd worden in de context van het Alavanyo-Nkonya landconflict. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt geopperd dat de onoplosbaarheid van de landconflicten ook rust op 
uitdagingen van sociale en culturele uitwisseling en toebehoren tussen twee groepen die het 
fundamentele resultaat zijn van de politisering van autochtoniteit en verschillen, bijvoorbeeld 
in het gebruik van merktekens. Er wordt onderzocht hoe deze merktekens gebruikt worden 
om eisen van autochtoniteit naar voor te schuiven met de bedoeling de betwiste grond te 
bezitten en hoe de twee twistende groepen hun verschillen kunnen minimaliseren en nieuwe 
fundamenten van gemeenschappelijke sociale en culturele uitwisseling kunnen ontwikkelen 
die dan vredevolle samenleving kan faciliteren tussen beide. 
In het zesde hoofdstuk analyseer ik zorgvuldig de verschillende gefaalde pogingen – 
rechtsuitspraken, koloniale pogingen, lokale mechanismen van conflictoplossing en door de 
overheid gesteunde bemiddelingscomités – die gebruikt werden van de koloniale periode tot 
op vandaag om het dispuut op te lossen. Deze studie stelt dat de oplossing van het Nkonya-
Alavanyo landconflict niet in het bemiddelingswerk van één enkele instelling of individu ligt, 
maar in een bredere benadering die samenwerking vergt van getrainde bemiddelaars, 
conflictbemiddelingsexperts, de overheid, lokale bevolking en andere belangrijke actoren die 
moeten rekening houden met de wereldbeelden van de twee samenlevingen over grond, 
alsook de angsten en activiteiten van jongeren, vrouwen, traditionele autoriteiten en 
elitegroepen. 
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